cgia immunity in Colorado

2014See, e.g., Springer, 13 P.3d at 801-02 (holding that a public entity is liable for the work of an independent contractor under the CGIA and explaining that a contrary conclusion would effectively nullify a CGIA waiver because a "public entity could simply hire an independent contractor ... and escape answering for injuries to citizens using its buildings"); Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 86 (Colo.2003) (interpreting a CGIA waiver term broadly because "we cannot interpret a term to withhold a waiver without clear legislative intent").

2001We determined that the "premises liability statute applies to the [governmental entity] as a landowner by reason of the CGIA's immunity waiver for dangerous conditions associated with construction or maintenance of the building." Id. at 805 .

2022Because the CGIA immunity provisions derogate Colorado’s common law, “we construe the [C]GIA provisions that withhold immunity broadly [and] we construe the exceptions to these waivers strictly.” Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000)).

2022Because the CGIA immunity provisions derogate Colorado’s common law, “we construe the [C]GIA provisions that withhold immunity broadly [and] we construe the exceptions to these waivers strictly.” Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000)).

2013See Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 , 924-26 (Colo.1993) (court may hold evidentiary hearing and resolve factual disputes relevant to motion to dismiss based on CGIA immunity).

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State , a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA

2022Because the CGIA immunity provisions derogate Colorado’s common law, “we construe the [C]GIA provisions that withhold immunity broadly [and] we construe the exceptions to these waivers strictly.” Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000)).

2022Because the CGIA immunity provisions derogate Colorado’s common law, “we construe the [C]GIA provisions that withhold immunity broadly [and] we construe the exceptions to these waivers strictly.” Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000)).

2025Walton challenged the timeliness of the appeal, arguing that the State couldn’t seek appellate review of the immunity claim when it had failed to file a timely “interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s initial order denying its CGIA motion to dismiss on the pleadings.” Id. at 639 . 11 ¶ 22 The supreme court rejected this argument.

2025Rather, because a public entity “has a right, not an obligation, to take an interlocutory appeal” under the statute, it may elect to forgo an immediate appeal of an adverse immunity ruling “in favor of pursuing trial or settlement on the claims, while 12 preserving the CGIA issue in the event of an appeal following final disposition of the case in the trial court.” Id.

2022Responding to this court’s prior abrogation of sovereign immunity, the General Assembly enacted the CGIA with the purposes of (1) protecting governments from unlimited liability that could “disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of . . . essential public services,” § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2021); (2) protecting taxpayers “against excessive fiscal burdens” as they would “ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability,” id.; and (3) “permit[ting] a person to seek redress for personal injuries caused by a public entity” in circumstances identified in the statute, State v. Mo

2022Responding to this court 's prior abrogation of sovereign immunity, the General Assembly enacted the CGIA with the purposes of (1) protecting governments from unlimited liability that could "disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of . . . essential public services," § 24-10-102, C.R.S. ( 2021 ) ; (2) protecting taxpayers "against excessive fiscal burdens" as they would "ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability," id. ; and (3) "permit [ting] a person to seek redress for personal injuries caused by a public entity" in circumstances identified in the statute , Stat

2022Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223, 225 (Colo. 1994); Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000) (“[W]e broadly construe the CGIA provisions that waive immunity in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence.”).

2022Walton, 968 P.2d at 644 ; see Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo. 1992) (“Injury stemming from the use of a dangerous or defective physical condition of the building itself might include injury resulting from, for example, using a faulty elevator or falling down defective stairs.”), overruled by Bertrand, 872 P.2d 223 . ¶ 15 Further, while a “dangerous condition” may be a hazard that the public entity itself creates, that dangerous condition must be one that is “associated with construction or maintenance, not solely design.” Springer, 13 P.3d at 799, 801 ; § 24-10-103(1.3) (“A dangero

2014See Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 88 P.3d 75 , 82 (Colo.2008) (citing the dictionary as the "appropriate source" from which to glean the meaning of "pursuit" in determining whether a police officer was immune from liability under the CGIA); Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo.1995) (endorsing the dictionary definition of the term "emergency" when interpreting a CGIA waiver).

2012Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo.1995). 118 The CGIA provides immunity to all public entities from suit for all actions that lie in tort, or that could lie in tort, unless an enumerated exception applies. §§ 24-10-105, -106, -110, C.R.S.2011; Brescioni v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 158 , 155 (Colo.App.1998)(the CGIA provides public entities immunity from suit).

2014Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254, 258 (Colo.1996); Bd. of Cnty.

2014Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254, 258 (Colo.1996); Bd. of Cnty.

2001Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636, 641 ("When disputed facts exist regarding application of the CGIA's immunity bar, the trial court on its own motion may hold an evidentiary hearing, and it should do so upon a public entity's request."); Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1384 ("Any factual dispute upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn is for the district court to resolve...."); Trinity Broad., 848 P.2d at 924-25 ; 2 Moore, supra, § 12.80[4].

1998See Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo.1997) (“Any factual dispute upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn is for the district court to resolve.”); Brace, 919 P.2d at 244 .

2025But the relief requested “informs our understanding of the nature of the injury and the duty allegedly breached.” Id. ¶ 14 Ultimately, the question of whether the CGIA bars a claim “turns on the source and nature of the government’s liability, or the nature of the duty from the breach of which liability arises.” Colo. Dep’t of Transp. v. Brown Grp.

2016The nature of the injury alleged-not the relief requested-is the primary inquiry to determine whether the CGIA applies to the claim, Id. at 1006 .

2025The CGIA’s immunity “encompasses all claims against a public entity arising from the breach of a general duty of care, as 6 distinguished from contractual relations or a distinctly non-tortious statutorily-imposed duty.” Id. at 691 .

2010Brown Group held that the CGIA barred a claim for a declaration that a state agency "[was] responsible for a pro rata share of past, present, and future costs" to remediate groundwater contamination. 182 P.3d at 691 .

2022Walton, 968 P.2d at 644 ; see Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo. 1992) (“Injury stemming from the use of a dangerous or defective physical condition of the building itself might include injury resulting from, for example, using a faulty elevator or falling down defective stairs.”), overruled by Bertrand, 872 P.2d 223 . ¶ 15 Further, while a “dangerous condition” may be a hazard that the public entity itself creates, that dangerous condition must be one that is “associated with construction or maintenance, not solely design.” Springer, 13 P.3d at 799, 801 ; § 24-10-103(1.3) (“A dangero

2001We held that an act of a third party was insufficient to create a dangerous condition of a public building under the CGIA, and that "the statute refers to an injury arising from the state of the building itself or the use of a state of the building, but not to one arising from activities conducted within the building." 826 P.2d at 827 . [3] We have since overruled this part of the Jenks opinion.

2014Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262 ; Carothers, 159 P.3d at 655-56 . { 15 Colorado cases construing the CGIA immunity provision have established the following principles with regard to when it applies: eThere is immunity if the claim arises from a breach of a general duty of care, as distinguished from a breach of a contract or other agreement.

2014Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262 ; Carothers, 159 P.3d at 655-56 . { 15 Colorado cases construing the CGIA immunity provision have established the following principles with regard to when it applies: eThere is immunity if the claim arises from a breach of a general duty of care, as distinguished from a breach of a contract or other agreement.

2008Discussion The CGIA provides no immunity from suit in an action for injuries resulting from the "operation and maintenance of any public water facility." § For many years, the CGIA did not define the term "public water facility." In the absence of a specific definition, the supreme court announced, in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509, 511 (Colo.1996), overruled in part by Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo.2000), that the "determinative factor ... is whether the facility is operated 'for the benefit of the public'" Thereafter, the Gallegos definition was used to determin

2001Dist., 895 P.2d 1120 (Colo.App.1995), which is in direct contradiction to the majority decision in this case. (3) Whether this court's adoption in Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo.1998) of the "deferential construction in favor of the victim" standard for interpretation of the CGIA waiver provisions overruled the "narrow" construction of waiver provisions standard set forth in City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996). (4) Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to apply, consistent with Walton v. State , a narrow construction of the immunity provision of the CGIA

2026See, e.g., Interbank Invs., LLC v. Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., 77 P.3d 814, 817 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[T]he law of the case doctrine recognizes limited exceptions to one division of this court being bound by the decision of another division in an earlier appeal.” (emphasis added)). 8 for its conclusion that the CGIA did not bar Wolfe’s claims.

2025Dist., 2020 COA 151, ¶ 19 (holding that even though an RTD bus driver did not act negligently when operating the bus, because the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from RTD’s failure to 9 maintain a handrail that came loose when the bus braked, CGIA immunity was waived). ¶ 18 Here, the district court was unconvinced that the automatic chain system on Ambulance 41 was negligently maintained or that it actually failed to deploy at the time of the accident.

2025See Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36 , ¶¶ 2, 24 (“We hold that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity.”).

2025One of the basic purposes of the statute is “to shield public entities and employees from being forced to trial or exposed to the other burdens of extended litigation, when the viability of the proceedings is dependent on the resolution of an essentially legal 16 question.” Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153, 157 (Colo. App. 1998).

2025One of the basic purposes of the statute is “to shield public entities and employees from being forced to trial or exposed to the other burdens of extended litigation, when the viability of the proceedings is dependent on the resolution of an essentially legal 16 question.” Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153, 157 (Colo. App. 1998).

2020Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 68 (Colo. 1995), claims under CADA plainly “could lie in tort.” Accordingly, CGIA immunity extends to CADA claims unless the General Assembly has expressly waived immunity.

2020Because the injuries that give rise to CADA claims can serve as the basis for common law tort claims, such as wrongful discharge in violation of public policy or tortious interference with an employment contract, see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992); Brooke v. Rest.