account presumption in Illinois

2020Furthermore, the individual defendants contend that reversal would be a harsh outcome because the Board, not the individual defendants, was responsible for creating and filing a record of proceedings under section 3- 108(b). -8- ¶ 32 In reversing and remanding the zoning board’s decision to determine whether a record of the administrative proceedings were kept, the Strohl court noted that, under the Administrative Review Act, technical errors in the administrative proceedings do not constitute grounds for reversal “unless it appears to the trial court that such error or failure materially affe

2019Furthermore, the individual defendants contend that reversal would be a harsh outcome because the Board, not the individual defendants, was responsible for creating and filing a record of proceedings under section 3-108(b). ¶ 32 In reversing and remanding the zoning board’s decision to determine whether a record of the administrative proceedings were kept, the Strohl court noted that, under the Administrative Review Act, technical errors in the administrative proceedings do not constitute grounds for reversal “unless it appears to the trial court that such error or failure materially affected

1988App. 3d 534 , 381 N.E.2d 1380 .) In the present case, the only evidence introduced to determine when the tampering occurred was the account analysis prepared and interpreted by NI-G’s expert witness, Norbert Oliver, director of measurement for NI-G.

1988Although circumstantial evidence will generally suffice whenever an inference may reasonably be drawn from it (Mort v. Walker (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 391 , 457 N.E.2d 18 ), the existence of a fact may not be inferred from the evidence when the existence of another fact inconsistent with the first can be inferred with equal certainty from the same evidence.

1988Although circumstantial evidence will generally suffice whenever an inference may reasonably be drawn from it (Mort v. Walker (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 391 , 457 N.E.2d 18 ), the existence of a fact may not be inferred from the evidence when the existence of another fact inconsistent with the first can be inferred with equal certainty from the same evidence.

1977(See Pure Torpedo Corp.; Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickinson (1910), 153 Ill.

1977(See Dick v. Zimmerman (1904), 207 Ill. 636, 639 , 69 N.E. 754 .) However, while the recipient of an account rendered, which through lack of objection on his part has ripened into an account stated, is precluded from raising previous disputes regarding various items of the account as a defense, he is not precluded from impeaching the account stated through the use of evidence which has its foundation in matters of anterior liability and which shows fraud, error or mistake.

1977(See Dick v. Zimmerman (1904), 207 Ill. 636, 639 , 69 N.E. 754 .) However, while the recipient of an account rendered, which through lack of objection on his part has ripened into an account stated, is precluded from raising previous disputes regarding various items of the account as a defense, he is not precluded from impeaching the account stated through the use of evidence which has its foundation in matters of anterior liability and which shows fraud, error or mistake.

1971Generally speaking, I agree that with respect to the usual joint survivorship account, the rule as announced in Murgic v. Granite City Trust and Savings Bank, 31 Ill.2d 587 , 202 N.E.2d 470 , is that from the creation of such an account there is a presumption of donative intent and that the burden is upon the contestant to prove the absence thereof.

1971Generally speaking, I agree that with respect to the usual joint survivorship account, the rule as announced in Murgic v. Granite City Trust and Savings Bank, 31 Ill.2d 587 , 202 N.E.2d 470 , is that from the creation of such an account there is a presumption of donative intent and that the burden is upon the contestant to prove the absence thereof.