6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 1 courts 1954–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.green2 sentences1987See Williams v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 370 , 203 A.2d 665 (1964) (trial judge has responsibility of proper conduct of trial and has wide discretion to hold examination of parties within bound); Commonwealth v. Dress, 354 Pa. 411 , 47 A.2d 197 (1946) (examination of witnesses is subject to control of trial court in whom is vested large discretion). *473 Appellant's next argument is also framed under the rubric of "the right to be heard." In this instance he complains that he was denied the right to be heard by counsel because the trial court restricted defense counsel's commen 1987See Williams v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 370 , 203 A.2d 665 (1964) (trial judge has responsibility of proper conduct of trial and has wide discretion to hold examination of parties within bound); Commonwealth v. Dress, 354 Pa. 411 , 47 A.2d 197 (1946) (examination of witnesses is subject to control of trial court in whom is vested large discretion). *473 Appellant's next argument is also framed under the rubric of "the right to be heard." In this instance he complains that he was denied the right to be heard by counsel because the trial court restricted defense counsel's commen | 1 | 1 |
Schofield Discipline Casegreen2 sentences1976As Rule 17-1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court expressly states: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to deny to any other court such powers as are necessary for that court to maintain control over proceedings conducted before it, such as the power of contempt, nor to prohibit bar associations from censuring, suspending or expelling their members from membership in the association." See also In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 214 , 66 A.2d 675, 682 (1949). [3] Following his closing argument appellant explained his conduct to the trial judge in Chambers thusly: "Therefore, Mr. Strauss [the a 1976As Rule 17-1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court expressly states: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to deny to any other court such powers as are necessary for that court to maintain control over proceedings conducted before it, such as the power of contempt, nor to prohibit bar associations from censuring, suspending or expelling their members from membership in the association." See also In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 214 , 66 A.2d 675, 682 (1949). [3] Following his closing argument appellant explained his conduct to the trial judge in Chambers thusly: "Therefore, Mr. Strauss [the a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baker v. Lafayette College
green
2 sentences2001We turn to the case upon which the Superior Court primarily relied for its guiding premise, our decision in Baker v. Lafayette College, 516 Pa. 291 , 532 A.2d 399 (1987). 2001We turn to the case upon which the Superior Court primarily relied for its guiding premise, our decision in Baker v. Lafayette College, 516 Pa. 291 , 532 A.2d 399 (1987). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Dress
green
2 sentences1987See Williams v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 370 , 203 A.2d 665 (1964) (trial judge has responsibility of proper conduct of trial and has wide discretion to hold examination of parties within bound); Commonwealth v. Dress, 354 Pa. 411 , 47 A.2d 197 (1946) (examination of witnesses is subject to control of trial court in whom is vested large discretion). *473 Appellant's next argument is also framed under the rubric of "the right to be heard." In this instance he complains that he was denied the right to be heard by counsel because the trial court restricted defense counsel's commen 1987See Williams v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 370 , 203 A.2d 665 (1964) (trial judge has responsibility of proper conduct of trial and has wide discretion to hold examination of parties within bound); Commonwealth v. Dress, 354 Pa. 411 , 47 A.2d 197 (1946) (examination of witnesses is subject to control of trial court in whom is vested large discretion). *473 Appellant's next argument is also framed under the rubric of "the right to be heard." In this instance he complains that he was denied the right to be heard by counsel because the trial court restricted defense counsel's commen | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences1984Rather than subscribe, as the majority has done, to the traditional, restricted rule which requires the employee to have express or implied authority to make the statements, I would apply the less restricted rule articulated in Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 259 Pa.Super.Ct. 167 , 393 A.2d 770 (1978), that an employee’s statement is admissible against the employer if the statement was made before the termination of the employment, concerned a matter within the scope of the employment and was accompanied by sufficient indicia of reliability. 1984Rather than subscribe, as the majority has done, to the traditional, restricted rule which requires the employee to have express or implied authority to make the statements, I would apply the less restricted rule articulated in Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 259 Pa.Super.Ct. 167 , 393 A.2d 770 (1978), that an employee’s statement is admissible against the employer if the statement was made before the termination of the employment, concerned a matter within the scope of the employment and was accompanied by sufficient indicia of reliability. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Watkins v. Sharon Aerie No. 327 Fraternal Order of Eagles
green
2 sentences1984Watkins v. Sharon Aerie, No. 327 Fraternal Order of Eagles, 423 Pa. 396 , 223 A.2d 742 (1966), is like Murray in that there, there was no proof of agency. 1984Watkins v. Sharon Aerie, No. 327 Fraternal Order of Eagles, 423 Pa. 396 , 223 A.2d 742 (1966), is like Murray in that there, there was no proof of agency. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman
green
1 sentence1966It should be noted that in all cases in which the State Department has not advised a Court of its determination of Sovereign Immunity, the determination thereof is properly a matter for the Court in the light of all the facts in that particular case: Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 ; Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Greenfield v. Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1954This court went on, however, by way of a pure gratuity, to add that “Moreover, plaintiff could have been asked on cross-examination the direct question as to what he had paid for the property [citing] Greenfield v. Phila., 282 Pa. 344 , 127 A. 768 .” Thus, what had begun as a very restricted rule in the Ilea case became, with only one case intervening (viz., Greenfield v. Philadelphia), a general rule by way of a dictum in the Luts case. 1954This court went on, however, by way of a pure gratuity, to add that “Moreover, plaintiff could have been asked on cross-examination the direct question as to what he had paid for the property [citing] Greenfield v. Phila., 282 Pa. 344 , 127 A. 768 .” Thus, what had begun as a very restricted rule in the Ilea case became, with only one case intervening (viz., Greenfield v. Philadelphia), a general rule by way of a dictum in the Luts case. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.