51 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fabre v. Marinred2 sentences2025Corp., 299 So. 3d 500 , 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting White v. Ferco Motors Corp., 260 So. 3d 388, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)). 2 See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). 2 evidence, the defendant is not entitled to have the Fabre defendant placed on the verdict form.” Florida law is well-settled that “[p]leadings are not evidence.” Turtle Lake Assocs., Ltd. v. Third Fin. 2020NOTE ON USE FOR 501.4 When the jury is instructed to apportion fault, and a Fabre issue is involved, see Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), and Nash v. Wells Fargo Services, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996). | 16 | 24 |
Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc.green2 sentences2025Cf. Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that appellee waived defense that noneconomic damages should be apportioned to a proposed Fabre defendant where appellee's answer did not include an affirmative defense that the proposed Fabre defendant's negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, where the appellee did not raise the defense during a pretrial conference, and where the appellee asserted throughout the trial that the proposed Fabre defendant's negligence was not at issue); Am. 2020NOTE ON USE FOR 501.4 When the jury is instructed to apportion fault, and a Fabre issue is involved, see Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), and Nash v. Wells Fargo Services, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996). | 6 | 11 |
Loureiro v. Pools by Greg, Inc.green2 sentences2015Just as this Court recognized in Loureiro v. Pools By Greg, Inc., 698 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the issue of the defendant’s negligence “was fully litigated at trial and the presence of the Fabre defendants on the verdict form did not disturb the jury’s ability to consider that matter.” In this case, the jury weighed all the facts and evidence and ultimately concluded that Dr. Freyre was not liable and, therefore, Defendant WBMC was not vicariously liable as well. 2015Just as this Court recognized in Loureiro v. Pools By Greg, Inc., 698 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the issue of the defendant’s negligence “was fully litigated at trial and the presence of the Fabre defendants on the verdict form did not disturb the jury’s ability to consider that matter.” In this case, the jury weighed all the facts and evidence arid ultimately concluded that Dr. Freyre was not liable and, therefore, Defendant WBMC was not vicariously liable as well. | 5 | 5 |
Phillips v. Guarnerigreen2 sentences2016As explained in Vucinich v. Ross, 893 So.2d 690, 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), there is a fundamental difference between a Fa-bre affirmative defense and an “empty chair” defense: “Fabre defendants are non-parties which are alleged by a party defendant to be wholly or partially negligent and should be placed on the verdict form so there can be an apportionment of fault against them for non-economic damages.... ” [Phillips v. Guarneri, 785 So.2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)]. 2005In Phillips v. Guarneri, 785 So.2d 705, n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the court explained a party's use of the term " Fabre Affirmative Defenses" by stating: " Fabre defendants are non-parties which are alleged by a party defendant to be wholly or partially negligent and should be placed on the verdict form so there can be an apportionment of fault against them for non-economic damages...." On the other hand, the term "empty chair" refers to the argument that "some non-party is the sole legal cause of the harm alleged but, unlike a Fabre defendant, this non-party is not placed on the verdict form | 4 | 4 |
Vucinich v. Rossgreen2 sentences2016As explained in Vucinich v. Ross, 893 So.2d 690, 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), there is a fundamental difference between a Fa-bre affirmative defense and an “empty chair” defense: “Fabre defendants are non-parties which are alleged by a party defendant to be wholly or partially negligent and should be placed on the verdict form so there can be an apportionment of fault against them for non-economic damages.... ” [Phillips v. Guarneri, 785 So.2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)]. 2006NOTES [1] See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993); Vucinich v. Ross, 893 So.2d 690, 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citation omitted) (explaining " Fabre defendants are non-parties which are alleged by a party defendant to be wholly or partially negligent and should be placed on the verdict form so there can be an apportionment of fault against them for non-economic damages"). [2] Section 768.81(3)(d) of the Florida Statutes requires a defendant seeking to impute fault to a negligent non-party to plead such a defense. § 768.81(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2004). | 3 | 3 |
American Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perezgreen2 sentences2018Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perez, 629 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (where reversal was required “on grounds unrelated to the damages issue,” including a comparative negligence error in omitting Fabre defendants from the verdict form, the 4 Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1993) (if defendant proves the fault of a nonparty on a comparative negligence affirmative defense, the jury may be asked to apportion the percentage of fault to the nonparty on the jury verdict form). 9 new trial would be “confined to issues of the liability of the defendant and of the other entities allegedly res 2018Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perez, 629 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (where reversal was required “on 4 Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1993) (if defendant proves the fault of a nonparty on a comparative negligence affirmative defense, the jury may be asked to apportion the percentage of fault to the nonparty on the jury verdict form). 9 grounds unrelated to the damages issue,” including a comparative negligence error in omitting Fabre defendants from the verdict form, the new trial would be “confined to issues of the liability of the defendant and of the other entities allegedly res | 2 | 2 |
Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maintenance, Inc.green2 sentences2021Ctr., Inc., 659 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1995); Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maint., Inc., 986 So. 2d 620 , 622 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("A 'Fabre defendant' is a nonparty defendant whom a party defendant asserts is wholly or partially responsible for the negligence alleged."). 3 answer (as well as their requested jury instruction), stating, "The Defendants' affirmative defense products liability to an unknown company will not be allowed. . . . 2014"A 'Fabre defendant’ is a nonparty defendant whom a party defendant asserts is wholly or partially responsible for the negligence alleged.” Claudio v. Regalado, 116 So.3d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maint., Inc., 986 So.2d 620 , 622 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). | 1 | 7 |
Wells v. Tallahassee Mem. Med. Centergreen2 sentences2024Ctr., Inc., 659 So. 2d 249, 254 (Fla. 1995) (interpreting comparative fault statute as permitting the assertion of a Fabre defense to apportion damages based on each alleged tortfeasor’s percentage of fault). 2 The plaintiff then moved to hold Publix jointly and severally liable for the invitee’s negligence, arguing that Publix owed the plaintiff a non- delegable duty. 2024Ctr., Inc., 659 So. 2d 249, 254 (Fla. 1995) (interpreting comparative fault statute as permitting the assertion of a Fabre defense to apportion damages based on each alleged tortfeasor’s percentage of fault). 2 The plaintiff then moved to hold Publix jointly and severally liable for the invitee’s negligence, arguing that Publix owed the plaintiff a non- delegable duty. | 1 | 5 |
D'ANGELO v. Fitzmauricegreen2 sentences2016Cf. D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So.2d 311 , 312 n. 2 (Fla.2003) (noting that the defendant's withdrawal of a Fabre defense “was a strategic decision”). 2016Cf. D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So.2d 311 , 312 n. 2 (Fla.2003) (noting that the defendant's withdrawal of a Fabre defense “was a strategic decision”). | 1 | 2 |
WR Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Doughertygreen2 sentences2013Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Dougherty, 636 So.2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).”); see, e.g., Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centers, 876 So.2d 8, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (ruling that it was appropriate for the jury to consider the potential fault of the non-party hospital that provided treatment to the decedent prior to her admission to the nursing home because both facilities "were dealing with a continuum of the same injury.”). 1994Grace & Co. —Conn. v. Dougherty, 636 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). | 1 | 2 |
Kay's Custom Drapes, Inc. v. Garrotegreen2 sentences2013Cf. Kay’s Custom Drapes, Inc. v. Garrote, 920 So.2d 1168 , 1171 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that trial court should have allowed a defendant leave to amend its answer to add a Fabre defendant who was the co-defendant who had just been dismissed from the suit, saying “[sjection 768.81(3)(d) of the Florida Statutes requires a defendant seeking to impute fault to a negligent non-party to plead such a defense.” (emphasis added)). 2013Cf. Kay’s Custom Drapes, Inc. v. Garrote, 920 So.2d 1168 , 1171 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that trial court should have allowed a defendant leave to amend its answer to add a Fabre defendant who was the co-defendant who had just been dismissed from the suit, saying “[sjection 768.81(3)(d) of the Florida Statutes requires a defendant seeking to impute fault to a negligent non-party to plead such a defense.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 2 |
Turtle Lake Assoc., Ltd. v. Third Fin. Services, Inc.green1 sentence2025Servs., Inc., 518 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Ferco Motors Corp.green1 sentence2025Corp., 299 So. 3d 500 , 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting White v. Ferco Motors Corp., 260 So. 3d 388, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)). 2 See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). 2 evidence, the defendant is not entitled to have the Fabre defendant placed on the verdict form.” Florida law is well-settled that “[p]leadings are not evidence.” Turtle Lake Assocs., Ltd. v. Third Fin. | 1 | 1 |
SOUTHERN BELL TEL. v. Dept. of Transp.green1 sentence2025Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 668 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“If a defendant wants a Fabre defendant on the verdict form, the defendant must see to it that there is legally sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury can find that the Fabre defendant was at fault. | 1 | 1 |
Okeechobee Aerie 4137, Fraternal Order of Eagles, Inc. v. Wildegreen1 sentence2022We review de novo “[w]hether a Fabre defendant should have been on the verdict form.” Okeechobee Aerie 4137, Fraternal Order of Eagles, Inc. v. Wilde, 199 So. 3d 333, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1116 (Fla. 2006) (“A trial court has wide discretion concerning the admissibility of evidence and the range of subjects about which an expert can testify.”). 2 Among other things, Mrs. Dayes also appeals (1) the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial after the Defendants’ appeal to the jury’s sympathy during voir dire and opening statements; (2) the trial court’s decision to allow the Defendants to bolster Minott’s testimony that he sounded the horn with a prior consistent statement; and (3) the trial court’s refusal to grant a directed verdict after a | 1 | 1 |
Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp.green1 sentence2020See Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1996). - 48 - MODEL INSTRUCTION NO. 3 Automobile collision; comparative negligence; wrongful death damages; Fabre issue Facts of the hypothetical case: Mary Smith, as personal representative of the estate of John Smith, deceased, has brought an action against Fast Transport Company. for damages resulting from the instantaneous death of John Smith in a collision between his car and a tractor trailer owned by Fast Transport Company. and driven by Joe Johnson, Fast Transport Co.’s employee. | 1 | 1 |
Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahasseegreen2 sentences2016Cf. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) ("[A] misconception by the trial judge of a controlling principle of law can constitute grounds for reversal.”). . 2016Cf. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) ("[A] misconception by the trial judge of a controlling principle of law can constitute grounds for reversal.”). . | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Cf. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) ("[A] misconception by the trial judge of a controlling principle of law can constitute grounds for reversal."). -8- that it did not consider prior to judgment, and to correct any error if the trial court becomes convinced that it has erred." Byrne v. Byrne, 128 So. 3d 2, 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). 2016Cf. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) ("[A] misconception by the trial judge of a controlling principle of law can constitute grounds for reversal."). -8- that it did not consider prior to judgment, and to correct any error if the trial court becomes convinced that it has erred." Byrne v. Byrne, 128 So. 3d 2, 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Claudio v. Regaladogreen1 sentence2014"A 'Fabre defendant’ is a nonparty defendant whom a party defendant asserts is wholly or partially responsible for the negligence alleged.” Claudio v. Regalado, 116 So.3d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maint., Inc., 986 So.2d 620 , 622 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudezgreen1 sentence2013See Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (reversing an order dismissing a defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiffs/parents for the wrongful death of their child, holding that the defendant could, by counterclaim, seek contribution from the parents for their alleged negligence as contributing cause of their child’s death); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pough, 392 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (reversing an order dismissing a defendant’s counterclaim for contribution in an auto negligence suit filed by the injured child’s parents and reinstating the counterclaim | 1 | 1 |
Chesterton v. Fishergreen1 sentence2013"A ‘Fabre defendant’ is a nonparty defendant whom a party defendant asserts is wholly or partially responsible for the negligence alleged.” Salazar v. Helicopter Structural & Maint., Inc., 986 So.2d 620 , 622 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Chesterton v. Fisher, 655 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); W.R. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centersgreen1 sentence2013Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Dougherty, 636 So.2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).”); see, e.g., Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centers, 876 So.2d 8, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (ruling that it was appropriate for the jury to consider the potential fault of the non-party hospital that provided treatment to the decedent prior to her admission to the nursing home because both facilities "were dealing with a continuum of the same injury.”). | 1 | 1 |
Abbott v. Dorleansgreen1 sentence2012See Abbott v. Dorleans, 41 So.3d 984, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Registe v. Portergreen1 sentence2010See § 767.04; cf. Registe v. Porter, 557 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (noting that “section 767.04 imposes absolute liability upon a dog owner for a dog-bite when the dog-bite victim is ... lawfully on or in a private place except when the dog is carelessly or mischievously provoked or when the owner has displayed in a prominent place on the premises a sign easily readable including the words ‘Bad Dog’ (or equivalent wording)”). | 1 | 1 |
| Lagueux v. Union Carbide Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fenberg v. Rosenthalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Coral Gables v. Jordangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Britt v. Henrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Brittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DANNER CONST. COMPANY, INC. v. Reynolds Metals Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| JR Brooks & Son, Inc. v. Quirozgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rohrback v. Dauergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garlock, Inc. v. Harrimangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Jones v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schindler Corp. v. Ross
green
2 sentences2018Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perez, 629 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (where reversal was required “on grounds unrelated to the damages issue,” including a comparative negligence error in omitting Fabre defendants from the verdict form, the 4 Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1993) (if defendant proves the fault of a nonparty on a comparative negligence affirmative defense, the jury may be asked to apportion the percentage of fault to the nonparty on the jury verdict form). 9 new trial would be “confined to issues of the liability of the defendant and of the other entities allegedly res 2018Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perez, 629 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (where reversal was required “on 4 Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1993) (if defendant proves the fault of a nonparty on a comparative negligence affirmative defense, the jury may be asked to apportion the percentage of fault to the nonparty on the jury verdict form). 9 grounds unrelated to the damages issue,” including a comparative negligence error in omitting Fabre defendants from the verdict form, the new trial would be “confined to issues of the liability of the defendant and of the other entities allegedly res | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Royal Palm Hotel Property, LLC v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022“A ‘Fabre defendant’ is a nonparty defendant whom a party defendant asserts is wholly or partially responsible for the negligence alleged.” Royal Palm Hotel Prop., LLC v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1108 , 1110 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Gerzel
green
1 sentence2013See Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (reversing an order dismissing a defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiffs/parents for the wrongful death of their child, holding that the defendant could, by counterclaim, seek contribution from the parents for their alleged negligence as contributing cause of their child’s death); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pough, 392 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (reversing an order dismissing a defendant’s counterclaim for contribution in an auto negligence suit filed by the injured child’s parents and reinstating the counterclaim | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pough
green
1 sentence2013See Chinos Villas, Inc. v. Bermudez, 448 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (reversing an order dismissing a defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiffs/parents for the wrongful death of their child, holding that the defendant could, by counterclaim, seek contribution from the parents for their alleged negligence as contributing cause of their child’s death); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pough, 392 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (reversing an order dismissing a defendant’s counterclaim for contribution in an auto negligence suit filed by the injured child’s parents and reinstating the counterclaim | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Crowell v. Kaufmann
green
2 sentences2011The anesthesiologist, therefore, requested a continuance of the summary judgment hearing until the completion of discovery “to preserve his ability to include a codefendant [, the surgeon,] as a Fabre defendant on the verdict form.” Id. at 326-27 . 2011Id. at 327 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| City of Pinellas Park v. Brown green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Gouty v. Schnepel green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.