6 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1986–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sinistajgreen2 sentences1999(See, CPL 200.80.) Maintaining that the narrow purpose of the speedy trial statute was to insure “prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial,” the Court concluded that the application of excludable time to the successive accusatory instrument was “entirely consistent with the purpose of CPL 30.30 as a prosecutorial readiness rule.” (People v Sinistaj, supra, at 239, 240 .) Unlike Sinistaj (supra), which dealt with successive indictments, the instant matter presents a seemingly unique set of facts for the purpose of the application of the relation-back doc trine. 1999(See, CPL 200.80.) Maintaining that the narrow purpose of the speedy trial statute was to insure “prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial,” the Court concluded that the application of excludable time to the successive accusatory instrument was “entirely consistent with the purpose of CPL 30.30 as a prosecutorial readiness rule.” (People v Sinistaj, supra, at 239, 240 .) Unlike Sinistaj (supra), which dealt with successive indictments, the instant matter presents a seemingly unique set of facts for the purpose of the application of the relation-back doc trine. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Worleygreen1 sentence2003The issuance of a successive indictment neither affords him additional excludable time nor does it renew, toll, or in any way supplement that single [statutory readiness] limitation which always commences to run upon the filing of the initial accusatory instrument” (id. at 241 [emphasis added]; see also People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stilesgreen1 sentence1998Speedy fact-finding is computed from the first day following the conclusion of the initial appearance (see, Family Ct Act § 340.1 [1], [2]; cf, People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 [the date upon which a criminal action is commenced is excluded from the computation of speedy trial under CPL 30.30]). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Randy K.
green
2 sentences1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). . 1992The court pointed out that Family Court Act § 340.1 is not a prosecutorial readiness rule (see also, Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398, 404 ), but "a true 'speedy trial’ provision, in that both its language and its underlying purpose are directed toward bringing the accused juvenile to trial” within the mandated time periods (Matter of Frank C., supra, at 413). | 2 | 1992–1998 |
People v. Cooper
green
1 sentence1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In re David W.
green
1 sentence1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In re Diogenes V.
green
1 sentence1998While Family Court Act § 340.1 does not constitute a prosecutorial readiness rule like CPL 30.30 (see, People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 295 ; cf., Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d, at 404 , supra [Family Court Act § 340.1 is a speedy hearing rule, not a prosecutorial readiness rule]), it is notable that both Family Court Act § 340.1 (7) and recent appellate cases employ terms such as “exclude”, “tolled” and “excludable” with respect to speedy fact-finding (see, e.g., Matter of David W., 241 AD2d 388 ; Matter of Diogenes V, 245 AD2d 42). . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Lomax
green
1 sentence1986Contrary to defendant’s arguments, our construction of CPL 30.30 to require that all excludable periods must be deducted from the "total time” (People v Lomax, supra, at p 357 ), starting with the filing of the accusatory instrument (CPL 1.20 [16], [17]), is entirely consistent with the purpose of CPL 30.30 as a prosecutorial readiness rule. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.