51 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Transportation v. Coxgreen2 sentences2017Moreover, "[n]ot only does [ OCGA § 50-21-24 (10) ] exempt [G]DOT from liability for highway design deficiencies where the highway was initially designed in substantial compliance with existing design standards, it exempts [G]DOT from liability for its failure to upgrade a highway to meet current design standards." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Transp. v. Cox , 246 Ga. App. 221 , 223, 540 S.E.2d 218 (2000). 2017Moreover, "[n]ot only does [ OCGA § 50-21-24 (10) ] exempt [G]DOT from liability for highway design deficiencies where the highway was initially designed in substantial compliance with existing design standards, it exempts [G]DOT from liability for its failure to upgrade a highway to meet current design standards." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Transp. v. Cox , 246 Ga. App. 221 , 223, 540 S.E.2d 218 (2000). | 3 | 4 |
Sadler v. Department of Transportation of Stategreen2 sentences2014Whether the DOT is entitled to sovereign immunity from the suit on the basis of the design standards exception in OCGA § 50-21-24 (10), as asserted in the DOT’s motion to dismiss, “is a threshold issue that the trial court was required to address before reaching the merits of any other argument.” Albertson v. City of Jesup, 312 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) ( 718 SE2d 4 ) (2011); Sadler v. Dept. of Transp., 311 Ga. App. 601, 603 ( 716 SE2d 639 ) (2011); State Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indent. 2014Whether the DOT is entitled to sovereign immunity from the suit on the basis of the design standards exception in OCGA § 50-21-24 (10), as asserted in the DOT’s motion to dismiss, “is a threshold issue that the trial court was required to address before reaching the merits of any other argument.” Albertson v. City of Jesup, 312 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) ( 718 SE2d 4 ) (2011); Sadler v. Dept. of Transp., 311 Ga. App. 601, 603 ( 716 SE2d 639 ) (2011); State Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indent. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Developers Surety & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2014Co., 324 Ga. App. 371, 374 ( 750 SE2d 697 ) (2013). 2014Co., 324 Ga. App. 371, 374 ( 750 SE2d 697 ) (2013). | 2 | 2 |
Albertson v. City of Jesupgreen2 sentences2014Whether the DOT is entitled to sovereign immunity from the suit on the basis of the design standards exception in OCGA § 50-21-24 (10), as asserted in the DOT’s motion to dismiss, “is a threshold issue that the trial court was required to address before reaching the merits of any other argument.” Albertson v. City of Jesup, 312 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) ( 718 SE2d 4 ) (2011); Sadler v. Dept. of Transp., 311 Ga. App. 601, 603 ( 716 SE2d 639 ) (2011); State Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indent. 2014Whether the DOT is entitled to sovereign immunity from the suit on the basis of the design standards exception in OCGA § 50-21-24 (10), as asserted in the DOT’s motion to dismiss, “is a threshold issue that the trial court was required to address before reaching the merits of any other argument.” Albertson v. City of Jesup, 312 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) ( 718 SE2d 4 ) (2011); Sadler v. Dept. of Transp., 311 Ga. App. 601, 603 ( 716 SE2d 639 ) (2011); State Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indent. | 2 | 2 |
Exxon Corp. v. Thomasongreen2 sentences2013See Anderson, supra; Exxon Corp. v. Thomason, 269 Ga. 761, 763 ( 504 SE2d 676 ) (1998) (“It is well settled that the conduct of discovery is within a trial court’s broad discretion.”). 2. 2013See Anderson, supra; Exxon Corp. v. Thomason, 269 Ga. 761, 763 ( 504 SE2d 676 ) (1998) (“It is well settled that the conduct of discovery is within a trial court’s broad discretion.”). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Fulton Countygreen2 sentences1999Corp., 206 Ga. App. 821, 826 (5) ( 426 SE2d 905 ) (1992) (upholding trial court’s denial of DOT’s motion for directed verdict for the defense of sovereign immunity as to OCGA § 13-6-11 damages); Eastern Air Lines v. Fulton County, 183 Ga. App. 891, 894-895 (4) ( 360 SE2d 425 ) (1987). 1999Corp., 206 Ga. App. 821, 826 (5) ( 426 SE2d 905 ) (1992) (upholding trial court’s denial of DOT’s motion for directed verdict for the defense of sovereign immunity as to OCGA § 13-6-11 damages); Eastern Air Lines v. Fulton County, 183 Ga. App. 891, 894-895 (4) ( 360 SE2d 425 ) (1987). | 2 | 2 |
Department of Transportation v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, 1994In Dept. of Transp. v. Taylor, 264 Ga. 18 ( 440 SE2d 652 ) (1994), the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the evidence was not relevant to Taylor’s recoverable damages and that the trial court properly granted the motion in limine. | 1 | 2 |
City of Rome v. Jordangreen2 sentences1995The question of whether the DOT’s defense based on the “public duty” doctrine established in City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 27 ( 426 SE2d 861 ) (1993), should be limited to cases where third party negligence is involved is indisputedly a “substantial question of law.” Youngblood, supra. We do not reach the substance of this weighty matter given the lack of factual development of the record at this stage of the case. 1995The question of whether the DOT’s defense based on the “public duty” doctrine established in City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 27 ( 426 SE2d 861 ) (1993), should be limited to cases where third party negligence is involved is indisputedly a “substantial question of law.” Youngblood, supra. We do not reach the substance of this weighty matter given the lack of factual development of the record at this stage of the case. | 1 | 2 |
Sjn Properties, LLC. v. Fulton County Board of Assessorsgreen2 sentences2026Accord DeKalb Cnty., 369 Ga. App. at 505(1). 21 SJN Props. v. Fulton Cnty Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 803 (2)(b)(iii) ( 770 SE2d 832 ) (2015) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original). 22 DeKalb Cnty., 369 Ga. App. at 506(1). 12 yet to begin, and declaratory judgment “will not be rendered based on a possible or probable future contingency.”23 The trial court did not err, then, by granting the DOT’s motion to dismiss the Appellants’ claim for declaratory judgment.24 3. 2026Accord DeKalb Cnty., 369 Ga. App. at 505(1). 21 SJN Props. v. Fulton Cnty Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 803 (2)(b)(iii) ( 770 SE2d 832 ) (2015) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original). 22 DeKalb Cnty., 369 Ga. App. at 506(1). 12 yet to begin, and declaratory judgment “will not be rendered based on a possible or probable future contingency.”23 The trial court did not err, then, by granting the DOT’s motion to dismiss the Appellants’ claim for declaratory judgment.24 3. | 1 | 1 |
The Merchant Law Firm, P.C. v. Emersongreen2 sentences2023See Merchant Law Firm v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 614 (1) (c), 615 (2) (a), 616 (2) (b) ( 800 SE2d 557 ) (2017) (affirming dismissal of three of appellant’s claims as right for any reason); Craigo v. Azizi, 301 Ga. App. 181, 187 (3) ( 687 SE2d 198 ) (2009) (affirming as right for any reason the dismissal of complaint on the basis of expert’s failure to satisfy former OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) (1), the predecessor to OCGA § 24-7-702 (c) (1)). 6 Hill was not licensed as a professional engineer until 1969, which, the parties agree, was after the intersection had been designed. 2023See Merchant Law Firm v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 614 (1) (c), 615 (2) (a), 616 (2) (b) ( 800 SE2d 557 ) (2017) (affirming dismissal of three of appellant’s claims as right for any reason); Craigo v. Azizi, 301 Ga. App. 181, 187 (3) ( 687 SE2d 198 ) (2009) (affirming as right for any reason the dismissal of complaint on the basis of expert’s failure to satisfy former OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) (1), the predecessor to OCGA § 24-7-702 (c) (1)). 6 Hill was not licensed as a professional engineer until 1969, which, the parties agree, was after the intersection had been designed. | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2023Unless the [Munros] can produce an engineer’s competent testimony that the DOT’s design for [the intersection] was not in substantial compliance with the applicable engineering and design standards, their claim cannot withstand the DOT’s motion [to dismiss].” Murray v. Dept. of Transp., 240 Ga. App. 285, 285-286 ( 523 SE2d 367 ) (1999). 2023Unless the [Munros] can produce an engineer’s competent testimony that the DOT’s design for [the intersection] was not in substantial compliance with the applicable engineering and design standards, their claim cannot withstand the DOT’s motion [to dismiss].” Murray v. Dept. of Transp., 240 Ga. App. 285, 285-286 ( 523 SE2d 367 ) (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Craigo v. Azizigreen2 sentences2023See Merchant Law Firm v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 614 (1) (c), 615 (2) (a), 616 (2) (b) ( 800 SE2d 557 ) (2017) (affirming dismissal of three of appellant’s claims as right for any reason); Craigo v. Azizi, 301 Ga. App. 181, 187 (3) ( 687 SE2d 198 ) (2009) (affirming as right for any reason the dismissal of complaint on the basis of expert’s failure to satisfy former OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) (1), the predecessor to OCGA § 24-7-702 (c) (1)). 6 Hill was not licensed as a professional engineer until 1969, which, the parties agree, was after the intersection had been designed. 2023See Merchant Law Firm v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 614 (1) (c), 615 (2) (a), 616 (2) (b) ( 800 SE2d 557 ) (2017) (affirming dismissal of three of appellant’s claims as right for any reason); Craigo v. Azizi, 301 Ga. App. 181, 187 (3) ( 687 SE2d 198 ) (2009) (affirming as right for any reason the dismissal of complaint on the basis of expert’s failure to satisfy former OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) (1), the predecessor to OCGA § 24-7-702 (c) (1)). 6 Hill was not licensed as a professional engineer until 1969, which, the parties agree, was after the intersection had been designed. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Transportation v. Mikellgreen1 sentence2023See also Dept. of Transp. v. Mikell, 229 Ga. App. at 58 (1) (a) (“expert testimony is required to support a claim of professional engineering negligence”). (b) Traffic control devices and speed breakers. | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Department of Transportation v. Owensgreen2 sentences2020Factual findings are sustained if there is [any] evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Owens, 330 Ga. App. 123, 133 (4) ( 766 SE2d 569 ) (2014). 2020Factual findings are sustained if there is [any] evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Owens, 330 Ga. App. 123, 133 (4) ( 766 SE2d 569 ) (2014). | 1 | 1 |
City of Tybee Island v. Harrodgreen2 sentences2020See Coffey v. Fayette County, 279 Ga. 111, 112 ( 610 SE2d 41 ) (2005); City of Tybee Island v. Harrod, 337 Ga. App. 523, 524-525 ( 788 SE2d 122 ) (2016). 2. 2020See Coffey v. Fayette County, 279 Ga. 111, 112 ( 610 SE2d 41 ) (2005); City of Tybee Island v. Harrod, 337 Ga. App. 523, 524-525 ( 788 SE2d 122 ) (2016). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Transportation v. Dupreegreen2 sentences2020As DOT correctly notes in its brief, the trial court was required to consider DOT’s motion under a preponderance 6 In its order, the trial court relied on Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668 ( 570 SE2d 1 ) (2002), for the following proposition: If an OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “expert opinion is sufficient to demonstrate that the malpractice case is not frivolous, then it should also be sufficient for a preliminary ruling to satisfy subject matter jurisdiction.” 256 Ga. App. at 673 (1) (b). 2020As DOT correctly notes in its brief, the trial court was required to consider DOT’s motion under a preponderance 6 In its order, the trial court relied on Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668 ( 570 SE2d 1 ) (2002), for the following proposition: If an OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “expert opinion is sufficient to demonstrate that the malpractice case is not frivolous, then it should also be sufficient for a preliminary ruling to satisfy subject matter jurisdiction.” 256 Ga. App. at 673 (1) (b). | 1 | 1 |
Coffey v. Fayette Countygreen2 sentences2020See Coffey v. Fayette County, 279 Ga. 111, 112 ( 610 SE2d 41 ) (2005); City of Tybee Island v. Harrod, 337 Ga. App. 523, 524-525 ( 788 SE2d 122 ) (2016). 2. 2020See Coffey v. Fayette County, 279 Ga. 111, 112 ( 610 SE2d 41 ) (2005); City of Tybee Island v. Harrod, 337 Ga. App. 523, 524-525 ( 788 SE2d 122 ) (2016). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc.green2 sentences2020Its evaluation rests on where the preponderance of the evidence lies, not necessarily on whether the issue may be decided as a matter of law.” Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 842-843 (1) ( 392 SE2d 37 ) (1990). 12 In this case, the trial court elected to proceed under the first “hearing option” and ultimately denied DOT’s motion. 2020Its evaluation rests on where the preponderance of the evidence lies, not necessarily on whether the issue may be decided as a matter of law.” Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 842-843 (1) ( 392 SE2d 37 ) (1990). 12 In this case, the trial court elected to proceed under the first “hearing option” and ultimately denied DOT’s motion. | 1 | 1 |
Marietta Properties, LLC v. City of Mariettagreen2 sentences2017Marietta Properties v. City of Marietta, 319 Ga. App. 184, 186 (1) ( 732 SE2d 102 ) (2012) (citation omitted). 2017Marietta Properties v. City of Marietta, 319 Ga. App. 184, 186 (1) ( 732 SE2d 102 ) (2012) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamondgreen2 sentences2014Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 231 Ga. 321, 323 (III) ( 201 SE2d 400 ) (1973) (holding that attorney’s statement in prior litigation that if his client won that case she would make no further claims on estate at issue were not admissions in judicio). 5 That Lovein made this affirmative agreement based on his legal conclusion that the testimony would not be admissible does not alter the fact of his agreement. 14 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the DOT’s motion in limine on this ground. 4. 2014Bank & Trust Co. v. Diamond, 231 Ga. 321, 323 (III) ( 201 SE2d 400 ) (1973) (holding that attorney’s statement in prior litigation that if his client won that case she would make no further claims on estate at issue were not admissions in judicio). 5 That Lovein made this affirmative agreement based on his legal conclusion that the testimony would not be admissible does not alter the fact of his agreement. 14 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the DOT’s motion in limine on this ground. 4. | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Department of Corrections v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2014Miller and Dillard, JJ., concur. 1 (Punctuation omitted.) Ga.Dept. of Corrections v. James, 312 Ga. App. 190, 193 ( 718 SE2d 55 ) (2011). 2 The trial court’s denial of the DOT’s motion is directly appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. 2014Miller and Dillard, JJ., concur. 1 (Punctuation omitted.) Ga.Dept. of Corrections v. James, 312 Ga. App. 190, 193 ( 718 SE2d 55 ) (2011). 2 The trial court’s denial of the DOT’s motion is directly appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. DOTgreen2 sentences2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, 2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, | 1 | 1 |
Department of Transportation v. Bridgesgreen2 sentences2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, 2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, | 1 | 1 |
Department of Transportation v. Durpogreen2 sentences2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, 2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Regents v. Canasgreen | 1 | 1 |
Eagle's Landing Christian Church, Inc. v. Henry Countygreen2 sentences2012In either event, business losses are recoverable as a separate item only if the property is “unique” and the loss is not remote or speculative.6 4 (Footnote omitted.) Eagle’s Landing Christian Church, Inc. v. Henry County, 308 Ga. App. 416, 417 ( 708 SE2d 23 ) (2011). 5 See, e.g., id. at 417 (an answer can be considered a notice of appeal under OCGA § 32-3-7 when it expresses dissatisfaction with the compensation proposed for the taking). 6 (Emphasis supplied.) DOT v. Acree Oil Co., 266 Ga. 336 (1) ( 467 SE2d 319 ) (1996). 4 McMeans argues that, as the alleged owner of the business operating o 2012In either event, business losses are recoverable as a separate item only if the property is “unique” and the loss is not remote or speculative.6 4 (Footnote omitted.) Eagle’s Landing Christian Church, Inc. v. Henry County, 308 Ga. App. 416, 417 ( 708 SE2d 23 ) (2011). 5 See, e.g., id. at 417 (an answer can be considered a notice of appeal under OCGA § 32-3-7 when it expresses dissatisfaction with the compensation proposed for the taking). 6 (Emphasis supplied.) DOT v. Acree Oil Co., 266 Ga. 336 (1) ( 467 SE2d 319 ) (1996). 4 McMeans argues that, as the alleged owner of the business operating o | 1 | 1 |
In Re Paulgreen2 sentences2012Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 506-507 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 682-683 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999). 2012Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 506-507 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009); In re Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 682-683 ( 513 SE2d 219 ) (1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Williamson v. Harvey Smith, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| AMBLING MANAGEMENT COMPANY v. Purdygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kleber v. City of Atlantagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hubbard v. Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fletcher v. Ellenburggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ford Motor Company v. Gibsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morton v. Bellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Caswell v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tuten v. City of Brunswickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salvatori Corp. v. Rubingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Transportation v. Petkasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Transportation v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glynn County v. Watersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Steele v. Georgia Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2012Dept. of Transp. v. Cox, 246 Ga. App. 221, 223 ( 540 SE2d 218 ) (2000); Steele, 271 Ga. App. at 376 . 2012Dept. of Transp. v. Cox, 246 Ga. App. 221, 223 ( 540 SE2d 218 ) (2000); Steele, 271 Ga. App. at 376 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Hillman v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1990On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the partial denial of the DOT motion in limine, holding that Buck’s was entitled to introduce evidence of consequential damages flowing from the taking of a construction easement under our holding in Hillman v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 338 ( 359 SE2d 637 ) (1987). 1990On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the partial denial of the DOT motion in limine, holding that Buck’s was entitled to introduce evidence of consequential damages flowing from the taking of a construction easement under our holding in Hillman v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 338 ( 359 SE2d 637 ) (1987). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Department of Transportation v. Katz
green
2 sentences2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, 2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Tift County v. Smith
green
1 sentence2013See also Dept. of Transp. v. Bridges, 268 Ga. 258, 259 ( 486 SE2d 593 ) (1997); Taylor, 264 Ga. at 20-21 (3) (c); Tift County, 219 Ga. at 73 ; Dept. of Transp. v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1) ( 469 SE2d 404 ) (1996). 16 169 Ga. App. 310 ( 312 SE2d 635 ) (1983). 17 Id. at 313 (2). 18 See Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Depart. of Transp., 242 Ga. App. 835, 838-839 (2) ( 531 SE2d 719 ) (2000) (“Impaired visibility by a certain flow of traffic, without more, does not constitute a taking or damaging of property that would entitle the [plaintiff] to compensation. . . .”). 6 Accordingly, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Department of Transportation v. Acree Oil Co. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Civils v. Fulton County green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Bouldin v. Aragona-Garcia Enterprises, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Department of Transportation v. Meadow Trace, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| At & T CORP. v. Sigala green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brantley v. Department of Human Resources green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Department of Transportation v. Sharpe green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Hardy v. Candler County neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Department of Transportation v. Whitehead green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Taylor v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Department of Transportation v. Arapaho Construction, Inc. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Braswell v. Owen of Georgia, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Fountain green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Mathis v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Clover Cable of Ohio, Inc. v. Heywood green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gunthorpe v. Daniels green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Knight v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hawes v. Bigbie green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Daniels v. Hartley green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Department of Transportation v. El Carlo Motel, Inc. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Housing Authority v. Goolsby green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| DeKalb County v. Trustees, Decatur Lodge No. 1602 green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.