6 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1981–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwestgreen2 sentences1988The implementation of this principle renders it essential that one threatened with stigmatization by unwarranted disclosure be accorded an opportunity to enforce the confidentiality it is designed to secure (see Douglas Oil Co. v Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 US 211, 218, n 8 ; cf. Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659 ).” (Supra, at 442-443.) "[I]t is * * * clear that the rule of secrecy applies equally to either one who gives evidence or to one concerning whom evidence is given.” (Supra, at 443.) This principle is equally applicable to individuals, and to governmental agencies and private in 1983The implementation of this principle renders it essential that one threatened with stigmatization by unwarranted disclosure be accorded an opportunity to enforce the confidentiality it is designed to secure (see Douglas Oil Co. v Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 US 211, 218, n 8 ; cf. Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659 ). | 2 | 2 |
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.green1 sentence2013(Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 US 252, 264-265 [1977] [“(O)fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Everitt v. Health Maintenance Centergreen2 sentences1983We, of course, acknowledge that errors may have occurred, and may occur, in the implementation of the rule, but we find nothing in the record of a compelling character to support the conclusion that such errors would not most appropriately be responded to on a case-by-case basis through appellate review in the manner indicated in Everitt v Health Maintenance Center (supra, p 227). 1983We, of course, acknowledge that errors may have occurred, and may occur, in the implementation of the rule, but we find nothing in the record of a compelling character to support the conclusion that such errors would not most appropriately be responded to on a case-by-case basis through appellate review in the manner indicated in Everitt v Health Maintenance Center (supra, p 227). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hynes v. Karassik
green
2 sentences1988The implementation of this principle renders it essential that one threatened with stigmatization by unwarranted disclosure be accorded an opportunity to enforce the confidentiality it is designed to secure (see Douglas Oil Co. v Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 US 211, 218, n 8 ; cf. Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659 ).” (Supra, at 442-443.) "[I]t is * * * clear that the rule of secrecy applies equally to either one who gives evidence or to one concerning whom evidence is given.” (Supra, at 443.) This principle is equally applicable to individuals, and to governmental agencies and private in 1983The implementation of this principle renders it essential that one threatened with stigmatization by unwarranted disclosure be accorded an opportunity to enforce the confidentiality it is designed to secure (see Douglas Oil Co. v Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 US 211, 218, n 8 ; cf. Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659 ). | 2 | 1983–1988 |
Bender v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
green
1 sentence1984Corp. ( 38 NY2d 662 ) in which the Court of Appeals, for the first time, permitted the implementation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a governmental agency. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Provenzo v. Sam
green
1 sentence1981As the Court of Appeals said in Provenzo v Sam ( 23 NY2d 256, 260 ): “The doctrine was first created to avoid a plaintiff being found contributorily negligent as a matter of law when he voluntarily placed himself in a perilous situation to prevent another person from suffering serious injury or death *** This is not to say, however, that after a plaintiff has established the necessary elements for the implementation of the doctrine that he can no longer be found contributorily negligent. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.