Rhode Island rule in Rhode Island

2019E.g., Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 (R.I. 2014); Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000).

2015Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422-23 (R.I.2014) (“This Court has not yet addressed whether continued adherence to our traditional Rhode Island standard is appropriate or whether the new Federal guide of plausibility should be adopted.”).

2016See, e.g., Crowe, 891 A.2d at 847 (looking to the committee notes to Rule 26). -9- 26 was amended by Rhode Island again on June 15, 2006, and it is that amended version of the rule, rather than the 1995 Rhode Island rule, that is applicable to the instant case.

2015Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 88 A.3d 1157, 1161 (R.I.2014); Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 290 (R.I.2007); Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I.2006).

2016It is true that we have stated on more than one occasion that “[wjhen * * * the Rhode Island rule is substantially similar to the federal rule, we often look to federal courts’ decisions for guidance and interpretation.” O’Connor v. Newport Hospital, 111 A.3d 317 , 323-24 n. 5 (R.I.2015); see Brown, 88 A.3d at 1110 n. 7.

2016It is true that we have stated on more than one occasion that “[wjhen * * * the Rhode Island rule is substantially similar to the federal rule, we often look to federal courts’ decisions for guidance and interpretation.” O’Connor v. Newport Hospital, 111 A.3d 317 , 323-24 n. 5 (R.I.2015); see Brown, 88 A.3d at 1110 n. 7.

2018We lead with the principle that "[a] dismissal, with prejudice, constitutes a final judgment on the merits." DiPinto v. Sperling , 9 F.3d 2 , 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (reviewing the Rhode Island doctrine of res judicata ).

2018We lead with the principle that "[a] dismissal, with prejudice, constitutes a final judgment on the merits." DiPinto v. Sperling , 9 F.3d 2 , 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (reviewing the Rhode Island doctrine of res judicata ).

2019E.g., Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 (R.I. 2014); Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000).

2019E.g., Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 (R.I. 2014); Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000).

2019E.g., Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 (R.I. 2014); Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000).

2019E.g., Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 (R.I. 2014); Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000).

2018Still, Goodrow alludes to the following notion to support his position that the federal court dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits: "If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or parties, or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did not go to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit." Costello v. United States , 365 U.S. 265 , 286, 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (quoting Hughes v. United States , 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 , 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866) ).

2018Still, Goodrow alludes to the following notion to support his position that the federal court dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits: "If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or parties, or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did not go to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit." Costello v. United States , 365 U.S. 265 , 286, 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (quoting Hughes v. United States , 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 , 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866) ).

2018Still, Goodrow alludes to the following notion to support his position that the federal court dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits: "If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or parties, or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did not go to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit." Costello v. United States , 365 U.S. 265 , 286, 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (quoting Hughes v. United States , 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 , 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866) ).

2018Still, Goodrow alludes to the following notion to support his position that the federal court dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits: "If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or parties, or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did not go to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit." Costello v. United States , 365 U.S. 265 , 286, 81 S.Ct. 534 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (quoting Hughes v. United States , 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 , 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866) ).

2016However, Cashman’s contention fails to take into account that Rule 4 We acknowledge that “we are not bound by reporter’s notes in applying [a] rule.” State v. Macaskill, 475 A.2d 1024, 1028 (R.I. 1984).

2016However, Cashman’s contention fails to take into account that Rule 4 We acknowledge that “we are not bound by reporter’s notes in applying [a] rule.” State v. Macaskill, 475 A.2d 1024, 1028 (R.I. 1984).

2015Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 88 A.3d 1157, 1161 (R.I.2014); Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 290 (R.I.2007); Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I.2006).

2015Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 88 A.3d 1157, 1161 (R.I.2014); Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 290 (R.I.2007); Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I.2006).

2015Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 88 A.3d 1157, 1161 (R.I.2014); Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 290 (R.I.2007); Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I.2006).

2015Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 88 A.3d 1157, 1161 (R.I.2014); Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 290 (R.I.2007); Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I.2006).

2014In Twombly , the Supreme Court stated that the “no set of facts” language originating in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 , 78 S.Ct. 99 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) — and on which this Court's articulation of the traditional Rhode Island standard is based — “has earned its retirement.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 563 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

2014In Twombly , the Supreme Court stated that the “no set of facts” language originating in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 , 78 S.Ct. 99 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) — and on which this Court's articulation of the traditional Rhode Island standard is based — “has earned its retirement.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 563 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

2013See World-Wide Computer Resources, Inc. v. Arthur Kaufman Sales Co., 615 A.2d 122, 124 (R.I.1992) (interpreting an identically worded predecessor to § 7-1.2-1418).

2013“We will do so, however, if ‘such recommendation is not well founded.’ ” Id. at 1164 (quoting In re Testa, 489 A.2d 331, 334 (R.I.1985)). *155 III Discussion To gain admittance to the Rhode Island bar, an applicant “shall be required to establish by clear and convincing evidence their moral character and fitness to the satisfaction of the Committee on Character and Fitness of the Supreme Court * * Rule 3(a).

2011Retired Adjunct Professors , 690 A.2d at 1347 . *Page 21 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a statute creates contractual rights "only when the language and the circumstances of the statute's enactment evince a clear legislative intent to create private and enforceable contract rights against the state." Id. at 1345.

2011Retired Adjunct Professors , 690 A.2d at 1347 . *Page 21 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a statute creates contractual rights "only when the language and the circumstances of the statute's enactment evince a clear legislative intent to create private and enforceable contract rights against the state." Id. at 1345.

2009Battery in Rhode Island The defendant next invites this Court to abandon our common-law definition of criminal battery and replace it with the Model Penal Code’s rule, 5 which requires bodily injury to support a criminal conviction for battery. 6 In Rhode Island, “[a]side from the obvious higher standard of proof required to establish criminal battery, the law recognizes no distinction between criminal and civil battery.” Fenwick v. Oberman, 847 A.2d 852, 855 (R.I.2004).

2009“Battery refers to an act that was intended to cause, and does cause, an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consummation of the assault.” State v. Messa, 594 A.2d 882, 884 (R.I.1991) (quoting Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I.1983)).