7 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morgan v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2018VRP (Dec. 8, 2009) at 226; see also Morgan , 504 U.S. at 750 n.5, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (Scalia, J., dissenting). ¶92 On December 22, 2009, the trial court excluded Juror 302 on the ground that her anti-death-penalty sentiments rendered her ineligible under the Witt standard. 2018VRP (Dec. 8, 2009) at 226; see also Morgan , 504 U.S. at 750 n.5, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (Scalia, J., dissenting). ¶92 On December 22, 2009, the trial court excluded Juror 302 on the ground that her anti-death-penalty sentiments rendered her ineligible under the Witt standard. | 2 | 2 |
Lonnie Joe Dutton v. John N. Brown and the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiaegreen2 sentences2007Excusing a juror who simply expresses conscientious objections to the death penalty violates the Witt test as “[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 814 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (“Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law.”). ¶13 2007Excusing a juror who simply expresses conscientious objections to the death penalty violates the Witt test as “[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 814 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (“Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law.”). ¶13 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gregoryred2 sentences2007Excusing a juror who simply expresses conscientious objections to the death penalty violates the Witt test as “[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 814 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (“Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law.”). ¶13 2007Excusing a juror who simply expresses conscientious objections to the death penalty violates the Witt test as “[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 814 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (“Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law.”). ¶13 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gregoryred2 sentences2007Excusing a juror who simply expresses conscientious objections to the death penalty violates the Witt test as “[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 814 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (“Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law.”). ¶13 2007Excusing a juror who simply expresses conscientious objections to the death penalty violates the Witt test as “[t]he crucial inquiry is whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath, notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 814 , 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (“Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law.”). ¶13 | 2 | 2 |
Uttecht v. Browngreen2 sentences2007Indeed the Uttecht Court stressed Witt’s instruction that “reviewing courts are to accord deference to the trial court,” stating, “[t]he judgment as to ‘whether a veniremen [sic] is biased ... is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ” Id. at 2223 (second alteration in original) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 428 ). 2007Indeed the Uttecht Court stressed Witt's instruction that *407 "reviewing courts are to accord deference to the trial court," stating, "[t]he judgment as to `whether a veniremen [sic] is biased . . . is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" Id. at 2223 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 428 , 105 S.Ct. 844 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences2007Indeed the Uttecht Court stressed Witt’s instruction that “reviewing courts are to accord deference to the trial court,” stating, “[t]he judgment as to ‘whether a veniremen [sic] is biased ... is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ” Id. at 2223 (second alteration in original) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 428 ). 2007Indeed the Uttecht Court stressed Witt's instruction that *407 "reviewing courts are to accord deference to the trial court," stating, "[t]he judgment as to `whether a veniremen [sic] is biased . . . is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" Id. at 2223 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 428 , 105 S.Ct. 844 ). | 4 | 2006–2007 |
Lockhart v. McCree
green
2 sentences2006Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 , 106 S. Ct. 1758 , 90 L. 2006Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 , 106 S. Ct. 1758 , 90 L. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Humphries v. Riveland
green
2 sentences2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). 2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Olsen v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2012Not a Claim against the Decedent ¶15 Smith v. McLaren, 58 Wn.2d 907, 909 , 365 P.2d 331 (1961), and Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wn.2d 862, 865-66 , 259 P.2d 418 (1953), establish that Witt’s claim is not a “claim against the decedent” subject to the nonclaim statute based on Witt’s alleged failure to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1). 2012Not a Claim against the Decedent ¶15 Smith v. McLaren, 58 Wn.2d 907, 909 , 365 P.2d 331 (1961), and Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wn.2d 862, 865-66 , 259 P.2d 418 (1953), establish that Witt’s claim is not a “claim against the decedent” subject to the nonclaim statute based on Witt’s alleged failure to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Vasquez v. Hawthorne
green
1 sentence2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Estate of Thornton
green
2 sentences2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). 2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Smith v. McLaren
green
2 sentences2012Not a Claim against the Decedent ¶15 Smith v. McLaren, 58 Wn.2d 907, 909 , 365 P.2d 331 (1961), and Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wn.2d 862, 865-66 , 259 P.2d 418 (1953), establish that Witt’s claim is not a “claim against the decedent” subject to the nonclaim statute based on Witt’s alleged failure to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1). 2012Not a Claim against the Decedent ¶15 Smith v. McLaren, 58 Wn.2d 907, 909 , 365 P.2d 331 (1961), and Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wn.2d 862, 865-66 , 259 P.2d 418 (1953), establish that Witt’s claim is not a “claim against the decedent” subject to the nonclaim statute based on Witt’s alleged failure to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Compton v. Westerman
green
2 sentences2012The Estate does not show that the mere fact some similar claims have been filed as creditor claims and that such filings were not challenged establishes that Witt’s claim was a “claim against the decedent.” RCW 11.40.010. *221 ¶20 Citing Compton v. Westerman, 150 Wash. 391 , 273 P. 524 (1928), the Estate next argues that Witt’s claim is a “generalized claim against all assets” and not a claim against specific property. 2012The Estate does not show that the mere fact some similar claims have been filed as creditor claims and that such filings were not challenged establishes that Witt’s claim was a “claim against the decedent.” RCW 11.40.010. *221 ¶20 Citing Compton v. Westerman, 150 Wash. 391 , 273 P. 524 (1928), the Estate next argues that Witt’s claim is a “generalized claim against all assets” and not a claim against specific property. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re the Marriage of Lindsey
green
2 sentences2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). 2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Latham v. Hennessey
green
2 sentences2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). 2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Vasquez v. Hawthorne
green
1 sentence2012Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103 , 33 P.3d 735 (2001)), 20 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn.2d 550 , 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), overruled in part by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 , 678 P.2d 328 (1984); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn.2d 72 , 499 P.2d 864 (1972), overruled in part by Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299 ; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn.2d 376 , 407 P.2d 967 (1965)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.