mere statutory violation in North Carolina

2013However, “[ujnder the rationale of [Supreme Court precedent] something more than a mere statutory violation is required to sustain a claim of wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception.” Garner, 350 N.C. at 571 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[A] degree of intent or wilfulness on the part of the employer [is required].” Id. at 572 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[T]he termination itself must be motivated by an unlawful reason or puipose that is against public policy.” Id.

2013However, “[ujnder the rationale of [Supreme Court precedent] something more than a mere statutory violation is required to sustain a claim of wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception.” Garner, 350 N.C. at 571 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[A] degree of intent or wilfulness on the part of the employer [is required].” Id. at 572 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[T]he termination itself must be motivated by an unlawful reason or puipose that is against public policy.” Id.

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);

2021However, this Court has found error per se in cases in which the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 84-14, State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 659 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 84- 14) (providing that, “in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent, except that the court may limit the number of those who may address the jury to three counsel on each side”), and N.C.G.S. § 7A-450(b1), State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 421 (1999) (citing N.C.G.S. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31-450(b1) (mandating the appointment of two counsel to represent defendants in capital cases);