6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1949–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DiGIROLAMO v. Apanavagegreen2 sentences1978(Emphasis added.) In DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557 , 312 A.2d 382 (1973), we held that an unliquidated tort claim is not separate property of the wife, even where the tort preceded the marriage. 1978(Emphasis added.) In DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557 , 312 A.2d 382 (1973), we held that an unliquidated tort claim is not separate property of the wife, even where the tort preceded the marriage. | 1 | 2 |
Feingold v. Liberty Mutual Groupgreen1 sentence2020Group, 847 F.Supp.2d 772, 777 (E.D.Pa. 2012), aff’d, 562 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“A disbarred attorney cannot rely on a contingent fee agreement to pursue on his own behalf an unliquidated tort claim of a former client under [Section] 8371. …”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tejedagreen2 sentences2014First, Allstate explained, under Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523 , 932 A.2d 877 (2007), Section 8371 created a form of an unliquidated tort claim. 2014See id. at 536 , 932 A.2d at 885 (holding, in determining the appropriate limitations period, that “an action under § 8371 is a statutorily-created tort action”). | 1 | 1 |
Stemniski v. Stemniskigreen2 sentences1973See text following note 1, supra. [12] Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 42 , 169 A.2d 51, 53 (1961); Brandt v. Hershey, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 182 A.2d 219 (1962). [13] Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman's unliquidated tort claim "separate property." E.g., O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). [14] See W. 1973See text following note 1, supra. [12] Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 42 , 169 A.2d 51, 53 (1961); Brandt v. Hershey, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 182 A.2d 219 (1962). [13] Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman's unliquidated tort claim "separate property." E.g., O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). [14] See W. | 1 | 1 |
Gilmore v. Alexandergreen2 sentences1949Accordingly, in 1913, when plaintiff issued the interrogatories, as an additional step in the execution, they were as effectually supported by the writ of attachment (Gilmore v. Alexander, 268 Pa. 415, 420, 424 , 112 A. 9 ; Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317, 325 , 159 A. 541 ) as if the existing writ had been discontinued and a new attachment issued.” Attachment execution will not bind an unliquidated tort claim; yet in Sniderman et al. v. Nerone et al., 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 381 , it was held that when a verdict had been secured the claim was bound by an attachment, notwithstanding a new trial was 1949Accordingly, in 1913, when plaintiff issued the interrogatories, as an additional step in the execution, they were as effectually supported by the writ of attachment (Gilmore v. Alexander, 268 Pa. 415, 420, 424 , 112 A. 9 ; Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317, 325 , 159 A. 541 ) as if the existing writ had been discontinued and a new attachment issued.” Attachment execution will not bind an unliquidated tort claim; yet in Sniderman et al. v. Nerone et al., 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 381 , it was held that when a verdict had been secured the claim was bound by an attachment, notwithstanding a new trial was | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meisel v. Little
green
2 sentences1973Nowhere does the 1893 Act state that a chose in action, such as an unliquidated tort claim, may not be a married woman’s “separate property.” Nowhere does it repeal the 1848 Act’s declaration that “property of whatever name or kind” may be a married woman’s “separate property.” This brief recital of the statutory history clearly illustrates the majority’s error in following Meisel v. Lit tle, 407 Pa. 546 , 180 A.2d 772 (1962). 1973Nowhere does the 1893 Act state that a chose in action, such as an unliquidated tort claim, may not be a married woman’s “separate property.” Nowhere does it repeal the 1848 Act’s declaration that “property of whatever name or kind” may be a married woman’s “separate property.” This brief recital of the statutory history clearly illustrates the majority’s error in following Meisel v. Lit tle, 407 Pa. 546 , 180 A.2d 772 (1962). | 2 | 1973–1975 |
Allen Feingold v. Liberty Mutual Group
green
1 sentence2020Group, 847 F.Supp.2d 772, 777 (E.D.Pa. 2012), aff’d, 562 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“A disbarred attorney cannot rely on a contingent fee agreement to pursue on his own behalf an unliquidated tort claim of a former client under [Section] 8371. …”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ash v. Continental Insurance
green
1 sentence2014First, Allstate explained, under Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523 , 932 A.2d 877 (2007), Section 8371 created a form of an unliquidated tort claim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Falco v. PADOS
green
2 sentences1975See DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557 , 312 A.2d 382 (1973); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523 , 207 A.2d 412 (1964); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546 , 180 A.2d 772 (1962). 1975See DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557 , 312 A.2d 382 (1973); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523 , 207 A.2d 412 (1964); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546 , 180 A.2d 772 (1962). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Daly v. BUTERBAUGH (Et Al.)
green
2 sentences1975See DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557 , 312 A.2d 382 (1973); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523 , 207 A.2d 412 (1964); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546 , 180 A.2d 772 (1962). 1975See DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557 , 312 A.2d 382 (1973); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523 , 207 A.2d 412 (1964); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546 , 180 A.2d 772 (1962). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Miller v. Miller
green
2 sentences1973In 1863, this Court in Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863), ruled an unliquidated tort claim was not “property” as that term was used in the Act of 1856. 1973In *561 1863, this Court in Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863), ruled an unliquidated tort claim was not "property" as that term was used in the Act of 1856. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Berry v. Harmon
green
2 sentences1973Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman’s unliquidated tort claim “separate property.” E.g., O’Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). 1973See text following note 1, supra. [12] Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 42 , 169 A.2d 51, 53 (1961); Brandt v. Hershey, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 182 A.2d 219 (1962). [13] Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman's unliquidated tort claim "separate property." E.g., O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). [14] See W. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
O'GRADY v. Potts
green
2 sentences1973Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman’s unliquidated tort claim “separate property.” E.g., O’Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). 1973Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman’s unliquidated tort claim “separate property.” E.g., O’Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Brandt v. Hershey
green
2 sentences1973See text following note 1, supra. [12] Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 42 , 169 A.2d 51, 53 (1961); Brandt v. Hershey, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 182 A.2d 219 (1962). [13] Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman's unliquidated tort claim "separate property." E.g., O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). [14] See W. 1973See text following note 1, supra. [12] Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 42 , 169 A.2d 51, 53 (1961); Brandt v. Hershey, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 539 , 182 A.2d 219 (1962). [13] Other state supreme courts have not hesitated to hold a married woman's unliquidated tort claim "separate property." E.g., O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644 , 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1959). [14] See W. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Frazier v. Berg
green
2 sentences1949Accordingly, in 1913, when plaintiff issued the interrogatories, as an additional step in the execution, they were as effectually supported by the writ of attachment (Gilmore v. Alexander, 268 Pa. 415, 420, 424 , 112 A. 9 ; Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317, 325 , 159 A. 541 ) as if the existing writ had been discontinued and a new attachment issued.” Attachment execution will not bind an unliquidated tort claim; yet in Sniderman et al. v. Nerone et al., 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 381 , it was held that when a verdict had been secured the claim was bound by an attachment, notwithstanding a new trial was 1949Accordingly, in 1913, when plaintiff issued the interrogatories, as an additional step in the execution, they were as effectually supported by the writ of attachment (Gilmore v. Alexander, 268 Pa. 415, 420, 424 , 112 A. 9 ; Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317, 325 , 159 A. 541 ) as if the existing writ had been discontinued and a new attachment issued.” Attachment execution will not bind an unliquidated tort claim; yet in Sniderman et al. v. Nerone et al., 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 381 , it was held that when a verdict had been secured the claim was bound by an attachment, notwithstanding a new trial was | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Lippincott v. Lippincott
green
1 sentence1949In Lippincott et al. v. Lippincott et al., 349 Pa. 501 , the court held an attachment execution to be a continuing levy upon a spendthrift trust. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Sniderman v. Nerone
green
1 sentence1949Accordingly, in 1913, when plaintiff issued the interrogatories, as an additional step in the execution, they were as effectually supported by the writ of attachment (Gilmore v. Alexander, 268 Pa. 415, 420, 424 , 112 A. 9 ; Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317, 325 , 159 A. 541 ) as if the existing writ had been discontinued and a new attachment issued.” Attachment execution will not bind an unliquidated tort claim; yet in Sniderman et al. v. Nerone et al., 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 381 , it was held that when a verdict had been secured the claim was bound by an attachment, notwithstanding a new trial was | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.