lockstep doctrine in Illinois

2025See, e.g., Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 315-16 (declining to recognize an exception to the lockstep doctrine when “[n]othing in the language of article I, section 6, or in the history of the constitutional debates suggest[ed] an intent that the use of trained dogs by the police be considered an unreasonable search or seizure”); see also People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 134-68 (Neville, J., dissenting) (extensively criticizing the lockstep doctrine). ¶ 59 Here, “defendant has not made a case for an exception to the lockstep doctrine,” so we conclude that the search was reasonable under article I

2025Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 315 ; - 19 - accord People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 172987, ¶ 46 (declining to depart from the lockstep doctrine for suspicionless parole searches). ¶ 60 III.

2018"The narrow exception * * * to the lockstep doctrine in the fourth amendment context is not relevant to this case." Id. at 240-41 , 278 Ill.Dec. 244 , 798 N.E.2d 91 (citing People v. Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d 60 , 75-76, 221 Ill.Dec. 409 , 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996) ). 4 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia , that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., amend.

2018“The narrow exception *** to the lockstep doctrine in the fourth amendment context is not relevant to this case.” Id. at 240-41 (citing People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 75-76 (1996)). -9­ 2018 IL App (2d) 170860 “[o]pposition to such searches was in fact one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself.

2023Under the lockstep doctrine, this court must adopt United States Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitution, no matter how poorly reasoned, as this court’s interpretation of similar provisions of the Illinois Constitution, unless “ ‘ “[w]e *** find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution.” ’ ” People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 1

2023Under the lockstep doctrine, “this court would be precluded from protecting the civil liberties of Illinois citizens should the United States Supreme Court decide to consistently favor police efficiency over the rights of the accused. *** [The lockstep doctrine] would preclude this court from protecting the individual liberties of Illinois citizens should such protection become essential in the future.” Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 259 (Clark, J., specially concurring).

1998See People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 217-23 (1995); cf. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996) (“We knowingly depart from that tradition [of applying the lockstep doctrine] here for the reasons set forth below”).

1998See People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d 211, 217-23 , 209 Ill.Dec. 41 , 650 N.E.2d 1014 (1995); cf. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60, 74 , 221 Ill.Dec. 409 , 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996) ("We knowingly depart from that tradition [of applying the lockstep doctrine] here for the reasons set forth below").

2025I write separately to reassert the position I stated in People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 133-68 (Neville, J., dissenting), and People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶¶ 118-25 (Neville, J., dissenting): this court should overrule People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 288-317 (2006), insofar as that case imposed the limited lockstep doctrine on Illinois courts.

2025See, e.g., Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 315-16 (declining to recognize an exception to the lockstep doctrine when “[n]othing in the language of article I, section 6, or in the history of the constitutional debates suggest[ed] an intent that the use of trained dogs by the police be considered an unreasonable search or seizure”); see also People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 134-68 (Neville, J., dissenting) (extensively criticizing the lockstep doctrine). ¶ 59 Here, “defendant has not made a case for an exception to the lockstep doctrine,” so we conclude that the search was reasonable under article I

2015Ed. at 656, 34 S. Ct. at 345 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under ‘legislative *** sanction’)), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 61 L.

2015Ed. at 656, 34 S. Ct. at 345 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under ‘legislative *** sanction’)), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 61 L.

2010People v. Chapman, 379 Ill.

2010People v. Chapman, 379 Ill.App.3d 317, 325 , 318 Ill.

2010The court cited People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 179-80 (2001), in which it had refused to “ ‘construe Krueger as suggesting that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution must be interpreted more expansively than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment.

2010The court cited People v. Bolden, 197 Ill.2d 166, 179-80 , 258 Ill.Dec. 538 , 756 N.E.2d 812 (2001), in which it had refused to "`construe Krueger as suggesting that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution must be interpreted more expansively than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment.

2009See Moorman, 369 Ill.

2009See Moorman, 369 Ill.App.3d at 208 , 307 Ill.Dec. 428 , 859 N.E.2d 1105 (Callum, J., dissenting).

2006In State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 , 889 n.3 (Minn. 1991), the Minnesota Supreme Court employed a more stringent standard of review than mere rational basis in its equal protection analysis under the state constitution, although the “state constitution embodies principles of equal protection synonymous to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 649-52 , 74 S.W.3d 215, 217-18 (2002), Arkansas’ highest court declined to follow the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 135 L.

2006In State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 , 889 n.3 (Minn. 1991), the Minnesota Supreme Court employed a more stringent standard of review than mere rational basis in its equal protection analysis under the state constitution, although the “state constitution embodies principles of equal protection synonymous to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 649-52 , 74 S.W.3d 215, 217-18 (2002), Arkansas’ highest court declined to follow the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 135 L.

2005See People v. DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 119 , 604 N.E.2d 336, 342-43 (1992); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill.

2005See People v. DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 119 , 604 N.E.2d 336, 342-43 (1992); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill.

1996People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 241-46 (1984); People v. Tillman, 1 Ill. 2d 525, 529-30 (1953).

1996People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226, 241-46 , 82 Ill.Dec. 613 , 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984); People v. Tillman, 1 Ill.2d 525, 529-30 , 116 N.E.2d 344 (1953).

2018The supreme court in Holmes reasoned that, pursuant to the lockstep doctrine, " '[p]olice are charged to enforce laws' " and that " '[t]he enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality.' " Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo , 443 U.S. 31 , 38, 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) ). ¶ 20 Here, the issue before this court is not probable cause; rather, the issue is whether McClinton voluntarily brought about a conviction governed by a statute later held void ab initio .

2018The supreme court in Holmes reasoned that, pursuant to the lockstep doctrine, " '[p]olice are charged to enforce laws' " and that " '[t]he enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality.' " Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo , 443 U.S. 31 , 38, 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) ). ¶ 20 Here, the issue before this court is not probable cause; rather, the issue is whether McClinton voluntarily brought about a conviction governed by a statute later held void ab initio .

2023The court unequivocally rejected the lockstep doctrine, as the court said, “in the context of deciding State guarantees, Federal authorities are not precedentially controlling; they merely guide the interpretation of State law. [Citation.] [W]hile this court may, in construing State [constitutional] guarantee[s], look for guidance and inspiration to constructions of Federal guarantee[s] by Federal courts, final conclusions on construction of State guarantee[s] are for this court to decide.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 436 .

2006The Supreme Court of Illinois “has not consistently applied the so-called lockstep doctrine as an assist in interpreting article I, section 2, the due[-]process clause in our [s]tate constitution.” McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 440 , 645 N.E.2d at 937 .

2005App. 3d 972, 982 , 713 N.E.2d 754, 762 (1999) (noting that because our state constitution provides broader rights of due process than the federal constitution, our supreme court has been reluctant to apply the lockstep doctrine in cases involving due process).

2005See People v. DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 119 , 604 N.E.2d 336, 342-43 (1992); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill.

2025Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 315 ; - 19 - accord People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 172987, ¶ 46 (declining to depart from the lockstep doctrine for suspicionless parole searches). ¶ 60 III.

2025Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 315 ; - 19 - accord People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 172987, ¶ 46 (declining to depart from the lockstep doctrine for suspicionless parole searches). ¶ 60 III.

2025I write separately to reassert the position I stated in People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 133-68 (Neville, J., dissenting), and People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶¶ 118-25 (Neville, J., dissenting): this court should overrule People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 288-317 (2006), insofar as that case imposed the limited lockstep doctrine on Illinois courts.