6 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that "[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony." Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d at 141 , 995 P.2d 31 . ¶ 24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wash.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that "the purpose of the `does not amount to' [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed." Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory lan 2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that “[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony.” Azpitarte, 140 Wn.2d at 141 . ¶24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wn.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that “the purpose of the ‘does not amount to’ [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed.” Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory language as requiring | 4 | 2003–2007 |
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that "[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony." Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d at 141 , 995 P.2d 31 . ¶ 24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wash.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that "the purpose of the `does not amount to' [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed." Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory lan 2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that “[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony.” Azpitarte, 140 Wn.2d at 141 . ¶24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wn.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that “the purpose of the ‘does not amount to’ [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed.” Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory language as requiring | 4 | 2003–2007 |
State v. Azpitarte
green
2 sentences2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that "[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony." Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d at 141 , 995 P.2d 31 . ¶ 24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wash.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that "the purpose of the `does not amount to' [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed." Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory lan 2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that “[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony.” Azpitarte, 140 Wn.2d at 141 . ¶24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wn.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that “the purpose of the ‘does not amount to’ [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed.” Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory language as requiring | 4 | 2003–2007 |
State v. Azpitarte
green
2 sentences2007(Emphasis added.) In Azpitarte, our Supreme Court ultimately held that "[t]he statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony." Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d at 141 , 995 P.2d 31 . ¶ 24 In State v. Ward, 148 Wash.2d 803, 812 , 64 P.3d 640 (2003), our Supreme Court clarified Azpitarte, noting that "the purpose of the `does not amount to' [assault in the first or second degree] provision is to elevate no-contact violations to a felony when any assault is committed." Our Supreme Court then explained: If we were to interpret the statutory lan 2003Petitioners contend that in State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wn.2d 138, 141 , 995 P.2d 31 (2000), this court held that an essential element of felony violation of a no-contact order is that the predicate assault not amount to assault in the first or second degree. | 3 | 2003–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.