6 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson Group, LLC v. Lenzgreen2 sentences2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]). 2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Nocro, Ltd. v. Russellgreen2 sentences2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]). 2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]). | 1 | 1 |
The ANDERSON GROUP, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springsgreen2 sentences2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]). 2016Therefore, the Town Board defendants are entitled to absolute immunity (see Matter of Nocro, Ltd. v Russell, 94 AD3d 894, 895 [2012]; see also The Anderson Group, LLC v City of Saratoga Springs, 557 F Supp 2d 332, 344-345 [ND NY 2008], affd 336 Fed Appx 21 [2d Cir 2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Tenney v. Brandhovegreen1 sentence2016Local legislators are “absolutely immune from suit under [42 USC] § 1983 for their legislative activities” (Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 49 [1998]), and such immunity is applicable to all actions within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” (Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376 [1951]). | 1 | 1 |
Bogan v. Scott-Harrisgreen1 sentence2016Local legislators are “absolutely immune from suit under [42 USC] § 1983 for their legislative activities” (Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 49 [1998]), and such immunity is applicable to all actions within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity” (Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 376 [1951]). | 1 | 1 |
Willett v. City University of New York (CUNY) Law Schoolgreen1 sentence2004However, where there has been a nonprejudicial, technical violation of the Open Meetings Law in connection with the termination of the employment of a probationary employee, given the nature of the employment interest and the purpose of the Open Meetings Law, annulment of the determination is unwarranted (see Matter of Willett v City Univ. of N.Y. [CUNY] Law School, 231 AD2d 642, 643 [1996]; Matter of Smithson v Ilion Hous. | 1 | 1 |
Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1984(Village of Mill Neck v Nolan, 259 NY 596, 597 ; see Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 987, 997 .) A review of the record, particularly the minutes of the January 6 Town Board hearing at which the resolution was adopted and the executive session that preceded that hearing, shows that the Board intended that the amendment provide for schedules for completion of underground work and that the Board intended to reserve the power to approve any aboveground energization as a means of insuring timely performance of Cablevision’s underground work. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Washington County Cease, Inc. v. Persico
green
1 sentence1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
International Paper Co. v. Sterling Forest Pollution Control Corp.
green
1 sentence1997Contrary to the Town Board’s claim, its actions under Transportation Corporations Law § 121 are “administrative, rather than legislative” (see, International Paper Co. v Sterling Forest Pollution Control Corp., 105 AD2d 278, 282 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
MATTER OF WASHINGTON COUNTY CEASE, INC. v. Persico
neutral
1 sentence1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kendrick v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Schweiker v. McClure
green
1 sentence1997A party appearing before an administrative tribunal is entitled to impartial and unprejudiced decision-making (see, Schweiker v McClure, 456 US 188, 195 ; Matter of Washington County Cease v Persico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 , affd 64 NY2d 923 ; Kendrick v Sullivan, 784 F Supp 94, 102 ); By retaining the attorney who prepared a report and argued on behalf of the chief opponent to the increase at the first hearing as its own special counsel, the Town Board clearly indicated that the application was not going to be reviewed impartially. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Lefkowitz
green
1 sentence1985On appeal by the Town Board, this court, by order dated June 22, 1981 modified the order appealed from by adding thereto a provision converting the proceeding into an action for a declaratory judgment (M atter of Amerada Hess Corp. v Lefkowitz, 82 AD2d 882 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Village of Mill Neck v. Nolan
green
1 sentence1984(Village of Mill Neck v Nolan, 259 NY 596, 597 ; see Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v City of New York, 101 Misc 2d 987, 997 .) A review of the record, particularly the minutes of the January 6 Town Board hearing at which the resolution was adopted and the executive session that preceded that hearing, shows that the Board intended that the amendment provide for schedules for completion of underground work and that the Board intended to reserve the power to approve any aboveground energization as a means of insuring timely performance of Cablevision’s underground work. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Polak v. Kavanah
green
1 sentence1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Janas v. Town Board
green
2 sentences1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following 1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Levitt v. Incorporated Village
green
1 sentence1980In Janas v Town Bd. of Town of Fleming ( 51 AD2d 473, 476-477 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expressly found that it could not consider plaintiff’s argument that the ordinance as applied to him was unconstitutional because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies provided in the ordinance but, went on to consider plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it required that a “[rjequest for [a special] permit must be accompanied by written approval of a majority of adjoining property owners (including property owners across the road).” Following | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.