46 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tichenor v. Santillogreen2 sentences2003Moreover, Tornquist was overruled by Tichenor v. Santillo, 218 N.J.Super. 165, 174 , 527 A. 2d 78 (App.Div.1987), where we held that a per quod claim will be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to the injured spouse, and by the percentage of any negligence attributable to the spouse asserting the per quod claim. 2003Moreover, Tornquist was overruled by Tichenor v. Santillo, 218 N.J.Super. 165, 174 , 527 A. 2d 78 (App.Div.1987), where we held that a per quod claim will be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to the injured spouse, and by the percentage of any negligence attributable to the spouse asserting the per quod claim. | 2 | 7 |
Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Construction Co.green2 sentences2021Co., 161 N.J. 178, 190 (1990) (noting that "a per quod claim is derivative of the injured spouse's personal injury cause of action"). 2014Co., 161 N.J. 178, 190 , 735 A.2d 1142 (1999); Black’s Law Dictionary 1028 (5 ed. 1979) (“A per quod claim is an action ‘per quod consortium amisit.’ In old pleading, [it meant] whereby he lost the company [of his wife]”). | 2 | 3 |
Hauck v. Danclargreen2 sentences2014On the other hand, courts have explained the critical distinction that “it is also independent, as the damages which may be awarded to the spouse pursuant to the per quod claim are clearly different from the damages which may be awarded to the spouse suffering the direct injury.” Hauck v. Danclar, 262 N.J.Super. 225, 227 , 620 A.2d 479 (Law Div.1993). 2014On the other hand, courts have explained the critical distinction that “it is also independent, as the damages which may be awarded to the spouse pursuant to the per quod claim are clearly different from the damages which may be awarded to the spouse suffering the direct injury.” Hauck v. Danclar, 262 N.J.Super. 225, 227 , 620 A.2d 479 (Law Div.1993). | 1 | 4 |
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Americagreen2 sentences1988The court denied a motion for a new trial, later affirmed by the Appellate Division, and in dicta, stated that it was in error in instructing the jury on the parent's per quod claim. *20 I have concluded, therefore, that a parent in a negligence action may not recover damages for loss of the society and companionship of an injured child, for the following reasons: (a) there is no authority in this State for allowing such recovery; (b) those New Jersey cases which authorize a parent to recover damages beyond medical expenses and loss of earnings and services involve the tort of seduction and ex 1978Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82 (1965), implemented by R. 4:28-3(b), requiring joinder by a spouse asserting a per quod claim in the negligence action brought by the injured spouse. | 1 | 3 |
Marsella v. Monmouth Medical Centergreen2 sentences2019Ibid. 2019This was so because the per quod claim was "incidental to, dependent on, and derivative of the claim of the injured person." Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Companygreen2 sentences1984In the latter case, it was stated: (a)lthough it is dependent upon an actionable wrong having been committed against his wife, a husband's per quod claim is independent from and not derivative of her personal injury claim. [ Id. at 574 ] Since it is a separate claim, a notice of claim on behalf of each claimant must be filed. 1984See, e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F. 2d 566 (3 Cir.1976). | 1 | 2 |
Gilhooley v. County of Uniongreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Gilhooley v. Cnty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533 , 540–41 (2000) ("[I]n order to vault the pain and suffering threshold under the Tort Claims Act," N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), "a plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged 1 Plaintiff's husband Arnold William Fisher, Jr., also asserted a per quod claim. | 1 | 1 |
Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2019Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)). 1 Stephen Scheps, who filed a per quod claim, also appeals. | 1 | 1 |
Milacci v. Mato Realty Co., Inc.green2 sentences2014Plaintiffs rely on Milacci v. Mato Realty Co., 217 N.J.Super. 297 , 525 A.2d 1120 (App.Div.1987) in support of its contention that a husband’s per quod claim substantially complies with the notice requirements of the TCA. 2014Plaintiffs rely on Milacci v. Mato Realty Co., 217 N.J.Super. 297 , 525 A.2d 1120 (App.Div.1987) in support of its contention that a husband’s per quod claim substantially complies with the notice requirements of the TCA. | 1 | 1 |
Jackowitz v. Langgreen2 sentences2010See Jackowitz, supra, 408 N.J.Super. at 505 , 975 A. 2d 531 ("Fleeting comments, even if improper, may not warrant a new trial, particularly when the verdict is fair."). [6] We are cognizant of the case law that may allow counsel to ask the jury to "send a message" in the very narrow area of punitive damages. 2010See Jackowitz, supra, 408 N.J.Super. at 505 , 975 A. 2d 531 ("Fleeting comments, even if improper, may not warrant a new trial, particularly when the verdict is fair."). [6] We are cognizant of the case law that may allow counsel to ask the jury to "send a message" in the very narrow area of punitive damages. | 1 | 1 |
Einwechter v. Marcianogreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Einwechter v. Marciano, 311 N.J.Super. 492, 496-97 , 710 A. 2d 573 (App.Div.1998) (finding wife's per quod claim was covered by same portion of an insurance policy providing UM motorist benefits for her spouse's personal injuries); In re Harris v. Security Ins. 2008See, e.g., Einwechter v. Marciano, 311 N.J.Super. 492, 496-97 , 710 A. 2d 573 (App.Div.1998) (finding wife's per quod claim was covered by same portion of an insurance policy providing UM motorist benefits for her spouse's personal injuries); In re Harris v. Security Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. County of Monmouthgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Kelly v. County of Monmouth, 380 N.J.Super. 552, 558 , 883 A. 2d 411 (App.Div.2005) (discussing willful misconduct in the context of an intentional battery). 2008See, e.g., Kelly v. County of Monmouth, 380 N.J.Super. 552, 558 , 883 A. 2d 411 (App.Div.2005) (discussing willful misconduct in the context of an intentional battery). | 1 | 1 |
Guiseppi v. Wallinggreen1 sentence2003The Court cited Judge Hand’s famous dictum: "There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.” Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.1944). | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2000NOTES [1] References to plaintiff or Mesgleski in the singular refer to Kenneth Mesgleski. [2] Count one of the complaint against defendants asserted a negligence claim; count two asserted an assault claim; count three asserted a reckless injury claim; count four asserted an improper training and supervision claim against the SPCA; count five asserted claims of invasion of privacy, trespass and civil rights violations; and count six asserted a per quod claim on behalf of Linda Mesgleski. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 726 (1966). [4] This 2000NOTES [1] References to plaintiff or Mesgleski in the singular refer to Kenneth Mesgleski. [2] Count one of the complaint against defendants asserted a negligence claim; count two asserted an assault claim; count three asserted a reckless injury claim; count four asserted an improper training and supervision claim against the SPCA; count five asserted claims of invasion of privacy, trespass and civil rights violations; and count six asserted a per quod claim on behalf of Linda Mesgleski. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 726 (1966). [4] This | 1 | 1 |
| Portee v. Jaffeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maidman v. Stagggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Colorado Department of Healthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arnold v. Shawano County Agricultural Societygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Patusco v. Prince MacAroni, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Painter v. Paintergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weir v. Market Transition Facility
green
2 sentences2019Ibid. 2019We based our conclusion, in part, on our observation that "it is significant that the spouse of an injured employee cannot assert a per quod claim within a workers' compensation proceeding." Ibid. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Goncalvez v. Patuto
green
2 sentences2014Ibid. 2006Id. at 627-30, 458 A. 2d 146 . | 2 | 2006–2014 |
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Plaintiffs filed their second amended Law Division complaint, the operative pleading here, asserting five causes of action against Fairview and Related: (1) sexual harassment and discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) (count one); (2) aiding and abetting A-3345-21 4 (count two); (3) tortious conduct (count three); (4) negligence (count four); and (5) a per quod claim on behalf of Diane (count five). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Madej v. Doe
green
2 sentences2014In support of dismissing the husband’s claim, the State relied upon the holding in Madej v. Doe, 194 N.J.Super. 580, 586 , 477 A.2d 439 (Law Div.1984) that a per quod claim of a husband is barred where the governmental entity had no notice of the per quod claim. 2014In support of dismissing the husband’s claim, the State relied upon the holding in Madej v. Doe, 194 N.J.Super. 580, 586 , 477 A.2d 439 (Law Div.1984) that a per quod claim of a husband is barred where the governmental entity had no notice of the per quod claim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wiese v. Dedhia
green
2 sentences2011They assert that Rule 4:58-4 only allows for a “single unallocated offer” in situations where a plaintiff has joined another plaintiff “for the purpose of asserting a per quod claim.” Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motion, arguing that the case of Wiese v. Dedhia, 354 N.J.Super. 256 , 806 A.2d 826 (App.Div.2002) allows multiple plaintiffs to file a single, aggregate offer of judgment as to all of their claims. 2011They assert that Rule 4:58-4 only allows for a “single unallocated offer” in situations where a plaintiff has joined another plaintiff “for the purpose of asserting a per quod claim.” Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ motion, arguing that the case of Wiese v. Dedhia, 354 N.J.Super. 256 , 806 A.2d 826 (App.Div.2002) allows multiple plaintiffs to file a single, aggregate offer of judgment as to all of their claims. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Murphy v. Implicito
green
2 sentences2010Co., 161 N.J. 178, 190 , 735 A.2d 1142 (1999) (explaining that "loss of consortium, or per quod, claim is intended to compensate a person for the loss of a spouse's society, companionship and services due to the fault of another[,]” and that "a per quod claim is derivative of the injured spouse's personal injury cause of action" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J.Super. 245, 269 , 920 A.2d 678 (App.Div.2007) (noting that, "[i]n general, a per quod claim includes the right of a husband or wife to receive compensation for loss of affection, comfort, c 2010Co., 161 N.J. 178, 190 , 735 A.2d 1142 (1999) (explaining that "loss of consortium, or per quod, claim is intended to compensate a person for the loss of a spouse's society, companionship and services due to the fault of another[,]” and that "a per quod claim is derivative of the injured spouse's personal injury cause of action" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J.Super. 245, 269 , 920 A.2d 678 (App.Div.2007) (noting that, "[i]n general, a per quod claim includes the right of a husband or wife to receive compensation for loss of affection, comfort, c | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum
green
2 sentences2010However, because he advances only a per quod claim, "the viability of [that claim] is subject to the survival of [his wifej's claim.” Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 194 N.J. 345 , 350 n. 3, 944 A.2d 630 (2008). 2010However, because he advances only a per quod claim, "the viability of [that claim] is subject to the survival of [his wifej's claim.” Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 194 N.J. 345 , 350 n. 3, 944 A.2d 630 (2008). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jobes v. Evangelista
green
2 sentences2008Simply put, good faith as a condition of the qualified immunity afforded by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 and actual malice in the New York Times sense are mutually exclusive. [ Jobes v. Evangelista, 369 N.J.Super. 384, 395 , 849 A. 2d 186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 457 , 852 A. 2d 193 (2004).] The remaining claims against the school defendants that are subject to the TCA, false imprisonment, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and the per quod claim, are all intentional torts, i.e., willful misconduct or based on intentional torts. 2008Simply put, good faith as a condition of the qualified immunity afforded by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 and actual malice in the New York Times sense are mutually exclusive. [ Jobes v. Evangelista, 369 N.J.Super. 384, 395 , 849 A. 2d 186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 457 , 852 A. 2d 193 (2004).] The remaining claims against the school defendants that are subject to the TCA, false imprisonment, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and the per quod claim, are all intentional torts, i.e., willful misconduct or based on intentional torts. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pickett v. Lloyd's
green
2 sentences2007"Compensation should not be dependent on what label we place on an action but rather on the nature of the injury inflicted on the plaintiff and the remedies requested." Pickett v. Lloyd's, 131 N.J. 457, 470 , 621 A. 2d 445 (1993). 2007"Compensation should not be dependent on what label we place on an action but rather on the nature of the injury inflicted on the plaintiff and the remedies requested." Pickett v. Lloyd's, 131 N.J. 457, 470 , 621 A. 2d 445 (1993). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2007Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 , 323 A. 2d 495 (1974) (holding that the insurer, who has "contractually restricted the independent negotiating power of its insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage" by "offer[ing] its policy limits [and] try[ing] to settle the matter if there is any possibility of a judgment above the [policy] limits"). [2] Robin Jolley, Sr. was ultimately dismissed from the litigation because he was not legally married to Kimberly Jolley, and therefore could not pursue a per quod claim. [3] Zur 2007Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 , 323 A. 2d 495 (1974) (holding that the insurer, who has "contractually restricted the independent negotiating power of its insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage" by "offer[ing] its policy limits [and] try[ing] to settle the matter if there is any possibility of a judgment above the [policy] limits"). [2] Robin Jolley, Sr. was ultimately dismissed from the litigation because he was not legally married to Kimberly Jolley, and therefore could not pursue a per quod claim. [3] Zur | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Oswin v. Shaw
red
2 sentences2005Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609 A.2d 415 (1992). 2005Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609 A.2d 415 (1992). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
DiProspero v. Penn
green
2 sentences2005During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A. 2d 1039 (2005), holding that the limitation on lawsuit option does not require proof of serious life impact. 2005During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 , 874 A. 2d 1039 (2005), holding that the limitation on lawsuit option does not require proof of serious life impact. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Boyd v. Steele
green
2 sentences2003Tichenor v. Santillo 218 N.J.Super. 165, 173 , 527 A. 2d 78 (App.Div. 1987); Wimmer v. Coombs, 198 N.J.Super. 184, 188 , 486 A. 2d 916 (App.Div.1985); Boyd v. Steele, 107 N.J.Super. 405, 410 , 258 A. 2d 719 (App.Div.1969). 2003Tichenor v. Santillo 218 N.J.Super. 165, 173 , 527 A. 2d 78 (App.Div. 1987); Wimmer v. Coombs, 198 N.J.Super. 184, 188 , 486 A. 2d 916 (App.Div.1985); Boyd v. Steele, 107 N.J.Super. 405, 410 , 258 A. 2d 719 (App.Div.1969). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wimmer v. Coombs
green
2 sentences2003Tichenor v. Santillo 218 N.J.Super. 165, 173 , 527 A. 2d 78 (App.Div. 1987); Wimmer v. Coombs, 198 N.J.Super. 184, 188 , 486 A. 2d 916 (App.Div.1985); Boyd v. Steele, 107 N.J.Super. 405, 410 , 258 A. 2d 719 (App.Div.1969). 2003Tichenor v. Santillo 218 N.J.Super. 165, 173 , 527 A. 2d 78 (App.Div. 1987); Wimmer v. Coombs, 198 N.J.Super. 184, 188 , 486 A. 2d 916 (App.Div.1985); Boyd v. Steele, 107 N.J.Super. 405, 410 , 258 A. 2d 719 (App.Div.1969). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rex v. Hutner
green
2 sentences2003Rex v. Hutner, 26 N.J. 489, 491-92 , 140 A. 2d 753 (1958). 2003Rex v. Hutner, 26 N.J. 489, 491-92 , 140 A. 2d 753 (1958). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Hedgebeth v. Medford green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Davis v. ELIZ. GEN. MED. CTR.
green
2 sentences2000Ctr., by Judge Menza who observed that, based upon statutory enactment or analogy with a spouse's claim for consortium, the trend appears to allow a per quod claim for companionship and society in cases where a minor child has been seriously injured. 228 N.J.Super. 17, 20-21 , 548 A. 2d 528 (Law Div.1988). 2000Ctr., by Judge Menza who observed that, based upon statutory enactment or analogy with a spouse's claim for consortium, the trend appears to allow a per quod claim for companionship and society in cases where a minor child has been seriously injured. 228 N.J.Super. 17, 20-21 , 548 A. 2d 528 (Law Div.1988). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Landwehr v. Landwehr green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Danek v. Hommer green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Kopak v. Polzer green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| BRENNANS. v. Biber neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Brennan v. Biber green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Calabrese v. Selective Insurance Co. of America green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Wolfe v. State Farm Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Wolfe v. State Farm Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Scott v. Garber green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Amato v. Amato green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hair v. County of Monterey green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Shockley Ex Rel. Shockley v. Prier green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Tornquist v. Perkowski green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Grover P. MacOn v. Seaward Construction Company, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Zalewski v. Gallagher green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Sweeney v. Pruyne green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Konitch v. Hartung green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Danek v. Hommer green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.