auto- mobile exception in Oregon

2021The court noted that, although in Kock this court had “in no uncertain terms rejected the theory that the exception extended to ‘stationary but oper- ational vehicle[s],’ ” the courts had since “ ‘refined the auto- mobile exception analysis,’ ” and “at present, a vehicle is ‘mobile’ for purposes of the automobile exception as long as it is operable.” Id. at 497-98 (first quoting Kock, 302 Or at 33 ; then quoting State v. Coleman, 167 Or App 86, 92 , 2 P3d 399 (2000); and then citing Meharry II, 342 Or at 181 ).7 7 When doing so, the Court of Appeals mentioned the lack of stability in the case

2017In placing that limitation on the Oregon automobile exception, this court noted that it sought to give officers “clear guidelines” for their actions and that it “ch[o]se not to stretch the auto- mobile exception [under Article I, section 9,] as far as the Supreme Court of the United States has done in interpret- ing the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

2025That court explained, in part: “Nevertheless, as the automobile exception is currently crafted in Oregon, pursuant to [State v.] Brown, [ 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986), State v.] Andersen, [ 361 Or 187 , 390 P3d 992 (2017), and State v.] Bliss, [ 363 Or 426 , 423 P3d 53 (2018),] the state is only required to show * * * that the auto- mobile was mobile at the time it was stopped by the police * * * and that probable cause existed for the search of the vehicle.* * * While McCarthy is being reviewed, the above legal landscape continues to exist.

2025That court explained, in part: “Nevertheless, as the automobile exception is currently crafted in Oregon, pursuant to [State v.] Brown, [ 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986), State v.] Andersen, [ 361 Or 187 , 390 P3d 992 (2017), and State v.] Bliss, [ 363 Or 426 , 423 P3d 53 (2018),] the state is only required to show * * * that the auto- mobile was mobile at the time it was stopped by the police * * * and that probable cause existed for the search of the vehicle.* * * While McCarthy is being reviewed, the above legal landscape continues to exist.

2025On appeal, the state concedes that the trial court’s reliance on the auto- mobile exception to deny the motion to suppress was mis- placed in light of State v. McCarthy, 369 Or 129 , 501 P3d 478 (2021).

2025On appeal, the state concedes that the trial court’s reliance on the auto- mobile exception to deny the motion to suppress was mis- placed in light of State v. McCarthy, 369 Or 129 , 501 P3d 478 (2021).

2025In that case, we declined to affirm the trial court’s ruling, which was based on the auto- mobile exception, on the right-for-the-wrong-reason basis of search incident to arrest because the record was “not mate- rially the same one that might have been developed had the state asserted the search-incident-to-arrest exception before 40 State v. Ribota the trial court.” Id. at 218-19 .

2025In that case, we declined to affirm the trial court’s ruling, which was based on the auto- mobile exception, on the right-for-the-wrong-reason basis of search incident to arrest because the record was “not mate- rially the same one that might have been developed had the 40 State v. Ribota state asserted the search-incident-to-arrest exception before the trial court.” Id. at 218-19 .

2017As this court explained in Brown, the exigency that permits officers to conduct a war- rantless search of a mobile vehicle arises from the fact that ‘’’the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or juris- diction in which the warrant must be sought.’ ” Id. at 275 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 153 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 2d 543 (1925)).

2017As this court explained in Brown, the exigency that permits officers to conduct a war- rantless search of a mobile vehicle arises from the fact that ‘’’the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or juris- diction in which the warrant must be sought.’ ” Id. at 275 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 153 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 2d 543 (1925)).

2021Earlier, in State v. Snow, 179 Or App 222, 226-27 , 39 P3d 909 (2002), aff’d, 337 Or 219 , 94 P3d 872 (2004), the court had similarly stated that “the exception’s development [had] not necessarily always been internally consistent.” In Snow, the court recapped the following automobile exception cases, which illustrate that inconsistency.

2021Earlier, in State v. Snow, 179 Or App 222, 226-27 , 39 P3d 909 (2002), aff’d, 337 Or 219 , 94 P3d 872 (2004), the court had similarly stated that “the exception’s development [had] not necessarily always been internally consistent.” In Snow, the court recapped the following automobile exception cases, which illustrate that inconsistency.

2021The auto- mobile exception is a “subset of the exigent circumstances exception.” State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177 , 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (Meharry II).

2021The auto- mobile exception is a “subset of the exigent circumstances exception.” State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177 , 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (Meharry II).

2021Earlier, in State v. Snow, 179 Or App 222, 226-27 , 39 P3d 909 (2002), aff’d, 337 Or 219 , 94 P3d 872 (2004), the court had similarly stated that “the exception’s development [had] not necessarily always been internally consistent.” In Snow, the court recapped the following automobile exception cases, which illustrate that inconsistency.

2021Earlier, in State v. Snow, 179 Or App 222, 226-27 , 39 P3d 909 (2002), aff’d, 337 Or 219 , 94 P3d 872 (2004), the court had similarly stated that “the exception’s development [had] not necessarily always been internally consistent.” In Snow, the court recapped the following automobile exception cases, which illustrate that inconsistency.

2021The court noted that, although in Kock this court had “in no uncertain terms rejected the theory that the exception extended to ‘stationary but oper- ational vehicle[s],’ ” the courts had since “ ‘refined the auto- mobile exception analysis,’ ” and “at present, a vehicle is ‘mobile’ for purposes of the automobile exception as long as it is operable.” Id. at 497-98 (first quoting Kock, 302 Or at 33 ; then quoting State v. Coleman, 167 Or App 86, 92 , 2 P3d 399 (2000); and then citing Meharry II, 342 Or at 181 ).7 7 When doing so, the Court of Appeals mentioned the lack of stability in the case

2021The court noted that, although in Kock this court had “in no uncertain terms rejected the theory that the exception extended to ‘stationary but oper- ational vehicle[s],’ ” the courts had since “ ‘refined the auto- mobile exception analysis,’ ” and “at present, a vehicle is ‘mobile’ for purposes of the automobile exception as long as it is operable.” Id. at 497-98 (first quoting Kock, 302 Or at 33 ; then quoting State v. Coleman, 167 Or App 86, 92 , 2 P3d 399 (2000); and then citing Meharry II, 342 Or at 181 ).7 7 When doing so, the Court of Appeals mentioned the lack of stability in the case

2020Cite as 302 Or App 383 (2020) 387 The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion, concluding that the search was valid under the auto- mobile exception, because the officers had lawfully stopped defendant in connection with a crime—viz., the delivery and possession of heroin—while his vehicle was mobile, and, when the officers stopped defendant’s vehicle, the officers had probable cause to believe controlled substances were in the pickup.

2020In Andersen, the Supreme Court revisited the auto- mobile exception announced in Brown—casting “some doubt 388 State v. Colman-Pinning on the per se nature” of the exception, State v. McCarthy, 302 Or App 82, 88 , 459 P3d 890 (2020)—when it explained: “We do not foreclose the possibility that Brown held out— that changes in technology and communication could result in warrants being drafted, submitted to a magistrate, and reviewed with sufficient speed that the automobile excep- tion may no longer be justified in all cases.

2020In Andersen, the Supreme Court revisited the auto- mobile exception announced in Brown—casting “some doubt 388 State v. Colman-Pinning on the per se nature” of the exception, State v. McCarthy, 302 Or App 82, 88 , 459 P3d 890 (2020)—when it explained: “We do not foreclose the possibility that Brown held out— that changes in technology and communication could result in warrants being drafted, submitted to a magistrate, and reviewed with sufficient speed that the automobile excep- tion may no longer be justified in all cases.