44 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1878–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Monnot v. . Murphygreen2 sentences2025To protect the original owner's rights, the ordinary requirements of adverse possession were designed to ensure that the party whose interest might be extinguished had " 'notice of the hostile claim and be thereby called upon to assert his [or her] legal title' " ( Hinkley v State , 234 NY 309, 317 [1922], quoting Monnot v Murphy , 207 NY 240, 245 [1913]). 2025To protect the original owner's rights, the ordinary requirements of adverse possession were designed to ensure that the party whose interest might be extinguished had " 'notice of the hostile claim and be thereby called upon to assert his [or her] legal title' " ( Hinkley v State , 234 NY 309, 317 [1922], quoting Monnot v Murphy , 207 NY 240, 245 [1913]). | 4 | 8 |
Hinkley v. . State of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2025To protect the original owner's rights, the ordinary requirements of adverse possession were designed to ensure that the party whose interest might be extinguished had " 'notice of the hostile claim and be thereby called upon to assert his [or her] legal title' " ( Hinkley v State , 234 NY 309, 317 [1922], quoting Monnot v Murphy , 207 NY 240, 245 [1913]). 2025To protect the original owner's rights, the ordinary requirements of adverse possession were designed to ensure that the party whose interest might be extinguished had " 'notice of the hostile claim and be thereby called upon to assert his [or her] legal title' " ( Hinkley v State , 234 NY 309, 317 [1922], quoting Monnot v Murphy , 207 NY 240, 245 [1913]). | 2 | 2 |
Trustees of the Freeholders & Commonalty v. Kirkgreen2 sentences1952The object of the statute, we have recognized, “ is that the real owner may, by unequivocal acts of the usurper, have notice of the hostile claim and be thereby called upon to assert his legal title.” (Monnot v. Murphy, supra, 207 N. Y. 240, 245 ; see, also, Trustees of Town of East Hampton v. Kirk, 84 N. Y. 215, 220 .) Since the character of the acts sufficient to afford such notice “ depends upon the nature and situation of the property and the uses to which it can be applied ”, it is settled that the provisions of sections 39 and 40 are to be construed, not in a narrow or technical sense, b 1947Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362 ; Koch v. Ellwood, 138 App. Div. 584 ; Shinnecock Hills & Peconic Bay Realty Co. v. Aldrich, 132 App. Div. 118 , affd. 200 N. Y. 533 .) For, as pointed out in Monnot v. Murphy ( 207 N. Y. 240, 245 ), the object of the statute “ is that the real owner may, by unequivocal acts of the usurper, have notice of the hostile claim and "be thereby called upon to assert his legal title.” (See, also, Trustees, Town of East Hampton v. Kirk, 84 N. Y. 215, 220 .) The record, before us establishes that in 1882 Dunning, an Adirondack» guide, a gypsy-like character, entered upon a * | 1 | 3 |
Culver v. . Rhodesgreen2 sentences2025But as the dissent concedes, notice need not be actual (dissenting op at 9; see Culver v Rhodes , 87 NY 348, 348 [1882]). 1922Co., 162 N. Y. 202, 220 .) Excessive use or violation of the right or privilege granted by the owner cannot create adverse possession until it amounts to a claim openly distinct from any claim of ownership on the part of the original proprietor. “ The object of the statute defining the acts essential to constitute an adverse possession is that the real owner may, by unequivocal acts of the usurper, have notice of the hostile claim and be thereby called upon to assert his legal title.” (Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240, 245 .) (See, also, Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 348 ; Flora v. Carbean, 38 N. | 1 | 2 |
Belgium Cold Springs Fire District v. Moroz & Barber Corp.green2 sentences2007Significantly, plaintiffs proof fails to demonstrate any “distinctive and decisive act” on its part or the part of its members that would have provided notice of a hostile claim to Myers, Berger or their predecessors (Lyon v Melino, 214 AD2d 992, 993 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Hassinger v Kline, 91 AD2d 988, 989 [1983]). 2001Plaintiffs failed, however, to present proof of any act on their part that would provide the requisite notice of a hostile claim (see, Lyon v Melino, 214 AD2d 992, 993 ). | 1 | 2 |
Brand v. Princegreen2 sentences1996By its special verdict, consisting of affirmative answers to five interrogatories, the jury found that defendant-husband’s adverse possession claim met the five conventionally recognized requirements: that his possession of the premises was (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) exclusive, (4) hostile and under claim of right, and (5) continuous for a period of ten years between the divorce and commencement of the action (see, Brand v Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636 ). 1987Put another way, defendants’ proof has satisfied the purpose of the adverse possession statute by showing the existence of acts by Fraser and his predecessors extending more than 10 years before this action was commenced, which unequivocally put plaintiff and its grantor upon notice of the hostile claim and thereby called upon them as legal owners to assert their title and right to possession (see, Monnot v Murphy, 207 NY 240, 245 ; see also, Brand v Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636 , supra). | 1 | 2 |
Beutler v. Maynardgreen2 sentences1994The requirement that the possession be continuous for a period of time exists so that the true owner can have an opportunity to discover that a hostile claim is asserted (Beutler v Maynard, supra; Jansen v Sawling, 37 AD2d 635 ). 1993The presence of a cabin, although not constantly inhabited or utilized, is a clear expression of intention to use the right of way; use of the [roadway] was actual, not merely threatened, and defendants were not powerless to stop the use during the prescriptive period” (Beutler v Maynard, supra, at 983). | 1 | 2 |
Lanza v. Wagnergreen1 sentence2017Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the judgment should have included a provision declaring that VSI is not the owner of the property by adverse possession (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962]). | 1 | 1 |
Larsen v. Hansongreen1 sentence2016Those refusals were sufficient to unequivocally notify plaintiffs of a hostile claim (see Koudellou v Sakalis, 29 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2006]; see generally Larsen v Hanson, 58 AD3d 1003, 1005 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Walling v. Przybylogreen1 sentence2016As to the period thereafter, the record contains numerous examples of requests by plaintiffs and their attorney for the removal of the sewer line being refused by defendant and the husband, and there is no evidence that, during the subsequent 10-year period, defendant or the husband acknowledged that they did not have a claim of right as to the sewer line’s placement (see generally Walling v Przybylo, 24 AD3d 1, 4-5 [2005], affd 7 NY3d 228 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Koudellou v. Sakalisgreen1 sentence2016Those refusals were sufficient to unequivocally notify plaintiffs of a hostile claim (see Koudellou v Sakalis, 29 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2006]; see generally Larsen v Hanson, 58 AD3d 1003, 1005 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mountain Corp.green1 sentence2011Corp., 88 NY2d at 160 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Robinson v Robinson, 34 AD3d at 976 ). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2011Corp., 88 NY2d at 160 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Robinson v Robinson, 34 AD3d at 976 ). | 1 | 1 |
Longshore v. Hoel Pond Landing, Inc.green1 sentence2009Just as where the possessor first enters property by permission rather than claim of right and must thereafter establish that “the initial permissive use was repudiated or renounced” (Longshore v Hoel Pond Landing, 284 AD2d 815, 816 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 603 [2001]), we hold that, here, defendant had to demonstrate that his overt acknowledgment of plaintiffs’ ownership was expressly withdrawn or that defendant otherwise made it clear that he no longer believed plaintiffs owned the land before a new statutory period could commence. | 1 | 1 |
Hassinger v. Klinegreen1 sentence2007Significantly, plaintiffs proof fails to demonstrate any “distinctive and decisive act” on its part or the part of its members that would have provided notice of a hostile claim to Myers, Berger or their predecessors (Lyon v Melino, 214 AD2d 992, 993 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Hassinger v Kline, 91 AD2d 988, 989 [1983]). | 1 | 1 |
Crary v. . Goodmangreen1 sentence2005The issue of whether the possessor’s belief that he or she is not claiming another’s property will disprove the existence of a hostile claim of right was addressed in New York as early as 1860 (see Crary v Goodman, 22 NY 170, 175 [I860]), and it continues to arise when trial courts erroneously conclude that the unintentional or inadvertent possession of another’s property cannot be deemed to be adverse (see e.g. | 1 | 1 |
Goldstein v. Weltergreen1 sentence2005Gore v Cambareri, 303 AD2d 551, 553 [2003]; Fatone v Vona, supra at 857 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Spiegel v. Ferrarogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jansen v. Sawling
green
2 sentences2023Plaintiff documented how Kilmer did not share that view, in fact, as she testified that Kilmer asked for permission to use Griffin Road when he logged defendant's property in 1996 and placed the letter in which Kilmer made that request into evidence. [FN2] Although "[t]he adverse use need not be on a daily basis [for it to be continuous for purposes of a prescriptive easement claim], . . . it must be such that an owner of the land would or should recognize a hostile claim is asserted," and the foregoing proof of sporadic adverse use by McGowan and permissive use by Kilmer during the period tha 1995The annual plucking of flowers, however, is not the type of use that would provide notice of a hostile claim to the owner of the Spring Lot (see, Midollo v Fanelli, 186 AD2d 545 ; Jansen v Sawling, 37 AD2d 635 ; Merriam v 352 W. 42nd St. | 5 | 1983–2023 |
Merriam v. 352 West 42nd Street Corp.
green
2 sentences1995Corp., 14 AD2d 383, 386 ). 1992Corp., 14 AD2d 383 ; Moore v Day, 199 App Div 76 , affd 235 NY 554 ). | 3 | 1990–1995 |
Weed v. . Weed
neutral
2 sentences1892The question was also considered in Weed v. Weed, 94 N. Y. 243 , and Andrews, J., stated as the rule that “a devisee who claims a mere legal estate in real property of the testator, where there is no trust, cannot maintain an action for the construction of the devise, but must assert his title by ejectment or other legal action, or, if in possession, must await an attack upon it, and set up the devise in answer to the hostile claim.” That the foundation of jurisdiction in such a case rests on the jurisdiction which a court of equity has over trusts was again recognized in Horton v. Cantwell, 1 1888Prior to this enactment it was a fixed rule of the court in defining its jurisdiction, that an heir-at-law or devisee who claimed a mere legal title to real property, when there was no trust, could not come into a court of equity for the mere purpose of obtaining a judicial construction of the provisions of a will, but must assert his title by legal action, or, if in possession, await an attack upon his title by some one who made a hostile claim. ( Weed v. Weed, 94 N. Y., 243 ; Chipman v. Montgomery, 63 id., 230.) The reported eases bearing upon the question are in support of a construction of | 3 | 1888–1918 |
Midollo v. Fanellli
neutral
2 sentences1995The annual plucking of flowers, however, is not the type of use that would provide notice of a hostile claim to the owner of the Spring Lot (see, Midollo v Fanelli, 186 AD2d 545 ; Jansen v Sawling, 37 AD2d 635 ; Merriam v 352 W. 42nd St. 1995Sales v Lewis, 213 AD2d 1016 ; Midollo v Fanelli, 186 AD2d 545 ; Merriam v 352 W. 42nd St. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Stack v. . Village of Phelps
neutral
2 sentences1958Any other user would not constitute notice of a hostile claim of title (cf. Shinnecock Hills & Peconic Bay Realty Co. v. Aldrich, 132 App. Div. 118 , affd. 200 N. Y. 533 ). 1947Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362 ; Koch v. Ellwood, 138 App. Div. 584 ; Shinnecock Hills & Peconic Bay Realty Co. v. Aldrich, 132 App. Div. 118 , affd. 200 N. Y. 533 .) For, as pointed out in Monnot v. Murphy ( 207 N. Y. 240, 245 ), the object of the statute “ is that the real owner may, by unequivocal acts of the usurper, have notice of the hostile claim and "be thereby called upon to assert his legal title.” (See, also, Trustees, Town of East Hampton v. Kirk, 84 N. Y. 215, 220 .) The record, before us establishes that in 1882 Dunning, an Adirondack» guide, a gypsy-like character, entered upon a * | 2 | 1947–1958 |
Shinnecock Hills & Peconic Bay Realty Co. v. Aldrich
green
2 sentences1958Any other user would not constitute notice of a hostile claim of title (cf. Shinnecock Hills & Peconic Bay Realty Co. v. Aldrich, 132 App. Div. 118 , affd. 200 N. Y. 533 ). 1947Co. v. Mapes, 216 N. Y. 362 ; Koch v. Ellwood, 138 App. Div. 584 ; Shinnecock Hills & Peconic Bay Realty Co. v. Aldrich, 132 App. Div. 118 , affd. 200 N. Y. 533 .) For, as pointed out in Monnot v. Murphy ( 207 N. Y. 240, 245 ), the object of the statute “ is that the real owner may, by unequivocal acts of the usurper, have notice of the hostile claim and "be thereby called upon to assert his legal title.” (See, also, Trustees, Town of East Hampton v. Kirk, 84 N. Y. 215, 220 .) The record, before us establishes that in 1882 Dunning, an Adirondack» guide, a gypsy-like character, entered upon a * | 2 | 1947–1958 |
Heller v. . Cohen
green
2 sentences1898Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 299 , 48 N. E. 527 . 1898Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 299 , 48 N. E. 527 . | 2 | 1898–1898 |
Walling v. Przybylo
green
1 sentence2016As to the period thereafter, the record contains numerous examples of requests by plaintiffs and their attorney for the removal of the sewer line being refused by defendant and the husband, and there is no evidence that, during the subsequent 10-year period, defendant or the husband acknowledged that they did not have a claim of right as to the sewer line’s placement (see generally Walling v Przybylo, 24 AD3d 1, 4-5 [2005], affd 7 NY3d 228 [2006]). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Fatone v. Vona
green
1 sentence2005Gore v Cambareri, 303 AD2d 551, 553 [2003]; Fatone v Vona, supra at 857 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Barnes v. . Light
green
1 sentence2000“Thus, the actual possession and improvement of premises, as owners are accustomed to possess and improve their estates, without any payment of rent, or recognition of title in another, or disavowal of title in oneself, will, unless rebutted by other evidence, establish the fact of a claim of title” (2 NY Jur 2d, Adverse Possession, § 40, at 488; see, Monnot v Murphy, supra, at 244; Barnes v Light, 116 NY 34, 39-40 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp.
green
1 sentence1996Clearly, where the adverse claimant seeks to establish incorporeal rights in land, use or physical presence on the property is the only means of giving notice to the record owner of a hostile claim because "[o]ne does not * * * possess or occupy an easement or any other incorporeal right” in the same manner that an estate in land is possessed (Di Leo v Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 NY 505, 511 , supra). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hasgo Power Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Lewis
neutral
1 sentence1995Sales v Lewis, 213 AD2d 1016 ; Midollo v Fanelli, 186 AD2d 545 ; Merriam v 352 W. 42nd St. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| McCann v. Ryan green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Moore v. . Day
green
1 sentence1992Corp., 14 AD2d 383 ; Moore v Day, 199 App Div 76 , affd 235 NY 554 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Moore v. Day green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Slater v. Ward green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Brown v. State neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| In re McDonough neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Carman v. Hewitt neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Branch v. Central Trust Co. green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| City of Grand Rapids v. Pere Marquette Railway Co. green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Ramapo Manufacturing Co. v. Mapes green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Koch v. Ellwood neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Todaro v. Somerville Realty Co. green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Kenney v. . Apgar green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Lewis v. . New York Harlem R.R. Co. green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Flora v. . Carbean green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| In Re the Estate of Killan neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Mellen v. . Mellen green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Davis v. Gray green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Carr v. United States green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| United States v. Lee green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Baker v. . Oakwood green | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Willis v. . Smyth green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| Whiting v. . Edmunds green | 1 | 1886–1886 |
| Jackson, ex rel. Shaw v. Speak green | 1 | 1886–1886 |
| Kenada v. Gardner neutral | 1 | 1886–1886 |
| Wambaugh v. Gates neutral | 1 | 1883–1883 |
| Edwards v. Bodine neutral | 1 | 1878–1878 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.