Poole motion in Alabama

2013It does not support the belief that MLC accepted full — or even primary — responsibility for the manufacture of the alleged defective vehicle, as it appears to explicitly state that some additional party was responsible for other parts of the design, testing, manufacturing, and marketing process. 8 Poole, citing Ex parte Nail, 111 So.3d 125 (Ala.2012), appears to contend that an inspection of the vehicle for manufacturing information before filing the complaint would have amounted to more than due diligence. 9 However, this case presents none of the legibility issues requiring extensive formal

2007See Bates v. State , 620 So.2d 745 , 746 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) ("`When the States does not respond to a petitioner's allegations, the unrefuted statement of facts must be taken as true.'"), quoting Smith v. State , 581 So.2d 1283 , 1284 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991).

2007See Bates v. State , 620 So.2d 745 , 746 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) ("`When the States does not respond to a petitioner's allegations, the unrefuted statement of facts must be taken as true.'"), quoting Smith v. State , 581 So.2d 1283 , 1284 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991).

2006(Poole's brief, p. 38.) Poole explains that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a complaint, this Court has applied the de novo standard of review, see, e.g., Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013 , 1017 (Ala. 2002), but Poole points out that usually rulings on evidentiary submissions, consistent with a trial court's role as a discretionary "gatekeeper," are reviewed under a more deferential standard, see, e.g., Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63 , 71 (Ala. 2001) ("When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `ruling

2006(Poole's brief, p. 38.) Poole explains that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a complaint, this Court has applied the de novo standard of review, see, e.g., Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Ala.2002), but Poole points out that usually rulings on evidentiary submissions, consistent with a trial court's role as a discretionary "gatekeeper," are reviewed under a more deferential standard, see, e.g., Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 71 (Ala.2001) ("When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `rulings on

2006(Poole's brief, p. 38.) Poole explains that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a complaint, this Court has applied the de novo standard of review, see, e.g., Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013 , 1017 (Ala. 2002), but Poole points out that usually rulings on evidentiary submissions, consistent with a trial court's role as a discretionary "gatekeeper," are reviewed under a more deferential standard, see, e.g., Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63 , 71 (Ala. 2001) ("When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `ruling

2006(Poole's brief, p. 38.) Poole explains that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a complaint, this Court has applied the de novo standard of review, see, e.g., Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Ala.2002), but Poole points out that usually rulings on evidentiary submissions, consistent with a trial court's role as a discretionary "gatekeeper," are reviewed under a more deferential standard, see, e.g., Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 71 (Ala.2001) ("When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `rulings on

2006The trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling other than to state that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant legal authorities, the parties' written submissions, and the parties' oral arguments" the court would "disregard the parts of Prince's [affidavit] testimony identified in Poole's Motion to Strike." It is well settled that "`a party is not allowed to directly contradict prior sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary judgment.'" Wilson v. Teng, 786 So.2d 485 , 497 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313 , 317 (Ala. 1992)).

2006The trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling other than to state that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant legal authorities, the parties' written submissions, and the parties' oral arguments" the court would "disregard the parts of Prince's [affidavit] testimony identified in Poole's Motion to Strike." It is well settled that "`a party is not allowed to directly contradict prior sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary judgment.'" Wilson v. Teng, 786 So.2d 485, 497 (Ala.2000) (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313, 317 (Ala.1992)).

2006See also Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309 , 318 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[a] district court's refusal to strike or disregard portions of an affidavit in a motion for summary judgment [under Rule 56 , Fed.R.Civ.P.] is reviewed for an abuse of discretion").

2006See also Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that "[a] district court's refusal to strike or disregard portions of an affidavit in a motion for summary judgment [under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.] is reviewed for an abuse of discretion").

2006(Poole's brief, p. 38.) Poole explains that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a complaint, this Court has applied the de novo standard of review, see, e.g., Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013 , 1017 (Ala. 2002), but Poole points out that usually rulings on evidentiary submissions, consistent with a trial court's role as a discretionary "gatekeeper," are reviewed under a more deferential standard, see, e.g., Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63 , 71 (Ala. 2001) ("When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `ruling

2006(Poole's brief, p. 38.) Poole explains that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a complaint, this Court has applied the de novo standard of review, see, e.g., Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 838 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Ala.2002), but Poole points out that usually rulings on evidentiary submissions, consistent with a trial court's role as a discretionary "gatekeeper," are reviewed under a more deferential standard, see, e.g., Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 71 (Ala.2001) ("When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `rulings on

2006The trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling other than to state that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant legal authorities, the parties' written submissions, and the parties' oral arguments" the court would "disregard the parts of Prince's [affidavit] testimony identified in Poole's Motion to Strike." It is well settled that "`a party is not allowed to directly contradict prior sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary judgment.'" Wilson v. Teng, 786 So.2d 485 , 497 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313 , 317 (Ala. 1992)).

2006Wilson, 786 So.2d at 497 .

2005The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has more recently followed the reasoning in Miller as well: “Although a motel guest may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his room, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1383-84 (11th Cir.1982), courts have refused to find such an interest in records similar to the registration records here.

2005We therefore hold that the trial court was correct in denying Poole’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his bank records.” United States v. Poole, 557 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir.1977).