African-American defendant in Florida

2014There, the defendant “could not be excluded as a donor of the sperm found on the vaginal swab,” and the “likelihood that [the DNA came from the African-American defendant] as opposed to another random person in the [African-American] population [was] 1 in 1800.” Id. at 162 .

2014There, the defendant “could not be excluded as a donor of the sperm found on the vaginal swab,” and the “likelihood that [the DNA came from the African-American defendant] as opposed to another random person in the [African-American] population [was] 1 in 1800.” Id. at 162 .

2014The evidence in Freeman further revealed that both the prosecution and the defense were aware of the then pending federal case, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), which involved an allegation that prosecutors were seeking the death penalty disproportionately against African American defendants.

2014The evidence in Freeman further revealed that both the prosecution and the defense were aware of the then pending federal case, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), which involved an allegation that prosecutors were seeking the death penalty disproportionately against African American defendants.

2007This Court granted the defendant a new trial because the prejudice expressed by counsel "so seriously affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that our confidence in the jury's verdicts of guilt is undermined." Davis, 872 So.2d at 253 .

2004In light of the repeated admonitions by the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and others against allowing racial prejudice to play any part in the determination of guilt or imposition of sentence in a criminal case, we are greatly disturbed by trial counsel's blatant acknowledgment to the jury, in defending an African-American defendant accused of an interracial crime, of his negative feelings toward "black people just because they're black." We condemn these statements not because counsel chose to discuss the topic of race in voir dire, which is permissible, but because he did so in a

2004In light of the repeated admonitions by the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and others against allowing racial prejudice to play any part in the determination of guilt or imposition of sentence in a criminal case, we are greatly disturbed by trial counsel's blatant acknowledgment to the jury, in defending an African-American defendant accused of an interracial crime, of his negative feelings toward "black people just because they're black." We condemn these statements not because counsel chose to discuss the topic of race in voir dire, which is permissible, but because he did so in a

1996We disagree because the record supports the conclusions that the African-American defendant’s third challenge of a Hispanic prospective juror was racially motivated, see Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995), and that the proffered reason for the strike was pretextual.

1995See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (reason for challenge may be pretextual if "unrelated to the facts of the case") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); cf. Desroches v. State, 645 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (African-American defendant's assertion that African-American prospective juror would be unable to relate to defendant's situation based on facts in record constituted race-neutral, non-pretextual reason for striking juror).