exoneration rule in Tennessee

6 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

Case	Followed	Cited
Rodriguez v. Nielsengreen neb · 2000 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Rodriguez, 609 N.W.2d at 374 (“[T]he public has a strong interest in encouraging the representation of criminal defendants, especially indigents.”); Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 1000 (the exoneration rule “promotes an ample defense bar by reducing the risk of malpractice claims”); Bailey, 621 A.2d at 114 . 2001See Rodriguez, 609 N.W.2d at 374 (“[T]he public has a strong interest in encouraging the representation of criminal defendants, especially indigents.”); Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 100 (the exoneration rule “promotes an ample defense bar by reducing the risk of malpractice claims”); Bailey, 609 N.W.2d at 114 .	2	2
Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A.green nh · 1999 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Rodriguez, 609 N.W.2d at 374 (“[T]he public has a strong interest in encouraging the representation of criminal defendants, especially indigents.”); Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 1000 (the exoneration rule “promotes an ample defense bar by reducing the risk of malpractice claims”); Bailey, 621 A.2d at 114 . 2001See Rodriguez, 609 N.W.2d at 374 (“[T]he public has a strong interest in encouraging the representation of criminal defendants, especially indigents.”); Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 100 (the exoneration rule “promotes an ample defense bar by reducing the risk of malpractice claims”); Bailey, 609 N.W.2d at 114 .	2	2
Mylar v. Wilkinsongreen ala · 1983 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989). 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. 1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Mich. 1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (N.M.	2	2
Shaw v. State, Department of Administrationgreen alaska · 1993 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 475-76 (Cal. 2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual innocence, but not deciding whet	2	2
State Ex Rel. O'Blennis v. Adolfgreen moctapp · 1985 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001O’Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (relying on collateral estoppel and public policy arguments consistent with the exoneration requirement). 2001O’Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on collateral estoppel and public policy arguments consistent with the exoneration requirement).	2	2
Glenn v. Aikengreen mass · 1991 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding	2	2
Ray v. Stonegreen kyctapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 475-76 (Cal. 2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual innocence, but not deciding whet	2	2
Gebhardt v. O'ROURKEgreen mich · 1994 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989). 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989).	2	2
Gomez v. Petersgreen gactapp · 1996 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding	2	2
Wiley v. County of San Diegogreen cal · 1998 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding	2	2
Vahila v. Hallgreen ohio · 1997 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001The exoneration requirement was soundly rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court in Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1168-69 (1997). 2001The exoneration requirement was soundly rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court in Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1168-69 (1997).	2	2
Duncan v. Campbellgreen nmctapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989). 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989).	2	2
Carmel v. Lunneygreen ny · 1987 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding	2	2
Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneogreen cal · 2001 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding	1	2
Krahn v. Kinneygreen ohio · 1989 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989). 2001See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237, 1239 (Ala.1983) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but suggesting there is no difference between civil and criminal malpractice cases); Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535 , 510 N.W.2d 900, 906 (1994); Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181 , 936 P.2d 863, 866-68 (App.1997) (confronting a plaintiff who had obtained post-conviction relief, but rejecting the reasoning behind the exoneration rule); Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103 , 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989).	1	2
In Re Estate of Vincentgreen tenn · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018“Under the common law doctrine of exoneration, an heir or devisee is generally entitled to have encumbrances upon real estate paid by the estate’s personalty unless, in the devisee’s case, the will directs otherwise.” In re Estate of Vincent, 98 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tenn. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (refusing to extend the doctrine of exoneration so that the surviving tenant in a joint tenancy would not be entitled to compel the executor of the deceased tenant’s estate to pay encumbrances on the real estate because “property passing through probate and property passing through non-probate m	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

Case	Cited	Years
Morgano v. Smith green nev · 1994 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 475-76 (Cal. 2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual innocence, but not deciding whet	2	2001–2001
Robert M. Levine v. Richard Kling green ca7 · 1997 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 475-76 (Cal. 2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual innocence, but not deciding whet	2	2001–2001
Peeler v. Hughes & Luce green tex · 1995 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 475-76 (Cal. 2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual innocence, but not deciding whet	2	2001–2001
Bailey v. Tucker green pa · 1993 2 sentences 2001See Rodriguez, 609 N.W.2d at 374 ("[T]he public has a strong interest in encouraging the representation of criminal defendants, especially indigents."); Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 1000 (the exoneration rule "promotes an ample defense bar by reducing the risk of malpractice claims"); Bailey, 621 A.2d at 114 . 2001See Rodriguez, 609 N.W.2d at 374 (“[T]he public has a strong interest in encouraging the representation of criminal defendants, especially indigents.”); Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 1000 (the exoneration rule “promotes an ample defense bar by reducing the risk of malpractice claims”); Bailey, 621 A.2d at 114 .	2	2001–2001
Adkins v. Dixon green va · 1997 2 sentences 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiffs guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 475-76 , 25 P.3d 670 (2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 966 P.2d 983, 991 (1998); Gomez v. Peters, 221 Ga.App. 57 , 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky.Ct.App.1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991) (holding 2001See Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993) (holding that actual innocence is relevant and that the defense lawyer may raise the issue of the plaintiff’s guilt as an affirmative defense) (Shaw II); Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 475-76 (Cal. 2001); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Levine, 123 F.3d at 582 ; Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must prove actual innocence, but not deciding whet	2	2001–2001
O'Conner v. O'Conner neutral · 1889 1 sentence 2003Vincent, despite taking title by deed and not through devise or descent, argues that the doctrine of exoneration should be applied to his situation as well, and that this Court should extend the doctrine to apply to mortgages on property passing outside probate. *149 The plaintiff cites to traditional exoneration cases, involving heirs taking through intestacy, American Surety Co. v. Grace, 151 Tenn. 575 , 271 S.W. 739 (1925) and O’Conner v. O’Conner, 88 Tenn. 76 , 12 S.W. 447 (1889), to show, by analogy, that he is entitled to exoneration.	1	2003–2003
American Surety Co. v. Grace neutral tenn · 1924 1 sentence 2003Vincent, despite taking title by deed and not through devise or descent, argues that the doctrine of exoneration should be applied to his situation as well, and that this Court should extend the doctrine to apply to mortgages on property passing outside probate. *149 The plaintiff cites to traditional exoneration cases, involving heirs taking through intestacy, American Surety Co. v. Grace, 151 Tenn. 575 , 271 S.W. 739 (1925) and O’Conner v. O’Conner, 88 Tenn. 76 , 12 S.W. 447 (1889), to show, by analogy, that he is entitled to exoneration.	1	2003–2003
Gibson v. Trant green tenn · 2001 1 sentence 2002A plaintiff must meet this exoneration requirement before he can sue his defense lawyer.” Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 108 .	1	2002–2002

Where else courts name it

MO 7 (1979–2018) KS 7 (2003–2026) TN 6 (2001–2018) NY 5 (1966–2020) CT 5 (2009–2024) IL 4 (1979–2022) CA 4 (2014–2026) FL 3 (2005–2023) IA 3 (2016–2017) NJ 2 (1950–2007) ME 2 (2014–2017) KY 2 (2019–2023) NE 2 (2020–2020) OR 2 (2011–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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