6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2015In a concurring opinion, two judges of the panel decision expressed their concern with Florida law which requires courts to apply a special rule in circumstantial criminal cases, noting the Fifth District’s analysis in Knight v. State, and the statement there that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” Id. at 881 (Morris and Black, JJ., concurring) (quoting Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). 2014In Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449, 455, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District concluded that the special circumstantial evidence test did not apply under the facts of that case but also opined that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” See also Rocker, 122 So.3d at 912 (Villanti, J., dissenting); Sims, 110 So.3d at 117 (Thomas, J., dissenting). | 2 | 4 |
Matter of Use by Tr. Cts. of Stand. Jury Inst.green1 sentence2020In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the special standard for evaluating circumstantial evidence as “confusing and incorrect”) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954)). | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the special standard for evaluating circumstantial evidence as “confusing and incorrect”) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954)). | 1 | 1 |
Twilegar v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Because the evidence pointing to Wright as the perpetrator was wholly circumstantial, the court applied the special circumstantial evidence standard of review, i.e., "not only must the evidence be sufficient to establish each element of the offense," it must also "be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence proposed by the defendant." Id. at 521 (quoting Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 188 (Fla. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
Jonathan Charles v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2019See Cornwell v. State, 425 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that a defendant’s motion alleging “the State had failed to prove a prima facie case” was “deficient to preserve the point on appeal”); see also Charles v. State, 253 So. 3d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“[A]ppellant cannot raise for the first time on appeal an argument that the special circumstantial evidence standard applies.”). | 1 | 1 |
Cornwell v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Cornwell v. State, 425 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that a defendant’s motion alleging “the State had failed to prove a prima facie case” was “deficient to preserve the point on appeal”); see also Charles v. State, 253 So. 3d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“[A]ppellant cannot raise for the first time on appeal an argument that the special circumstantial evidence standard applies.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jonathon Knight v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2019Our supreme court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: "Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Knight, 186 So. 3d at 1009 (alteration in original) (quoting Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982)). 2019However, in Knight the supreme court clarified the special circumstantial evidence standard of review and narrowed its application to cases in which the evidence pointing to the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offense is wholly circumstantial. 186 So. 3d at 1010 . | 1 | 1 |
Jaramillo v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Our supreme court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: "Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Knight, 186 So. 3d at 1009 (alteration in original) (quoting Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Pagan v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002) ("If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction."). | 1 | 1 |
Westbrooks v. Stategreen1 sentence2015In a concurring opinion, two judges of the panel decision expressed their concern with Florida law which requires courts to apply a special rule in circumstantial criminal cases, noting the Fifth District’s analysis in Knight v. State, and the statement there that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” Id. at 881 (Morris and Black, JJ., concurring) (quoting Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Castro v. Stategreen2 sentences2014In Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449, 455, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District concluded that the special circumstantial evidence test did not apply under the facts of that case but also opined that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” See also Rocker, 122 So.3d at 912 (Villanti, J., dissenting); Sims, 110 So.3d at 117 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 2014In Knight v. State, 107 So.3d 449, 455, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District concluded that the special circumstantial evidence test did not apply under the facts of that case but also opined that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” See also Rocker, 122 So.3d at 912 (Villanti, J., dissenting); Sims, 110 So.3d at 117 (Thomas, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simsgreen2 sentences2013See also Rocker v. State, 122 So.3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (Villanti, J„ dissenting) (agreeing with Knight that the supreme court should reconsider the special circumstantial evidence standard); State v. Sims, 110 So.3d 113, 117-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). . 2013See also Rocker v. State, 122 So.3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (Villanti, J„ dissenting) (agreeing with Knight that the supreme court should reconsider the special circumstantial evidence standard); State v. Sims, 110 So.3d 113, 117-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). . | 1 | 1 |
Beggio v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See also Rocker v. State, 122 So.3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (Villanti, J„ dissenting) (agreeing with Knight that the supreme court should reconsider the special circumstantial evidence standard); State v. Sims, 110 So.3d 113, 117-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). . 2013See also Rocker v. State, 122 So.3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (Villanti, J„ dissenting) (agreeing with Knight that the supreme court should reconsider the special circumstantial evidence standard); State v. Sims, 110 So.3d 113, 117-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McArthur v. State
green
1 sentence2019Other than in the context of that comment on the weight of the evidence, Knight was not mentioned; most of the dissent described why its author felt that the conviction should be affirmed even under the special circumstantial evidence standard of review. - 29 - sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." (quoting McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 , 976 n.12 (Fla. 1977))). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ralph Daniel Wright, Jr. v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2019Because the evidence pointing to Wright as the perpetrator was wholly circumstantial, the court applied the special circumstantial evidence standard of review, i.e., "not only must the evidence be sufficient to establish each element of the offense," it must also "be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence proposed by the defendant." Id. at 521 (quoting Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 188 (Fla. 2010)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |