unsupported claim in Washington

2010See State v. Calvert, 79 Wash.App. 569, 576 , 903 P.2d 1003 (1995) (rejecting a defendant's incompetency claim based on a head injury sustained nine days prior to the plea hearing where neither the defendant's medical records nor the doctor's testimony supported the defendant's claim that he was incompetent when he pleaded guilty); State v. Hystad, 36 Wash.App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant's unsupported incompetency claim because "defendant's bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice"); State v. Armst

2010App. 59, 63-65 , 533 P.2d 147 (1975) (rejecting a defendant’s unsupported claim that he was “ ‘drunk off barbiturates’ ” when he pleaded guilty). ¶11 DeClue argues that, similar to Marshall, he presented substantial evidence of incompetency and the trial court erred by holding an evidentiary hearing instead of a formal competency hearing under RCW 10.77.060.

2016Dep't. 183 Wn.2d 237, 248 , 350 P.3d 647 (2015); RAP 10.3(a)(6). 21 No. 73415-6-1/22 "[wjhether [Klavano] asked [Templin] to decrease her hours or [Templin] chose to decrease her hours . . . does not lend credibility to an unsupported claim of physical infirmity that prevents her from working full-time." Templin does not challenge the trial court's finding that she "sought no treatment for any alleged back injuries after 1993" and that "[h]er earnings after 1993 were not negatively affected by any alleged back injuries." Thus, these findings are verities on appeal.68 Further, any testimony pre

2016Dep't. 183 Wn.2d 237, 248 , 350 P.3d 647 (2015); RAP 10.3(a)(6). 21 No. 73415-6-1/22 "[wjhether [Klavano] asked [Templin] to decrease her hours or [Templin] chose to decrease her hours . . . does not lend credibility to an unsupported claim of physical infirmity that prevents her from working full-time." Templin does not challenge the trial court's finding that she "sought no treatment for any alleged back injuries after 1993" and that "[h]er earnings after 1993 were not negatively affected by any alleged back injuries." Thus, these findings are verities on appeal.68 Further, any testimony pre

2013This unsupported claim lacks merit. -9- 69867-2-1/10 666, 246 P.3d 835 (2011): see also Albice. 174 Wn.2d at 581 n.4 (Stephens, J., concurring).

2010See State v. Calvert, 79 Wash.App. 569, 576 , 903 P.2d 1003 (1995) (rejecting a defendant's incompetency claim based on a head injury sustained nine days prior to the plea hearing where neither the defendant's medical records nor the doctor's testimony supported the defendant's claim that he was incompetent when he pleaded guilty); State v. Hystad, 36 Wash.App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant's unsupported incompetency claim because "defendant's bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice"); State v. Armst

2010See State v. Calvert, 79 Wash.App. 569, 576 , 903 P.2d 1003 (1995) (rejecting a defendant's incompetency claim based on a head injury sustained nine days prior to the plea hearing where neither the defendant's medical records nor the doctor's testimony supported the defendant's claim that he was incompetent when he pleaded guilty); State v. Hystad, 36 Wash.App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant's unsupported incompetency claim because "defendant's bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice"); State v. Armst

1993If that were sufficient, one court's unduly narrow reading of a criminal statute would become binding on all other courts, including this one." (Citation omitted.) Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 , 112 L.

1993If that were sufficient, one court's unduly narrow reading of a criminal statute would become binding on all other courts, including this one." (Citation omitted.) Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 , 112 L.

1973Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1 , 431 P.2d 603 (1967); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673 , 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Kilde v. Sorwak, supra. The judgment is reversed for a new trial.

1973Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1 , 431 P.2d 603 (1967); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673 , 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Kilde v. Sorwak, supra. The judgment is reversed for a new trial.

1973Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1 , 431 P.2d 603 (1967); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673 , 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Kilde v. Sorwak, supra. The judgment is reversed for a new trial.

1973Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1 , 431 P.2d 603 (1967); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673 , 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Kilde v. Sorwak, supra. The judgment is reversed for a new trial.

1973Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1 , 431 P.2d 603 (1967); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673 , 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Kilde v. Sorwak, supra. The judgment is reversed for a new trial.

1973Petersavage v. Bock, 72 Wn.2d 1 , 431 P.2d 603 (1967); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904 , 365 P.2d 328 (1961); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673 , 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Kilde v. Sorwak, supra. The judgment is reversed for a new trial.