Town Board defendant (New York) · Go Syfert
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Town Board defendant in New York

6 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Anderson Group, LLC v. Lenzgreen
ca2 · 2009 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]).

2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]).

11
Nocro, Ltd. v. Russellgreen
nyappdiv · 2012 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]).

2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]).

11
The ANDERSON GROUP, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springsgreen
nynd · 2008 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]).

2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]).

11
Tenney v. Brandhovegreen
scotus · 1951 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Local legislators are “absolutely immune from suit under [42 USC] § 1983 for their legislative activities” (Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 49 [1998]), and such immunity is applicable to all actions within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” (Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376 [1951]).

11
Bogan v. Scott-Harrisgreen
scotus · 1998 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Local legislators are “absolutely immune from suit under [42 USC] § 1983 for their legislative activities” (Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 49 [1998]), and such immunity is applicable to all actions within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” (Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376 [1951]).

11
Willett v. City University of New York (CUNY) Law Schoolgreen
nyappdiv · 1996 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004However, where there has been a nonprejudicial, technical violation of the Open Meetings Law in connection with the termination of the employment of a probationary employee, given the nature of the employment interest and the purpose of the Open Meetings Law, annulment of the determination is unwarranted (see Matter of Willett v City Univ. of N.Y. [CUNY] Law School, 231 AD2d 642, 643 [1996]; Matter of Smithson v Ilion Hous.

11
Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. City of New Yorkgreen
nysupct · 1979 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984(Village of Mill Neck v Nolan, 259 NY 596, 597 ; see Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 987, 997 .) A review of the record, particularly the minutes of the January 6 Town Board hearing at which the resolution was adopted and the executive session that preceded that hearing, shows that the Board intended that the amendment provide for schedules for completion of underground work and that the Board intended to reserve the power to approve any aboveground energization as a means of insuring timely performance of Cablevision’s underground work.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Washington County Cease, Inc. v. Persico green
nyappdiv · 1984
1 sentence

1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially.

11997–1997
International Paper Co. v. Sterling Forest Pollution Control Corp. green
nyappdiv · 1984
1 sentence

1997Contrary to the Town Board’s claim, its actions under Transportation Corporations Law § 121 are “administrative, rather than legislative” (see, International Paper Co. v Sterling Forest Pollution Control Corp., 105 AD2d 278, 282 ).

11997–1997
MATTER OF WASHINGTON COUNTY CEASE, INC. v. Persico neutral
ny · 1985
1 sentence

1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially.

11997–1997
Kendrick v. Sullivan green
nysd · 1992
1 sentence

1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially.

11997–1997
Schweiker v. McClure green
scotus · 1982
1 sentence

1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially.

11997–1997
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Lefkowitz green
nyappdiv · 1981
1 sentence

1985On appeal by the Town Board, this court, by order dated June 22, 1981 modified the order appealed from by adding thereto a provision converting the proceeding into an action for a declaratory judgment (M atter of Amerada Hess Corp. v Lefkowitz, 82 AD2d 882 ).

11985–1985
Village of Mill Neck v. Nolan green
ny · 1932
1 sentence

1984(Village of Mill Neck v Nolan, 259 NY 596, 597 ; see Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 987, 997 .) A review of the record, particularly the minutes of the January 6 Town Board hearing at which the resolution was adopted and the executive session that preceded that hearing, shows that the Board intended that the amendment provide for schedules for completion of underground work and that the Board intended to reserve the power to approve any aboveground energization as a means of insuring timely performance of Cablevision’s underground work.

11984–1984
Polak v. Kavanah green
nyappdiv · 1975
1 sentence

1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following

11980–1980
Janas v. Town Board green
nyappdiv · 1976
2 sentences

1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following

1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following

11980–1980
Levitt v. Incorporated Village green
ny · 1959
1 sentence

1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following

11980–1980

Where else courts name it

NY 6 (1980–2016) NC 3 (2007–2012) WI 2 (1990–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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