Ferguson factors in Mississippi

2026Nonmarital Property (6) Marcus possessed significant nonmarital property, including a house 3 The Ferguson factors include the (1) “[s]ubstantial contribution to the accumulation of the property; (2) disposition of assets; (3) market value and emotional value of the marital assets; (4) value of non-marital property; (5) tax or other consequences; (6) “extent to which property division may” reduce periodic payments and reduce friction; (7) financial needs of the parties; and (8) “[a]ny other factor which in equity should be considered.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). 9

2026Nonmarital Property (6) Marcus possessed significant nonmarital property, including a house 3 The Ferguson factors include the (1) “[s]ubstantial contribution to the accumulation of the property; (2) disposition of assets; (3) market value and emotional value of the marital assets; (4) value of non-marital property; (5) tax or other consequences; (6) “extent to which property division may” reduce periodic payments and reduce friction; (7) financial needs of the parties; and (8) “[a]ny other factor which in equity should be considered.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). 9

2017The “[d]ivision of marital assets is now governed under the law as stated in Hemsley and Ferguson[, whereby . . .] the character of the parties’ assets, i.e., marital or non-marital, must be determined pursuant to Hemsley [and then. . .] equitably divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines.” Lauro, 847 So. 2d at 848 (quoting Johnson, 650 So. 2d at 1287 ).

2017The “[d]ivision of marital assets is now governed under the law as stated in Hemsley and Ferguson[, whereby . . .] the character of the parties’ assets, i.e., marital or non-marital, must be determined pursuant to Hemsley [and then. . .] equitably divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines.” Lauro, 847 So. 2d at 848 (quoting Johnson, 650 So. 2d at 1287 ).

2025“A chancellor is required to make findings of fact regarding all applicable Ferguson factors.” Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 285 .

2025The Court held that “failure to consider all applicable Ferguson factors is error and mandates reversal.” Id. at 286 .

2018"In reviewing a chancellor's judgment, this Court does not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, but [we] review[ ] the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion." Phillips v. Phillips , 904 So.2d 999 , 1001 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2004).

2018"In reviewing a chancellor's judgment, this Court does not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, but [we] review[ ] the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion." Phillips v. Phillips , 904 So.2d 999 , 1001 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2004).

2008“This Court has reversed decisions where, even though the chancellor may have actually applied the Ferguson factors, the chancellor failed to make specific findings on the record.” Owen v. Owen, 798 So.2d 394, 399 (¶ 13) (Miss.2001) (citing Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 732 So.2d 876, 880-81 (¶19) (Miss.1999)).

2008“This Court has reversed decisions where, even though the chancellor may have actually applied the Ferguson factors, the chancellor failed to make specific findings on the record.” Owen v. Owen, 798 So.2d 394, 399 (¶ 13) (Miss.2001) (citing Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 732 So.2d 876, 880-81 (¶19) (Miss.1999)).

2024Ct. App. 2010) (citing Weathersby v. Weathersby, 693 So. 2d 1348, 1354 (Miss. 1997)).

2024Ct. App. 2010) (citing Weathersby v. Weathersby, 693 So. 2d 1348, 1354 (Miss. 1997)).

2025When “reviewing a chancellor’s judgment [in property division,] this Court does not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, but reviews the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse [her] discretion.” Goellner v. Goellner, 11 So. 3d 1251, 1264 (¶45) (Miss.

2025When “reviewing a chancellor’s judgment [in property division,] this Court does not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, but reviews the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse [her] discretion.” Goellner v. Goellner, 11 So. 3d 1251, 1264 (¶45) (Miss.

2023“If lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.” Davenport v. Davenport, 156 So. 3d 231, 241 (¶34) (Miss. 2014).

2023“If lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.” Davenport v. Davenport, 156 So. 3d 231, 241 (¶34) (Miss. 2014).

2020In order to equitably distribute property, the chancery 10 court applies the Ferguson factors, which include: “(1) contribution to the accumulation of property, (2) dissipation of assets, (3) the market or emotional value of assets subject to distribution, (4) the value of assets not subject to distribution, (5) the tax and economic consequences of the distribution, (6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need for alimony, (7) the financial security needs of the parties, and (8) any other factor that in equity should be considered.” Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273, 1281 (¶36

2020In order to equitably distribute property, the chancery 10 court applies the Ferguson factors, which include: “(1) contribution to the accumulation of property, (2) dissipation of assets, (3) the market or emotional value of assets subject to distribution, (4) the value of assets not subject to distribution, (5) the tax and economic consequences of the distribution, (6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need for alimony, (7) the financial security needs of the parties, and (8) any other factor that in equity should be considered.” Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273, 1281 (¶36

2017In its opinion, the chancery court divided the marital estate using the following language: "Examining the factors for equitable distribution as set forth in Ferguson , and further considering Hemsley v. Hemsley , 639 So.2d 909 , 921 (Miss. 1994), the Court finds that both parties have contributed equally to the acquisition of the aforesaid property." 7 Candice asserts the chancery court's opinion is just a "blanket statement," which fails to satisfy the Lowrey requirement of an "on the record" analysis of the Ferguson factors.

2017In its opinion, the chancery court divided the marital estate using the following language: "Examining the factors for equitable distribution as set forth in Ferguson , and further considering Hemsley v. Hemsley , 639 So.2d 909 , 921 (Miss. 1994), the Court finds that both parties have contributed equally to the acquisition of the aforesaid property." 7 Candice asserts the chancery court's opinion is just a "blanket statement," which fails to satisfy the Lowrey requirement of an "on the record" analysis of the Ferguson factors.

2020The court reasoned that “[w]ithout findings from the [c]hancellor . . . , we cannot determine if the distribution of property outlined . . . meets the standards of equitable distribution by Ferguson.” Id.; see also Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So. 2d 341, 348 (¶21) (Miss. 2000) (reversed and remanded for further findings because “the chancellor made no conclusions of law to support the division of the marital estate”); Johnson v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 1156, 1161 (¶12) (Miss. 2002) (reversed for the chancellor’s failure to provide “specific findings of fact and conclusions of law” in regard to the Fergu

2020The court reasoned that “[w]ithout findings from the [c]hancellor . . . , we cannot determine if the distribution of property outlined . . . meets the standards of equitable distribution by Ferguson.” Id.; see also Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So. 2d 341, 348 (¶21) (Miss. 2000) (reversed and remanded for further findings because “the chancellor made no conclusions of law to support the division of the marital estate”); Johnson v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 1156, 1161 (¶12) (Miss. 2002) (reversed for the chancellor’s failure to provide “specific findings of fact and conclusions of law” in regard to the Fergu

2010Appellate courts “look to the chancellor’s application of the Ferguson factors when reviewing questions of equitable distribution.” Id. (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994)).

2010Appellate courts “look to the chancellor’s application of the Ferguson factors when reviewing questions of equitable distribution.” Id. (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994)).

2024This Court “do[es] not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew.” Dickerson v. Dickerson, 34 So. 3d 637, 644 (¶24) (Miss.

2024This Court “do[es] not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew.” Dickerson v. Dickerson, 34 So. 3d 637, 644 (¶24) (Miss.

2024However, the appellate courts “[have] not hesitated to reverse chancellors who fail to apply the Ferguson factors and make the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by this Court.” Id. at 348 (¶20).

2024However, the appellate courts “[have] not hesitated to reverse chancellors who fail to apply the Ferguson factors and make the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by this Court.” Id. at 348 (¶20).

2015“The failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is ‘manifest error requiring reversal and remand.’ ” Id. (quoting Sandlin, 699 So.2d at 1204 ); see also Reed v. Reed, 141 So.3d 450, 455 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (remand was required where appellant raised the issue of inequity in his post-trial motion and the chancellor failed to support his findings with any *1033 analysis, discussion, or mention of the Ferguson factors or the evidence before him). ¶7.

2015“The failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is ‘manifest error requiring reversal and remand.’ ” Id. (quoting Sandlin, 699 So.2d at 1204 ); see also Reed v. Reed, 141 So.3d 450, 455 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (remand was required where appellant raised the issue of inequity in his post-trial motion and the chancellor failed to support his findings with any *1033 analysis, discussion, or mention of the Ferguson factors or the evidence before him). ¶7.

2024Here, the chancellor explained his findings in detail and appropriately classified the property as marital pursuant to Hemsley “and conducted a detailed analysis of all the Ferguson factors in distributing the marital property.” See Randolph, 199 So. 3d at 1287 (¶18) (citing Selman v. Selman, 722 So. 2d 547, 554 (¶29) (Miss. 1998) (stating reversal is warranted “only where the failure to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute[s] manifest error.”))).

2024Here, the chancellor explained his findings in detail and appropriately classified the property as marital pursuant to Hemsley “and conducted a detailed analysis of all the Ferguson factors in distributing the marital property.” See Randolph, 199 So. 3d at 1287 (¶18) (citing Selman v. Selman, 722 So. 2d 547, 554 (¶29) (Miss. 1998) (stating reversal is warranted “only where the failure to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute[s] manifest error.”))).

2024“A chancellor is required to make findings of fact regarding all applicable Ferguson factors.” Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 285 (¶26). “[M]arital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability 6 and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 904-05 (Miss. 1994).

2021As noted above, when applying the Ferguson factors, a chancellor is required to take into account a spouse’s adulterous conduct to the extent that such “misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 285 (¶26) (quoting Carrow, 642 So. 2d at 904-05 ).

2005When this Court reviews a chancellor’s judgment in property division we are not to conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, “but are to review the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.” Id. at 1243 (¶ 8). ¶ 14.

2005When this Court reviews a chancellor’s judgment in property division we are not to conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, “but are to review the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.” Id. at 1243 (¶ 8). ¶ 14.

2024Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 281 (¶10) (reversing and remanding because “the appropriate Ferguson . . . test[] [was] not set out and applied”); Johnson v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 1156, 1162 (¶14) (Miss. 2002) (“Because the chancellor failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as required by Ferguson . . . , the trial court’s division of property must be reversed[.]”); Heigle, 771 So. 2d at 348 (¶22) (“As a result of the chancellor’s failure to apply the Ferguson factors properly, this Court has no choice but to reverse and remand this action to the trial court.”); Johnso

2024Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 281 (¶10) (reversing and remanding because “the appropriate Ferguson . . . test[] [was] not set out and applied”); Johnson v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 1156, 1162 (¶14) (Miss. 2002) (“Because the chancellor failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as required by Ferguson . . . , the trial court’s division of property must be reversed[.]”); Heigle, 771 So. 2d at 348 (¶22) (“As a result of the chancellor’s failure to apply the Ferguson factors properly, this Court has no choice but to reverse and remand this action to the trial court.”); Johnso

2012See Fitzgerald, 914 So.2d at 197 (¶ 17). “[T]he chancellor is to value [ (using the fair market value) ] and equitably divide the marital property, em ploying the Ferguson factors as guidelines, in light of each party’s non-marital property.” Drumright v. Drumright, 812 So.2d 1021, 1025 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2001).

2012See Fitzgerald, 914 So.2d at 197 (¶ 17). “[T]he chancellor is to value [ (using the fair market value) ] and equitably divide the marital property, em ploying the Ferguson factors as guidelines, in light of each party’s non-marital property.” Drumright v. Drumright, 812 So.2d 1021, 1025 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2001).

2016“If lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.” Id. at 241 (¶ 34) (citing Haney v. Haney, 907 So.2d 948, 955 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2005)). “[I]f the alimony, lump-sum or otherwise, is awarded subsequent to the equitable distribution of the marital assets, then chancellors must conduct their analysis under the Armstrong factors.” Id. (citing Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So.2d 843, 848 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003)). ¶ 24.

2016“If lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.” Id. at 241 (¶ 34) (citing Haney v. Haney, 907 So.2d 948, 955 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2005)). “[I]f the alimony, lump-sum or otherwise, is awarded subsequent to the equitable distribution of the marital assets, then chancellors must conduct their analysis under the Armstrong factors.” Id. (citing Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So.2d 843, 848 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003)). ¶ 24.

2017In addition to, applying the Ferguson factors, “[contributions and fault should be considered by the chancellor in determining equitable distribution of a marital estate.” Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004, 1008 (¶10) (Miss. 2002). “[A]n equitable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property.” Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 863-64 (Miss. 1994).

2017In addition to, applying the Ferguson factors, “[contributions and fault should be considered by the chancellor in determining equitable distribution of a marital estate.” Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004, 1008 (¶10) (Miss. 2002). “[A]n equitable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property.” Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 863-64 (Miss. 1994).

2023Id. “[W]hen ‘lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.’” Lewis v. Pagel, 172 So. 3d 162, 176 (¶29) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Davenport v. Davenport, 156 So. 3d 231, 241 (¶34) (Miss. 2014)).

2023Id. “[W]hen ‘lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.’” Lewis v. Pagel, 172 So. 3d 162, 176 (¶29) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Davenport v. Davenport, 156 So. 3d 231, 241 (¶34) (Miss. 2014)).

2009The chancellor is not required to consider all eight Ferguson factors but “may consider only those factors he [or she] finds ‘applicable’ to the property in question.” Owen v. Owen, 798 So.2d 394, 399 (¶ 13) (Miss.2001) (quoting Carrow v. Carrow, 741 So.2d 200, 202(¶ 10) (Miss.1999)). ¶ 6.

2005“The chancellor need not make findings as to all the Ferguson factors, but may consider only those factors he finds ‘applicable’ to the property in question.” Carrow v. Carrow, 741 So.2d 200 (¶ 10)(Miss.1999).

2013This Court has held that a trial court must apply the Ferguson factors in determining an award of lump-sum alimony “in all appropriate situations.” Yelverton, 961 So.2d at 25-26 .

2013This Court has held that a trial court must apply the Ferguson factors in determining an award of lump-sum alimony “in all appropriate situations.” Yelverton, 961 So.2d at 25-26 .

2019In ordering an equitable distribution of property, a chancellor is required to make findings of fact regarding the Ferguson factors.2 Bond v. Bond, 69 So. 3d 771, 772-73 (¶5) (Miss.

2019In ordering an equitable distribution of property, a chancellor is required to make findings of fact regarding the Ferguson factors.2 Bond v. Bond, 69 So. 3d 771, 772-73 (¶5) (Miss.

2024When this Court reviews “questions of equitable distribution” of the marital assets, we “look to the chancellor’s application of the Ferguson factors.” Gregg v. Gregg, 31 So. 3d 1277, 1280 (¶8) (Miss.

2024When this Court reviews “questions of equitable distribution” of the marital assets, we “look to the chancellor’s application of the Ferguson factors.” Gregg v. Gregg, 31 So. 3d 1277, 1280 (¶8) (Miss.

2024Ct. App. 2020) (finding chancellor’s failure to mention Ferguson factors to support her basis for dividing the marital estate was manifest error requiring reversal and 14 remand); Chipley, 210 So. 3d at 1033 (¶7) (reversing and remanding where “there [was] no record evidence any [Ferguson] factors were ever considered,” observing that “[w]ithout these required findings and conclusions of law, we are unable to review the chancellor’s property division,” thus requiring that the chancellor’s judgment be reversed and remanded “for the [new] chancellor to conduct a new trial on the property divisio

2024Ct. App. 2020) (finding chancellor’s failure to mention Ferguson factors to support her basis for dividing the marital estate was manifest error requiring reversal and 14 remand); Chipley, 210 So. 3d at 1033 (¶7) (reversing and remanding where “there [was] no record evidence any [Ferguson] factors were ever considered,” observing that “[w]ithout these required findings and conclusions of law, we are unable to review the chancellor’s property division,” thus requiring that the chancellor’s judgment be reversed and remanded “for the [new] chancellor to conduct a new trial on the property divisio