Anthony analysis in Tennessee

2014See State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (explicitly recognizing that the test set forth in Dixon replaced the Anthony test).

2014See State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (explicitly recognizing that the test set forth in Dixon replaced the Anthony test).

2013The Dixon court also added a second level of inquiry to the Anthony analysis, concluding that where the confinement is beyond that necessary for the accompanying felony, a court must next determine “whether the additional movement or confinement: (1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant’s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim’s risk of harm.” Id. at 535 .

2013The Dixon court also added a second level of inquiry to the Anthony analysis, concluding that where the confinement is beyond that necessary for the accompanying felony, a court must next determine “whether the additional movement or confinement: (1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant’s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim’s risk of harm.” Id. at 535 .

2008As we previously have observed, the Dixon test “provides the structure necessary for applying the principles announced in Anthony.” State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Tenn.2005). 5 Although we adhere to the due process principles adopted in Anthony, 6 we now make clear that the Anthony analysis should not be used in conjunction with the Dixon two-part test.

2008As we previously have observed, the Dixon test “provides the structure necessary for applying the principles announced in Anthony.” State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Tenn.2005). 5 Although we adhere to the due process principles adopted in Anthony, 6 we now make clear that the Anthony analysis should not be used in conjunction with the Dixon two-part test.

2004State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. 1999) (holding due process was not violated by dual convictions for burglary and theft); see State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the “essentially incidental” test developed in Anthony “is not helpful in the context of sexual offenses”); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (applying the Anthony analysis and upholding a separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping for detention that occurred during the course of an aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. 1993) (

2004State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. 1999) (holding due process was not violated by dual convictions for burglary and theft); see State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the “essentially incidental” test developed in Anthony “is not helpful in the context of sexual offenses”); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (applying the Anthony analysis and upholding a separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping for detention that occurred during the course of an aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. 1993) (

2011State v. Cowan, 46 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tenn. Crim.

2011State v. Cowan, 46 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Thus, there is no Anthony issue presented in this case. -8- The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient because the proof shows that “any confinement lasted only a very brief period before Mr. Splunge jumped from the car.” However, “nothing in the especially aggravated kidnapping statutes requires that the victim be removed for a certain distance or be confined for a certain period of time in order for a defendant’s actions to amount to a substantial interference with the victim’s liberty.” State v. Turner, 41 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tenn. Crim.

2003“Rather, the Anthony rule means that separate convictions cannot stand because, even though the evidence is sufficient to support both convictions, principles of due process would be offended by two separate convictions.” Turner, 41 S.W.3d at 671 .

2004State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. 1999) (holding due process was not violated by dual convictions for burglary and theft); see State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the “essentially incidental” test developed in Anthony “is not helpful in the context of sexual offenses”); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (applying the Anthony analysis and upholding a separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping for detention that occurred during the course of an aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. 1993) (

2004State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. 1999) (holding due process was not violated by dual convictions for burglary and theft); see State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the “essentially incidental” test developed in Anthony “is not helpful in the context of sexual offenses”); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (applying the Anthony analysis and upholding a separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping for detention that occurred during the course of an aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. 1993) (

2003I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusions that State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), is not implicated and that the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction withstands an Anthony analysis.

2003I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusions that State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), is not implicated and that the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction withstands an Anthony analysis.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2015See, e.g., Alston, 465 S.W.3d at 565 (declining to extend the White jury instruction requirement to cases involving especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary).

2015See, e.g., Alston, 465 S.W.3d at 565 (declining to extend the White jury instruction requirement to cases involving especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary).

2010State v. R oberts, 943 S.W.2d 403, 406-07 (Tenn. Crim.

2010State v. R oberts, 943 S.W.2d 403, 406-07 (Tenn. Crim.

2005State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tenn. 2001).

2004State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. 1999) (holding due process was not violated by dual convictions for burglary and theft); see State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the “essentially incidental” test developed in Anthony “is not helpful in the context of sexual offenses”); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (applying the Anthony analysis and upholding a separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping for detention that occurred during the course of an aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. 1993) (

2004State v. Ralph, 6 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. 1999) (holding due process was not violated by dual convictions for burglary and theft); see State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the “essentially incidental” test developed in Anthony “is not helpful in the context of sexual offenses”); State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (applying the Anthony analysis and upholding a separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping for detention that occurred during the course of an aggravated assault and attempted sexual battery); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. 1993) (

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.

2001See State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 , 958 n. 3 (Tenn.1997) (trial court set aside defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping post-trial under Anthony); State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn.1996) (when kidnapping is “essentially incidental” to another offense— most notably, robbery and rape — then the due process provision of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits a conviction for kidnapping); State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1993) (facts fully support convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, but not kidnapping under the Anthony rule); State v. Binion, 947 S.