high end standard in Washington

2023The court imposed a concurrent indeterminate sentence at the high end of the standard sentencing range of 280 months to life. 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L.

2023The court imposed a concurrent indeterminate sentence at the high end of the standard sentencing range of 280 months to life. 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L.

2020Carreno Maldonado, 135 Wn.

2015App. 313, 320 , 165 P.3d 409 (2007). 13 State v. Carreno-Maldonado. 135 Wn.

2026Williams, 103 Wn.

2020In State v. Williams, the State agreed to recommend a sentence at the high end of the standard range. 103 Wn.

2026Inda requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range of no more than seven years under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e) 2 and State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017).

2023The sentencing court found that there were not “substantial and compelling reasons that would justify an exceptional sentence in this particular case” and imposed a sentence of 280 months of total confinement, determining that “the sentence at the high end of the standard range is the appropriate sentence.” Tyson appealed the sentencing court’s ruling to this court and, after his appeal was denied, our mandate issued in October 2008. 2 No. 78007-7-I/3 More than nine years later, in November 2017, Tyson filed a motion seeking relief from the judgment and sentence, relying on the decision in Hou

2023Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 312-13 .

2022Although the sentencing court here, as in Ali, was unaware that it had complete discretion to disregard an otherwise mandatory firearm enhancement, it rejected Moore’s contention that any sentence other than a high end standard range sentence was appropriate because of the “senseless” nature of the crime and the impact it had on the victim’s family. -8- No. 81644-6-I/9 Moore’s case is more analogous to Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 310 .

2020App. 312, 315 , 922 P.2d 100 (1996) (holding that defendant’s objections to court’s modification of his sentence were not moot, even though he had served the entire modified sentence, because the modifications could cause a future sentencing court to impose additional demanding conditions of community placement or sway a court to impose the high end of the standard range).

2012App. 312, 315 , 922 P.2d 100 (1996) (resentencing appropriate even though defendant had served entire modified sentence because modifications could cause a future sentencing court to impose additional demanding conditions of community placement or sway a court to impose the high end of the standard range).

2019The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”6 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, “civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”7 This includes a sentencing hearing.8 ~ Ch. 9.94 RCW. ~ RCW 9.94A.585(1). ~ State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 6 U.S. CONST. amend.

2018The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."5 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, "civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."6 This includes a sentencing hearing.7 2 Ch. 9.94 RCW. 3 RCW 9.94A.585(1). 4 State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 5 U.S. CONST. amend.

2019The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”6 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, “civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”7 This includes a sentencing hearing.8 ~ Ch. 9.94 RCW. ~ RCW 9.94A.585(1). ~ State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 6 U.S. CONST. amend.

2018The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."5 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, "civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."6 This includes a sentencing hearing.7 2 Ch. 9.94 RCW. 3 RCW 9.94A.585(1). 4 State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 5 U.S. CONST. amend.

2013We first note that a trial judge is "under no obligation to explain [her] reason for imposing a sentence at the high end of the standard range." State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 714 , 854 P.2d 1042 (1993).

2013We first note that a trial judge is "under no obligation to explain [her] reason for imposing a sentence at the high end of the standard range." State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 714 , 854 P.2d 1042 (1993).

2010In support, Swenson argues that the rationale in State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wash.2d 30 , 162 P.3d 389 (2007) supports resentencing in front of another judge.

2010In support, Swenson argues that the rationale in State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30 , 162 P.3d 389 (2007) supports resentencing in front of another judge.

2010In support, Swenson argues that the rationale in State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wash.2d 30 , 162 P.3d 389 (2007) supports resentencing in front of another judge.

2010In support, Swenson argues that the rationale in State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30 , 162 P.3d 389 (2007) supports resentencing in front of another judge.

2007This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d 774, 785 , 83 P.3d 410 (2004), where the defendant argued that a charge of possession with intent to deliver "meth" was deficient because the shorthand could be confused with drugs other than methamphetamine, the possession of which might carry a lesser sentence. [6] The court agreed, holding that charging possession of "methamphetamine" (rather than "meth" or some other drug) in the amended information was crucial because the presence of that specific drug increased the statutory maximum sentence.

2007This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 785 , 83 P.3d 410 (2004), where the defendant argued that a charge of possession with intent to deliver “meth” was deficient because the shorthand could be confused with drugs other than methamphetamine, the possession of which might carry a lesser sentence. 6 The court agreed, holding that charging possession of “methamphetamine” (rather than “meth” or some other drug) in the amended information was crucial because the presence of that specific drug increased the statutory maximum sentence.

2007This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d 774, 785 , 83 P.3d 410 (2004), where the defendant argued that a charge of possession with intent to deliver "meth" was deficient because the shorthand could be confused with drugs other than methamphetamine, the possession of which might carry a lesser sentence. [6] The court agreed, holding that charging possession of "methamphetamine" (rather than "meth" or some other drug) in the amended information was crucial because the presence of that specific drug increased the statutory maximum sentence.

2007This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 785 , 83 P.3d 410 (2004), where the defendant argued that a charge of possession with intent to deliver “meth” was deficient because the shorthand could be confused with drugs other than methamphetamine, the possession of which might carry a lesser sentence. 6 The court agreed, holding that charging possession of “methamphetamine” (rather than “meth” or some other drug) in the amended information was crucial because the presence of that specific drug increased the statutory maximum sentence.

2026Sunich reasoned that the maximum penal sentence “necessarily would have been determined according to the SRA upon conviction, so the high end of the standard range presumptively represents the maximum possible sentence.” Id.

2024App. 787, 795-96 , 205 P.3d 944 (2009) (affirming defendant’s sentence under RCW 9A.20.021 even though it exceeded the high end of the standard range under the SRA); see also State v. Bruch, 182 Wn.2d 854, 866 , 346 P.3d 724 (2015) (“Where the SRA contains an obligation to sentence within the ‘statutory maximum,’ it refers to the maximum sentences set forth in RCW 9A.20.021.”).

2024Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d at 864 .

2023The trial court imposed the high end of the standard range on each count and sentenced Martin to 334 total months of confinement. 2 In March 2022, Martin filed a motion under CrR 7.8(b) to correct his offender score and to be resentenced based on our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021). 3 Martin’s offender score at 2 The sentences on counts 1-3 were ordered to run consecutively for a total of 334 months, while count 4 was ordered concurrent to them pursuant to RCW 9.94A.589(b). 3 In Blake, the court held that Washington’s drug possession statute, form

2023The trial court imposed the high end of the standard range on each count and sentenced Martin to 334 total months of confinement. 2 In March 2022, Martin filed a motion under CrR 7.8(b) to correct his offender score and to be resentenced based on our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021). 3 Martin’s offender score at 2 The sentences on counts 1-3 were ordered to run consecutively for a total of 334 months, while count 4 was ordered concurrent to them pursuant to RCW 9.94A.589(b). 3 In Blake, the court held that Washington’s drug possession statute, form

2021State v. Toney, 149 Wn.

2020App. 231, 233 , 11 P.3d 878 (2000).

2020Subsequent to Parker’s original sentencing after trial, the Supreme Court decided State v. O’Dell, which held that in particular cases, the youth of the offender at the time of the crime could be a substantial and compelling factor to justify a sentence below the standard range. 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2020Subsequent to Parker’s original sentencing after trial, the Supreme Court decided State v. O’Dell, which held that in particular cases, the youth of the offender at the time of the crime could be a substantial and compelling factor to justify a sentence below the standard range. 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2020The State argued that youth was not a factor that would justify an exceptional sentence, citing State v. Ha’mim, 82 Wn.

2020The court acknowledged the science 25 See State v. Knight, 176 Wn.

2019State v. Lake, 107 Wn.