Futch rule in Pennsylvania

1979The relevant period in examining a Futch claim is between arrest and incrimination, Commonwealth v. Boone, 467 Pa. 168 , 354 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974), and, where, as here, the second statement is essentially the same as the prior statement, the time the prior statement is given governs.

1979The relevant period in examining a Futch claim is between arrest and incrimination, Commonwealth v. Boone, 467 Pa. 168 , 354 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974), and, where, as here, the second statement is essentially the same as the prior statement, the time the prior statement is given governs.

1979MANDERINO, J., dissents. “2 In Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278 , 370 A.2d 301 (1977), we modified the Futch rule and held that unless a defendant is arraigned within six hours, any statement obtained between arrest and arraignment shall not be admissible.

1979MANDERINO, J., dissents. “2 In Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278 , 370 A.2d 301 (1977), we modified the Futch rule and held that unless a defendant is arraigned within six hours, any statement obtained between arrest and arraignment shall not be admissible.

1985The Futch rule, of course, “is subject to the commonsense [sic] caveat that the ‘unnecessary delay’ must have contributed to the securing of the evidence.” Futch, supra, 447 Pa. at 393 , 290 A.2d at 419 .

1985The Futch rule, of course, “is subject to the commonsense [sic] caveat that the ‘unnecessary delay’ must have contributed to the securing of the evidence.” Futch, supra, 447 Pa. at 393 , 290 A.2d at 419 .

1980We are satisfied that appellant’s confession was not of the type proscribed by Futch or its progeny. 4 See, Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa.Super. 495 , 393 A.2d 13 (1978) (evidentiary use of initial incriminating statement made two hours and twenty-five minutes after arrest was not violative of Futch rule); Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa.Super. 172 , 386 A.2d 495 (1978) (inculpatory statement made four hours and ten minutes after arrest was not product of unnecessary delay); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515 , 364 A.2d 312 (1976) (no unnecessary delay where appellant gave initial statement thi

1980We are satisfied that appellant’s confession was not of the type proscribed by Futch or its progeny. 4 See, Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa.Super. 495 , 393 A.2d 13 (1978) (evidentiary use of initial incriminating statement made two hours and twenty-five minutes after arrest was not violative of Futch rule); Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa.Super. 172 , 386 A.2d 495 (1978) (inculpatory statement made four hours and ten minutes after arrest was not product of unnecessary delay); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515 , 364 A.2d 312 (1976) (no unnecessary delay where appellant gave initial statement thi

1987While this flexibili ty was salutary in providing our trial courts the leeway to separate evidence tainted by that coercive influence from that which resulted from volunteered self compelled utterances, Commonwealth v. Rowe, [ 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974)] supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Penn, [ 497 Pa. 232 , 439 A.2d 1154 (1982)] supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, [ 487 Pa. 626 , 410 A.2d 787 (1980)] supra; Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, [ 483 Pa. 576 , 397 A.2d 1173 (1979] supra, experience proved it to be difficult for law enforcement officials to administer.

1987While this flexibili ty was salutary in providing our trial courts the leeway to separate evidence tainted by that coercive influence from that which resulted from volunteered self compelled utterances, Commonwealth v. Rowe, [ 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974)] supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Penn, [ 497 Pa. 232 , 439 A.2d 1154 (1982)] supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, [ 487 Pa. 626 , 410 A.2d 787 (1980)] supra; Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, [ 483 Pa. 576 , 397 A.2d 1173 (1979] supra, experience proved it to be difficult for law enforcement officials to administer.

1979The relevant period in examining a Futch claim is between arrest and incrimination, Commonwealth v. Boone, 467 Pa. 168 , 354 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974), and, where, as here, the second statement is essentially the same as the prior statement, the time the prior statement is given governs.

1979The relevant period in examining a Futch claim is between arrest and incrimination, Commonwealth v. Boone, 467 Pa. 168 , 354 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974), and, where, as here, the second statement is essentially the same as the prior statement, the time the prior statement is given governs.

1978Mr. Justice Roberts would hold appellant’s Futch claim waived for want of compliance with the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a) and our decision in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 81 , 33 n.1, 331 A.2d 213 , 214 n.1 (1975).

1978Mr. Justice Roberts would hold appellant's Futch claim waived for want of compliance with the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a) and our decision in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31 , 33 n.1, 331 A.2d 213 , 214 n.1 (1975).

1987While this flexibili ty was salutary in providing our trial courts the leeway to separate evidence tainted by that coercive influence from that which resulted from volunteered self compelled utterances, Commonwealth v. Rowe, [ 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974)] supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Penn, [ 497 Pa. 232 , 439 A.2d 1154 (1982)] supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, [ 487 Pa. 626 , 410 A.2d 787 (1980)] supra; Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, [ 483 Pa. 576 , 397 A.2d 1173 (1979] supra, experience proved it to be difficult for law enforcement officials to administer.

1987While this flexibili ty was salutary in providing our trial courts the leeway to separate evidence tainted by that coercive influence from that which resulted from volunteered self compelled utterances, Commonwealth v. Rowe, [ 459 Pa. 163 , 327 A.2d 358 (1974)] supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Penn, [ 497 Pa. 232 , 439 A.2d 1154 (1982)] supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, [ 487 Pa. 626 , 410 A.2d 787 (1980)] supra; Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, [ 483 Pa. 576 , 397 A.2d 1173 (1979] supra, experience proved it to be difficult for law enforcement officials to administer.

1983“The delay must be unnecessary; evidence that is prejudicial must be obtained; and the incriminating evidence must be reasonably related to the delay.” Commonwealth v. Leroy Smith, 487 Pa. 626, 630 , 410 A.2d 787, 789-790 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 572 , 319 A.2d 419, 420 (1974); Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 587 , 397 A.2d 1173, 1179 , cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964 , 99 S.Ct. 2412 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1979); Commonwealth v. Keith Smith, 317 Pa.Super. 118, 125 , 463 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1983); Commonwealth v. Miller, 293 Pa.Super. 281, 286 , 438 A.2d 995, 997 (1981

1983“The delay must be unnecessary; evidence that is prejudicial must be obtained; and the incriminating evidence must be reasonably related to the delay.” Commonwealth v. Leroy Smith, 487 Pa. 626, 630 , 410 A.2d 787, 789-790 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 572 , 319 A.2d 419, 420 (1974); Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 587 , 397 A.2d 1173, 1179 , cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964 , 99 S.Ct. 2412 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1979); Commonwealth v. Keith Smith, 317 Pa.Super. 118, 125 , 463 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1983); Commonwealth v. Miller, 293 Pa.Super. 281, 286 , 438 A.2d 995, 997 (1981

1983“The delay must be unnecessary; evidence that is prejudicial must be obtained; and the incriminating evidence must be reasonably related to the delay.” Commonwealth v. Leroy Smith, 487 Pa. 626, 630 , 410 A.2d 787, 789-790 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 572 , 319 A.2d 419, 420 (1974); Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 587 , 397 A.2d 1173, 1179 , cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964 , 99 S.Ct. 2412 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1979); Commonwealth v. Keith Smith, 317 Pa.Super. 118, 125 , 463 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1983); Commonwealth v. Miller, 293 Pa.Super. 281, 286 , 438 A.2d 995, 997 (1981

1983“The delay must be unnecessary; evidence that is prejudicial must be obtained; and the incriminating evidence must be reasonably related to the delay.” Commonwealth v. Leroy Smith, 487 Pa. 626, 630 , 410 A.2d 787, 789-790 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 572 , 319 A.2d 419, 420 (1974); Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 587 , 397 A.2d 1173, 1179 , cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964 , 99 S.Ct. 2412 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1979); Commonwealth v. Keith Smith, 317 Pa.Super. 118, 125 , 463 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1983); Commonwealth v. Miller, 293 Pa.Super. 281, 286 , 438 A.2d 995, 997 (1981

1981In Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 464 Pa. 464 , 347 A.2d 305 (1975), this Court was, apparently for the first time, presented with an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief in which a Futch violation was alleged.

1981In Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 464 Pa. 464 , 347 A.2d 305 (1975), this Court was, apparently for the first time, presented with an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief in which a Futch violation was alleged.

1981The Commonwealth’s reliance upon the above-quoted language is, then, misplaced; the Gilmore dissent plainly addressed the second, retroactivity, clause of § 1180-3(c)(12). *554 Of similar import is another case relied upon by the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Betrand, 484 Pa. 511 , 399 A.2d 682 (1979).

1981The Commonwealth’s reliance upon the above-quoted language is, then, misplaced; the Gilmore dissent plainly addressed the second, retroactivity, clause of § 1180-3(c)(12). *554 Of similar import is another case relied upon by the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Betrand, 484 Pa. 511 , 399 A.2d 682 (1979).

1980We are satisfied that appellant’s confession was not of the type proscribed by Futch or its progeny. 4 See, Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa.Super. 495 , 393 A.2d 13 (1978) (evidentiary use of initial incriminating statement made two hours and twenty-five minutes after arrest was not violative of Futch rule); Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa.Super. 172 , 386 A.2d 495 (1978) (inculpatory statement made four hours and ten minutes after arrest was not product of unnecessary delay); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515 , 364 A.2d 312 (1976) (no unnecessary delay where appellant gave initial statement thi

1979In countering appellant’s Futch claim, appellee focuses upon the relatively short time period, approximately four hours, between the arrest and the commencement of the statement. 2 Although this is the relevant time period for purposes of a Futch analysis, see Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116 , 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515 , 364 A.2d 312 (1976), appellee seems to ignore the fact that all administrative processing of appellant had been completed by approximately 3:15 p. m., some three hours *28 before the statement was made by appellant.

1979In countering appellant’s Futch claim, appellee focuses upon the relatively short time period, approximately four hours, between the arrest and the commencement of the statement. 2 Although this is the relevant time period for purposes of a Futch analysis, see Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116 , 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515 , 364 A.2d 312 (1976), appellee seems to ignore the fact that all administrative processing of appellant had been completed by approximately 3:15 p. m., some three hours *28 before the statement was made by appellant.

1979Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374 , 380 A.2d 769 (1977).

1979Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374 , 380 A.2d 769 (1977).

1979Rule 118 (in part) adopted January 31, 1970, effective May 1, 1970; renumbered as Rule 130 and amended September 18, 1973, effective January 1, 1974." In Commonwealth v. Williams, 476 Pa. 344 , 382 A.2d 1202 (1978) this court reiterated the three-prong test for admissibility: "In Commonwealth v. Williams [ 455 Pa. 569 , 319 A.2d 419 (1974)], we established a three-pronged test to determine if a statement obtained during a pre-arraignment delay must be suppressed: (1) the delay must be unnecessary; (2) the evidence must be prejudicial; and (3) the evidence must be reasonably related to the dela

1979Rule 118 (in part) adopted January 31, 1970, effective May 1, 1970; renumbered as Rule 130 and amended September 18, 1973, effective January 1, 1974." In Commonwealth v. Williams, 476 Pa. 344 , 382 A.2d 1202 (1978) this court reiterated the three-prong test for admissibility: "In Commonwealth v. Williams [ 455 Pa. 569 , 319 A.2d 419 (1974)], we established a three-pronged test to determine if a statement obtained during a pre-arraignment delay must be suppressed: (1) the delay must be unnecessary; (2) the evidence must be prejudicial; and (3) the evidence must be reasonably related to the dela