Denno hearing in Arkansas

2007See, e.g., Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1 , 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568 , 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a statement in return for immunity).

2007See, e.g., Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1 , 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568 , 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a statement in return for immunity).

2007See, e.g., Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1 , 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568 , 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a statement in return for immunity).

2007See, e.g., Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1 , 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568 , 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a statement in return for immunity).

2007See, e.g., Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1 , 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568 , 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a statement in return for immunity).

2007See, e.g., Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996) (remand for a new suppression hearing on voluntariness of statement because material police witness not present at first hearing); Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1 , 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990) (remand for Denno hearing); Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568 , 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980) (remand for an explicit determination by the trial court on voluntariness of confession); Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (remand for hearing to determine whether defendant struck a deal with the prosecutor to give a statement in return for immunity).

1997See Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996); Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9 , 642 S.W.2d 887 (1982) (Supp.

1997See Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258 , 920 S.W.2d 821 (1996); Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9 , 642 S.W.2d 887 (1982) (Supp.

1997Weger, 315 Ark. at 558 , 869 S.W.2d at 690 .

1997Weger, 315 Ark. at 558 , 869 S.W.2d at 690 .

1990In Smith v. State, 254 Ark. 538 , 494 S.W.2d 489 (1973), we said: We hold that whenever the accused offers testimony that his confession was induced by violence, threats, coercion or offers of reward then the burden is upon the state to produce all material witnesses *702 who were connected with the controverted confession or give adequate explanation for their absence. [My emphasis.] We have held that in-custodial statements that are not in the nature of a confession do not even require a Denno hearing.

1990In Smith v. State, 254 Ark. 538 , 494 S.W.2d 489 (1973), we said: We hold that whenever the accused offers testimony that his confession was induced by violence, threats, coercion or offers of reward then the burden is upon the state to produce all material witnesses *702 who were connected with the controverted confession or give adequate explanation for their absence. [My emphasis.] We have held that in-custodial statements that are not in the nature of a confession do not even require a Denno hearing.

1988In Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103 , 589 S.W.2d 21 (1979), we dealt with the claim of an appellant who said that statements she made to officials in the process of hindering apprehension or prosecution of a robber were the same as a confession with respect to which she had been deprived of a Denno hearing.

1988In Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103 , 589 S.W.2d 21 (1979), we dealt with the claim of an appellant who said that statements she made to officials in the process of hindering apprehension or prosecution of a robber were the same as a confession with respect to which she had been deprived of a Denno hearing.

1983The case of Hignite v. State, 265 Ark. 866 , 581 S.W.2d 552 (1979), is not controlling, because there the issue was merely that of voluntariness in general, not the State’s failure to call all necessary witnesses to testify at the Denno hearing.

1983The case of Hignite v. State, 265 Ark. 866 , 581 S.W.2d 552 (1979), is not controlling, because there the issue was merely that of voluntariness in general, not the State’s failure to call all necessary witnesses to testify at the Denno hearing.

1981Northern v. State, 257 Ark. 549 , 518 S.W. 2d 482 (1975 v. Bushong v. State, 267 Ark. 113 , 589 S.W. 2d 559 (1979).

1981Northern v. State, 257 Ark. 549 , 518 S.W. 2d 482 (1975 v. Bushong v. State, 267 Ark. 113 , 589 S.W. 2d 559 (1979).

1981The Denno hearing testimony of Wilson and Wingo reveals that, at the Cabot Police Department, at about 11:00 a.m. on February 14, 1980, they fully advised appellant of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1981The Denno hearing testimony of Wilson and Wingo reveals that, at the Cabot Police Department, at about 11:00 a.m. on February 14, 1980, they fully advised appellant of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2017Unlike the Denno hearing, the focus was on how the 18 Cite as 2017 Ark. 201 police used Amanda to compel Holly to submit to police interviews after he had invoked his right to counsel.

2017Unlike the Denno hearing, the focus was on how the 18 Cite as 2017 Ark. 201 police used Amanda to compel Holly to submit to police interviews after he had invoked his right to counsel.

2003That holding is consistent with subsequent case law. 1 In Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709 , 587 S.W.2d 571 (1979), appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting a tape of the confession where only a transcript was available at the Denno hearing.

2003That holding is consistent with subsequent case law. 1 In Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709 , 587 S.W.2d 571 (1979), appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting a tape of the confession where only a transcript was available at the Denno hearing.

2001The majority relies on Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12 , 960 S.W.2d 434 (1998), in support of their harmless—error analysis.

2001The majority relies on Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12 , 960 S.W.2d 434 (1998), in support of their harmless—error analysis.

1998Relying upon Ingram v. State, 53 Ark.App. 77 , 918 S.W.2d 724 (1996), Conner also contends that because he was a juvenile, the police officers should have taken additional measures to ensure that he understood his rights.

1998Relying upon Ingram v. State, 53 Ark.App. 77 , 918 S.W.2d 724 (1996), Conner also contends that because he was a juvenile, the police officers should have taken additional measures to ensure that he understood his rights.

1997An Illinois court of appeals dealt with the issue and held that an appellate decision that a conviction must be reversed because of the prosecution’s failure to produce or explain the absence of a witness at a Denno hearing merely rendered the record “insufficient to determine the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress a defendant’s confession.” People v. Feagans, 480 N.E.2d at 158 .

1997An Illinois court of appeals dealt with the issue and held that an appellate decision that a conviction must be reversed because of the prosecution’s failure to produce or explain the absence of a witness at a Denno hearing merely rendered the record “insufficient to determine the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress a defendant’s confession.” People v. Feagans, 480 N.E.2d at 158 .

1997When the necessary witnesses are not produced, and no satisfactory explanation of their absence is forthcoming, we hold that evidence of the accused that his statement was involuntarily given “stands uncontradicted.” Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96 , 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570 , 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975).

1997When the necessary witnesses are not produced, and no satisfactory explanation of their absence is forthcoming, we hold that evidence of the accused that his statement was involuntarily given “stands uncontradicted.” Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96 , 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570 , 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975).

1997When the necessary witnesses are not produced, and no satisfactory explanation of their absence is forthcoming, we hold that evidence of the accused that his statement was involuntarily given “stands uncontradicted.” Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96 , 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570 , 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975).

1997When the necessary witnesses are not produced, and no satisfactory explanation of their absence is forthcoming, we hold that evidence of the accused that his statement was involuntarily given “stands uncontradicted.” Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96 , 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570 , 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975).

1995Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the State was prohibited from seeking the death penalty under Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), as Oliver was less than sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. 1 At trial, Oliver was found guilty of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole.

1995Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the State was prohibited from seeking the death penalty under Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), as Oliver was less than sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. 1 At trial, Oliver was found guilty of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole.

1994In Reynolds , the Eighth Circuit decided that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), did apply to trials of § 1983 civil rights actions.

1994In Reynolds, the Eighth Circuit decided that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), did apply to trials of § 1983 civil rights actions.