result of legal error in Arizona

2025Denial of the motions to dismiss with prejudice ¶17 The superior court must dismiss charges with prejudice if a prosecutor engaged in (1) improper conduct, (2) which is “not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial,” (3) and prejudice results “which cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial.” Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98 , 108–09 (1984).

2024To warrant reversal, the alleged prosecutorial error must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]uch conduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool v. Superior Ct. In & For Pima Cnty., 139 Ariz. 98, 108 (1984). ¶16 We have reviewed the entirety of the prosecuto

2020“Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235 , 238–39 ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (quoting Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98 , 108–09 (1984)).

2019“Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial . . . .’“ State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (quoting Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09 (1984)).

2023Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct requires showing “intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial . . . [and] not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety.” State v. Lapan, 249 Ariz. 540 , 548–9 ¶ 25 (App. 2020) (quoting State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383 , 393 ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (cleaned up).

2022Prerequisite to such a dismissal, the prosecution must engage in misconduct—“conduct that ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or significant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.’” State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383, 393, ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (quoting Pool v. Superior Ct., 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09 (1984)). 3 STATE v. DELGADO Decision of the Court ¶10 The court did not expressly find that the interests of justice required dismissal with prejudice but made other findings describing its reason

2024To warrant reversal, the alleged prosecutorial error must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]uch conduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool v. Superior Ct. In & For Pima Cnty., 139 Ariz. 98, 108 (1984). ¶16 We have reviewed the entirety of the prosecuto

2016“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Id. ¶26 Prosecutorial misconduct is not “merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.” Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108 (1984).

2016See State v. Ramos, 235 Ariz. 230, 234, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (citing Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 ). ¶25 Prosecutorial misconduct “‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (quoting Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09 (1984)).

2015See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d at 607 . ¶16 “Prosecutorial misconduct ’is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, ¶ 11 , 172 P.3d 423, 426-27 (App. 2007) (quoting State v. Pool, 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09 , 677 P.2d 261 , 271-72 (1984)).

2019“Prosecutorial misconduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.” State v. Ramos, 235 Ariz. 230, 237, ¶ 22 (App. 2014) (quotation omitted). ¶15 Anderson has not met that burden here.

2016See State v. Ramos, 235 Ariz. 230, 234, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (citing Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 ). ¶25 Prosecutorial misconduct “‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (quoting Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108-09 (1984)).

2018Rather, viewed in its entirety, it is “intentional conduct” that the prosecutor “knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose.” Id. at 108- 09. ¶13 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the “defendant must show that the offending statements [or conduct], in the context of the entire proceeding, so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 402, ¶ 60 (2006) (internal quotation omitted).

2017Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the prosecutor: (1) “places the prestige of the government behind its evidence,” or (2) “suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the evidence.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 402, ¶ 62 (2006) (quoting State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 423 (1989)).

2018See State v. Trani, 200 Ariz. 383, 384, ¶ 5 (App. 2001). ¶12 Prosecutorial misconduct is “not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety.” Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108 (1984).

2016Id.; see State v. Trani, 200 Ariz. 383, 384, ¶ 7 , 26 P.3d 1154, 1155 (App. 2001) (discussing the second element of the Pool analysis). ¶22 To decide whether a prosecutor’s conduct, in the totality of the circumstances, amounts to “intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial,” a court should “measure what the prosecutor ‘intends’ and ‘knows’ by objective factors, which include the situation in which the prosecutor found himself, the evidence of actual knowledge and intent and any other factors which may give rise to an appropriate inference or conclusion.” Poo

2009We will reverse a conviction “if the cumulative effect of the alleged acts of misconduct ‘shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, ¶ 74 , 189 P.3d at 419 , quoting State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶ 155 , 141 P.3d 368, 403 (2006). ¶ 37 Martinez maintains the prosecutor used “improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction” by using Jones and Cano to elicit incriminating information because the state had a weak case.

2009We will reverse a conviction “if the cumulative effect of the alleged acts of misconduct ‘shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, ¶ 74 , 189 P.3d at 419 , quoting State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶ 155 , 141 P.3d 368, 403 (2006). ¶ 37 Martinez maintains the prosecutor used “improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction” by using Jones and Cano to elicit incriminating information because the state had a weak case.

2025Double jeopardy is then triggered because the State “intentionally expos[ing] the defendant to multiple trials for the same crime . . . is exactly what the double jeopardy provision intended to prevent.” State v. Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 392, ¶ 6 (2000) (cleaned up). ¶18 The parties only dispute the second Pool factor—whether the prosecutor’s mistake was intentional or, as the court found, resulted from the prosecutor not having a “sufficient mastery of the State’s evidence.” Absent clear error, we defer to the superior court’s findings on whether a prosecutor’s conduct was intentional.

2022See State v. Marquess, 168 Ariz. 123, 126 (App. 1991) (when the court dismisses an indictment with prejudice, the interest of justice finding may be implied).

2019“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’“ State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 3 Deputy Watson was not the State’s case agent in this matter. 7 STATE v. LINCOURT Decision of the Court ¶15 A violation of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.3(a) does not automatically require reversal.

2019See State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 497 (1996). ¶14 “Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.’” State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235 , 238–39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (quoting Pool v. Super.

2018See State v. Herrera, 174 Ariz. 387 , 396–97 (1993) (finding no misconduct where prosecutor urged jurors “to do justice” if burden of proof was met); State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 468, ¶ 210 (2016) (finding no misconduct where prosecutor argued that “[w]e are seeking a just punishment for what this defendant has done”); see also State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235 , 238–39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (“Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be

2018See State v. Herrera, 174 Ariz. 387 , 396–97 (1993) (finding no misconduct where prosecutor urged jurors “to do justice” if burden of proof was met); State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 468, ¶ 210 (2016) (finding no misconduct where prosecutor argued that “[w]e are seeking a just punishment for what this defendant has done”); see also State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235 , 238–39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (“Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be

2017Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the prosecutor: (1) “places the prestige of the government behind its evidence,” or (2) “suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the evidence.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 402, ¶ 62 (2006) (quoting State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 423 (1989)).

2015To constitute reversible error, the misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial, and “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 , 160 P.3d 203, 214 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2015To constitute reversible error, the misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial, and “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 , 160 P.3d 203, 214 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2012For prosecutorial misconduct to qualify as fundamental error, the error must *19 be “‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’ ” State v. Harrod, 218 Ariz. 268, ¶ 35 , 183 P.3d 519, 529 (2008), quoting State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, ¶ 26 , 969 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1998). ¶ 12 During direct examination, the prosecutor asked a police officer whether Lopez, in the approximately three-week period between the crimes and his arrest, had “ever turn[ed] himself in to cooperate with the police and give his side of the story for the events.” 3 The officer responded

2012For prosecutorial misconduct to qualify as fundamental error, the error must *19 be “‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’ ” State v. Harrod, 218 Ariz. 268, ¶ 35 , 183 P.3d 519, 529 (2008), quoting State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, ¶ 26 , 969 P.2d 1184, 1191 (1998). ¶ 12 During direct examination, the prosecutor asked a police officer whether Lopez, in the approximately three-week period between the crimes and his arrest, had “ever turn[ed] himself in to cooperate with the police and give his side of the story for the events.” 3 The officer responded

2012State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶ 9 “A defendant seeking reversal of a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct must establish that (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” State v. Dixon, 226 Ariz. 545, 549, ¶ 7 , 250 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2011) (internal citation omitted and quotations omitted.) Prosecutorial misconduct “is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, take

2012State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶ 9 “A defendant seeking reversal of a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct must establish that (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” State v. Dixon, 226 Ariz. 545, 549, ¶ 7 , 250 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2011) (internal citation omitted and quotations omitted.) Prosecutorial misconduct “is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, take