special damages rule in Florida

2020As Judge Lagoa noted, Detournay, 127 So. 3d at 878-79 , the supreme court made the special-damages rule more lenient in Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972).

2019A decade and a half after Boucher, the supreme court decided Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837-38 (Fla. 1972), in which it recognized that "changed conditions, including increased population growth and density, require a more lenient application of" the special damages rule than Boucher contemplated.

2025Fla., LLC v. Jimenez, 946 So. 2d 90, 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also id. (“The purpose of the special damages rule is to prevent surprise at trial.”). 5 Here, the Shaws requested damages for loss of quiet enjoyment in their complaint, and they introduced evidence at trial to support their impairment of use of the property, along with their diminished quality of life.

2025Fla., LLC v. Jimenez, 946 So. 2d 90, 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also id. (“The purpose of the special damages rule is to prevent surprise at trial.”). 5 Here, the Shaws requested damages for loss of quiet enjoyment in their complaint, and they introduced evidence at trial to support their impairment of use of the property, along with their diminished quality of life.

2019The rule serves to limit the avalanche of litigation that might otherwise result from any alleged zoning violation; one need not have a surfeit of imagination to picture the results if every member of a community bothered by a single zoning violation was authorized to bring the same suit against the same defendant alleging the same general type of harm.3 See Skaggs-Albertson's, 363 So. 2d at 1088 ; see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla 1974) (quoting Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead-Save 2The Chapmans have not disputed that the special damages rule applies to their

2019See also Skaggs- Albertsons, 363 So. 2d at 1088 (explaining that the special damages rule "has acquired a more liberal application"); Albright v. Hensley, 492 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (explaining that "the courts have reduced what was [formerly] required to establish special damages").

2019Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see also Atha v. Allen P. Van Overbeke, D.M.D., P.A., 213 So. 3d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (stating standard for judging sufficiency of a complaint).

2019Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see also Atha v. Allen P. Van Overbeke, D.M.D., P.A., 213 So. 3d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (stating standard for judging sufficiency of a complaint).

2019The rule serves to limit the avalanche of litigation that might otherwise result from any alleged zoning violation; one need not have a surfeit of imagination to picture the results if every member of a community bothered by a single zoning violation was authorized to bring the same suit against the same defendant alleging the same general type of harm.3 See Skaggs-Albertson's, 363 So. 2d at 1088 ; see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla 1974) (quoting Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead-Save 2The Chapmans have not disputed that the special damages rule applies to their

2019See also Skaggs- Albertsons, 363 So. 2d at 1088 (explaining that the special damages rule "has acquired a more liberal application"); Albright v. Hensley, 492 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (explaining that "the courts have reduced what was [formerly] required to establish special damages").

2019See also Skaggs- Albertsons, 363 So. 2d at 1088 (explaining that the special damages rule "has acquired a more liberal application"); Albright v. Hensley, 492 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (explaining that "the courts have reduced what was [formerly] required to establish special damages").

2016In Kelner , this Court held that the special damages requirement “has no application where a person affected seeks to challenge such action of the city on the ground that the action was illegal, or that the proceedings before the city council which resulted in such action were conducted contrary to the provisions of the charter, such as by failure of the city to give notice required by its charter, as alleged here.” Kelner, 252 So.2d at 871 (emphasis added).

2004See Exchange Invs., Inc. v. Alachua County, 481 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Rayan Corp., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Dade County, 356 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); see also Messett v. Cohen, 741 So.2d 619 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (recognizing that the special damages standard applies to the issue of standing).

2004See Exchange Invs., Inc. v. Alachua County, 481 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Rayan Corp., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Dade County, 356 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); see also Messett v. Cohen, 741 So.2d 619 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (recognizing that the special damages standard applies to the issue of standing).