contrary to law standard in Ohio

2014Butler No. CA2013-02-027, 2013-Ohio-5204, ¶ 6 , quoting State v. Crawford, 12th Dist.

2014Butler No. CA2013-27-027, 2013-Ohio-5204, ¶6 , quoting State v. Crawford, 12th Dist.

2014Cuyahoga No. 99478, 2013-Ohio-5023, ¶ 16 , quoting State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , paragraph seven of the syllabus. {¶34} What remains is the contrary to law standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) under which this court may reverse where it “clearly and convincingly finds * * * that [a] sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Relying on Kalish, we have held that “a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism f

2014Cuyahoga No. 99478, 2013-Ohio-5023, ¶ 16 , quoting State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , paragraph seven of the syllabus. {¶34} What remains is the contrary to law standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) under which this court may reverse where it “clearly and convincingly finds * * * that [a] sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Relying on Kalish, we have held that “a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism f

2014Id.

2014Cuyahoga No. 99478, 2013-Ohio-5023, ¶ 16 , quoting State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , paragraph seven of the syllabus. {¶34} What remains is the contrary to law standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) under which this court may reverse where it “clearly and convincingly finds * * * that [a] sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Relying on Kalish, we have held that “a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and recidivism f

2014Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124 . {¶35} While I agree with the general rule as stated by A.H., my reading of the case law suggests that R.C. 2929.11(B) is an exception to the rule.

2012Franklin at id. {¶19} In discussing proportionality, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and that “the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 , 1999-Ohio-113 , 715 N.E.2d 167 .

2012Franklin at id. {¶19} In discussing proportionality, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and that “the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 , 1999-Ohio-113 , 715 N.E.2d 167 .

2012Franklin at id. {¶19} In discussing proportionality, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and that “the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 , 1999-Ohio-113 , 715 N.E.2d 167 .

2012Franklin at id. {¶19} In discussing proportionality, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and that “the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 , 1999-Ohio-113 , 715 N.E.2d 167 .

2012Franklin at id. {¶19} In discussing proportionality, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and that “the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 , 2008-Ohio-2338 , 888 N.E.2d 1073 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371 , 1999-Ohio-113 , 715 N.E.2d 167 .

2009No. 08AP-233, 2009-Ohio-1100 , 2009 WL 638475 , ¶ 4, 7 (appellant asserted that her sentence was contrary to law because it was inconsistent and disproportionate to the sentences imposed on others involved in the same crimes). {¶ 9} Here, whether we apply the two-step analysis of Kalish or the contrary-to-law standard of Burton, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced appellant.

2009No. 08AP-336, 2008-Ohio-6513 , 2008 WL 5196517 , ¶ 8-11 (acknowledging Kalish and rejecting the appellant’s contentions “[wjhether we apply a contrary to law or abuse of discretion standard”). {¶ 10} In applying the contrary-to-law standard, we determine whether the trial court considered and properly applied the appropriate statutory guidelines and whether the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

2009O’Keefe, 2009-Ohio-1563 , 2009 WL 840403 , at ¶ 39.