verified claim in New York

2015We agree with defendant that CPLR 2001 does not permit a court to disregard the complete failure to file a summons, i.e., an initial paper necessary to commence an action (see Goldenberg v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 16 NY3d 323, 328 [2011]; O’Brien v Contreras, 126 AD3d 958, 958-959 [2015]).

2015We agree with defendant that CPLR 2001 does not permit a court to disregard the complete failure to file a summons, i.e., an initial paper necessary to commence an action (see Goldenberg v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 16 NY3d 323, 328 [2011]; O’Brien v Contreras, 126 AD3d 958, 958-959 [2015]).

2015We agree with defendant that CPLR 2001 does not permit a court to disregard the complete failure to file a summons, i.e., an initial paper necessary to commence an action (see Goldenberg v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 16 NY3d 323, 328 [2011]; O’Brien v Contreras, 126 AD3d 958, 958-959 [2015]).

2015We agree with defendant that CPLR 2001 does not permit a court to disregard the complete failure to file a summons, i.e., an initial paper necessary to commence an action (see Goldenberg v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 16 NY3d 323, 328 [2011]; O’Brien v Contreras, 126 AD3d 958, 958-959 [2015]).

2014Since the statutory requirements of the Court of Claims Act must be strictly construed (see Thomas v State of New York, 57 AD3d 969, 970 [2008]), the failure of the claimants to set forth in the verified claim when the claim arose constituted a jurisdictional defect mandating dismissal (see Prisco v State of New York, 62 AD3d 978, 979 [2009]; Jones v State of New York, 56 AD3d 906 [2008]).

2014Since the statutory requirements of the Court of Claims Act must be strictly construed (see Thomas v State of New York, 57 AD3d 969, 970 [2008]), the failure of the claimants to set forth in the verified claim when the claim arose constituted a jurisdictional defect mandating dismissal (see Prisco v State of New York, 62 AD3d 978, 979 [2009]; Jones v State of New York, 56 AD3d 906 [2008]).

2014Since the statutory requirements of the Court of Claims Act must be strictly construed (see Thomas v State of New York, 57 AD3d 969, 970 [2008]), the failure of the claimants to set forth in the verified claim when the claim arose constituted a jurisdictional defect mandating dismissal (see Prisco v State of New York, 62 AD3d 978, 979 [2009]; Jones v State of New York, 56 AD3d 906 [2008]).

2014Since the statutory requirements of the Court of Claims Act must be strictly construed (see Thomas v State of New York, 57 AD3d 969, 970 [2008]), the failure of the claimants to set forth in the verified claim when the claim arose constituted a jurisdictional defect mandating dismissal (see Prisco v State of New York, 62 AD3d 978, 979 [2009]; Jones v State of New York, 56 AD3d 906 [2008]).

2021Co. , 216 AD2d 448, 448 ; see 11 NYCRR 65-3.15). "[A]n insurer must pay or deny only a verified claim—that is, a claim that has been verified to the extent compliance with section 65-3.5 dictates in the particular case—within 30 calendar days of receipt; and, conversely, is not obligated to pay any claim until it has been so verified" ( Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp. , 8 NY3d 294, 299 ).

2018The remaining issue is whether defendant was provided with proper verification of plaintiff's claim for lost wages. "[A]n insurer must pay or deny only a verified claim" ( Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp. , 8 NY3d 294, 299 [2007]; see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]), which ordinarily requires "its receipt of verification of all of the relevant information requested" (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [b] [3]; see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp. , 8 NY3d at 299 ).

2026However, because the complete and verified claim was not served on the Attorney General until May 27, 2025, the six-month limitation period began on November 27, 2024 ( see Speers v State of New York , 285 AD2d 872, 872 [3d Dept 2001]).

2026However, because the complete and verified claim was not served on the Attorney General until May 27, 2025, the six-month limitation period began on November 27, 2024 ( see Speers v State of New York , 285 AD2d 872, 872 [3d Dept 2001]).

2025(Estate <~{Cantarella, NYLJ, July 10, 1989 at 2, col 6 [Sur Ct, Bronx County July 10, 1989]) [Actual knowledge of the claim vitiates the protection afforded by SCPA 1802]; see also Matter ofSnitkin, 151 Misc 118, 120 [Sur Ct, NY County 1934].) Moreover, executor made distributions to residuary beneficiaries, including herself, within the seven-month period.

2025(See eg th Matter of Lee, 107 Misc 2d 928, 930 [Sur Ct, Yates County 1981 ].) Thus, E 70 St Corp could serve executor with a verified claim against the estate pursuant to SCP A 1803 at anytime.

2025(See eg th Matter of Lee, 107 Misc 2d 928, 930 [Sur Ct, Yates County 1981 ].) Thus, E 70 St Corp could serve executor with a verified claim against the estate pursuant to SCP A 1803 at anytime.

2025(See eg Matter <~/Bailey, 147 Misc 2d 46, 47 [Sur Ct, Bronx County 1990].) Here, executor had actual knowledge of the claim before her appointment and thus cannot th avail herself to the protections of SCP A 1802 even though E 70 St Corp has not served her with a verified claim.

2025(See eg Matter <~/Bailey, 147 Misc 2d 46, 47 [Sur Ct, Bronx County 1990].) Here, executor had actual knowledge of the claim before her appointment and thus cannot th avail herself to the protections of SCP A 1802 even though E 70 St Corp has not served her with a verified claim.

2024Even granting the verified claim a liberal construction, presuming its allegations true and providing claimant the benefit of every possible inference, said claim failed to set forth any factual basis upon which defendant could have reasonably anticipated the perpetrators' harmful conduct and, thus, it failed to "provide a sufficiently detailed description of the particulars of the claim to enable defendant to investigate and promptly ascertain the existence and extent of its liability" ( Morra v State of New York , 107 AD3d at 1115-1116 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitte

2024In the second prong, which need not be established by documentary evidence, a claimant must state, in the verified claim, "facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed at trial in proving that (a) he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument or his acts or omissions charged in the accusatory instrument did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the state, and (b) he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b[4]; see Reed v State of New York , 78 NY2d 1, 9 [1991]; Nieve

2024Even granting the verified claim a liberal construction, presuming its allegations true and providing claimant the benefit of every possible inference, said claim failed to set forth any factual basis upon which defendant could have reasonably anticipated the perpetrators' harmful conduct and, thus, it failed to "provide a sufficiently detailed description of the particulars of the claim to enable defendant to investigate and promptly ascertain the existence and extent of its liability" ( Morra v State of New York , 107 AD3d at 1115-1116 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitte

2024In the second prong, which need not be established by documentary evidence, a claimant must state, in the verified claim, "facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed at trial in proving that (a) he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument or his acts or omissions charged in the accusatory instrument did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the state, and (b) he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b[4]; see Reed v State of New York , 78 NY2d 1, 9 [1991]; Nieve

2024"If the court finds after reading the claim that claimant is not likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b(4); see David W. v State , 27 AD3d at 116 ; Stewart v State of New York , 133 AD2d at 114 ).

2022In this regard, the verified claim together with Leopold Cox's affidavit alleging that the snowplow operator was excessively speeding in dangerous, icy conditions, was sufficient to show [*2]that the snowplow operator acted in conscious "disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow" ( Deleon v New York City Sanitation Dept. , 25 NY3d 1102, 1105 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103[b]).

2006Corp., 288 AD2d 11, 12 [2001]; Kelleir v Supreme Indus.

2004Previously, based upon the conclusion that defendant had failed (in paragraph second of its answer) to expressly deny the equal protection allegations contained in the verified claim (see CPLR 3018 [a]), this Court concluded that defendant “has admitted that each person stopped was stopped on the basis of race alone” and proceeded to determine that “[t]he proper standard for the Court of Claims to apply in this case is the strict scrutiny test” ( 250 AD2d 314, 321 [1998], supra).