6 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LaPierre v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See LaPierre, 734 P.2d at 1000 ; Kirby, 649 P.2d at 968 . 1988See LaPierre v. State, 734 P.2d 997 , 1001-02 n. 3 (Alaska App.1987). | 2 | 2 |
Kirby v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See LaPierre, 734 P.2d at 1000 ; Kirby, 649 P.2d at 968 . 1987See also Kirby v. State, 649 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska App.1982). | 1 | 2 |
LaLonde v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Thus, Alaska's early decisions on this topic most notably, the supreme court's decision in LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1980)were decided under the common law. [16] Now, however, the heat of passion defense is codified in AS 11.41.115. 2003We then held that, because the legislature "inten[ded] to codify the traditional doctrine of heat of passion" in AS 11.41.115, this same common-law doctrine concerning a defendant's reasonable but mistaken belief would continue to apply to cases governed by our heat of passion statute. [27] See Perkins & Boyce, p. 97. [28] 614 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1980). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2003This means that we are no longer at liberty to define the defense as we think bestno longer free to exercise our common-law authority to "adopt the rule [of law] that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy". [17] Instead, questions regarding the definition and scope of this defense must be answered by ascertaining the legislature's intent through statutory construction. [18] In Martin v. State, 664 P.2d 612, 616-17 (Alaska App.1983), this Court examined the origins of AS 11.41.115 and concluded that our legislature's purpose was, in large part, to codify the common-law d 2003This means that we are no longer at liberty to define the defense as we think best-no longer free to exercise our common-law authority to "adopt the rule [of law] that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy". 17 Instead, questions regarding the definition and scope of this defense must be answered by ascertaining the legislature's intent through statutory construction. 18 In Martin v. State, 664 P.2d 612, 616-17 (Alaska App.1983), this Court examined the origins of AS 11.41.1115 and concluded that our legislature's purpose was, in large part, to codify the common-law defe | 1 | 1 |
Hai Hai Vuong v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (rejecting, under former Tex. Penal Code § 19.04(a), (b)— which required "provocation by the individual killed" — a heat of passion claim asserted by a defendant who had purportedly been threatened by gang members, since the court found "no indication in the record that Appellant believed, at the time of the murders, that either victim was a gang member[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Hawley v. Stategreen1 sentence1984See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Hawley v. State, 614 P.2d 1349, 1358 (Alaska 1980). | 1 | 1 |
McMahan v. Stategreen1 sentence1984See McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1980); Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979); Nashoalook v. State, 663 P.2d 975 , 979 n. 2 (Alaska App. 1983). [2] A.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) characterizes as non-hearsay a statement offered against a defendant that is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party [made] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." [3] The jury was instructed in conformity with former AS 11.81.335 that "[a] person may not use deadly force ... if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of so doing by retr | 1 | 1 |
Bruton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1984See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Hawley v. State, 614 P.2d 1349, 1358 (Alaska 1980). 1984See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Hawley v. State, 614 P.2d 1349, 1358 (Alaska 1980). | 1 | 1 |
Quick v. Stategreen1 sentence1984See McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1980); Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979); Nashoalook v. State, 663 P.2d 975 , 979 n. 2 (Alaska App. 1983). [2] A.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) characterizes as non-hearsay a statement offered against a defendant that is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party [made] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." [3] The jury was instructed in conformity with former AS 11.81.335 that "[a] person may not use deadly force ... if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of so doing by retr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dandova v. State
green
1 sentence2012We discussed this "series of provocations" theory in Dandova, 72 P.3d at 334-37 , but the facts of Dandove did not require us to decide whether Alaska law recognizes this broader approach to the heat of passion defense. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Berry
green
2 sentences2003Id. 134 Cal.Rptr. 415 , 556 P.2d at 780-81 . 2003Id. 134 Cal.Rptr. 415 , 556 P.2d at 780-81 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Foster v. State
green
2 sentences1996Cf. Foster v. State, 264 Ga. 369 , 444 S.E.2d 296 , 296 n. 2 (1994) (noting with apparent approval Model Penal Code commentary describing traditional view that provocation must arise from an action of the victim "or at least that the defendant [must] reasonably so believe[].”). 6 . 1996Cf. Foster v. State, 264 Ga. 369 , 444 S.E.2d 296 , 296 n. 2 (1994) (noting with apparent approval Model Penal Code commentary describing traditional view that provocation must arise from an action of the victim "or at least that the defendant [must] reasonably so believe[].”). 6 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Xi Van Ha v. State
green
1 sentence1996Under AS 11.41.115(f)(2), the defendant’s passion must be caused by “conduct ... sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation[, other than a person who is intoxicated,] under the circumstances as the defendant reasonably believed them to be.” Moreover, under AS 11.41.115(a), the defendant’s use of force must occur “before there [was] a reasonable opportunity for the [defendant’s] passion to cool.” Ha, 892 P.2d at 197 . 4 To place the heat of passion defense in issue, a defendant need only produce “some evidence” to support the defense. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Blackhurst v. State
green
1 sentence1996Either party may request the trial court to instruct the jury on the defense when some evidence supports it, see Blackhurst, 721 P.2d at 647 ; upon request, the trial court must ordinarily give the jury an appropriate heat of passion instruction. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Nashoalook v. State
green
1 sentence1984See McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1980); Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979); Nashoalook v. State, 663 P.2d 975 , 979 n. 2 (Alaska App. 1983). [2] A.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) characterizes as non-hearsay a statement offered against a defendant that is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party [made] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." [3] The jury was instructed in conformity with former AS 11.81.335 that "[a] person may not use deadly force ... if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself and others avoid the necessity of so doing by retr | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.