opportunity to present defense in New York

2018In the student disciplinary context, due process entitles an accused student to "the names of the witnesses against [him or her], the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing" ( Matter of Gruen v Chase , 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; accord Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton , 135 AD3d 1144 , 1146 [2016]; see Matter of [*8]Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam , 105 AD3d 1117 , 1119 [2013]).

2018In disciplinary proceedings at public colleges, " [d]ue process requires that the [accused students] be given the names of the witnesses against them, the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing'" ( Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 AD3d 1144 , 1146, quoting Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 ).

2017Here, we conclude that those basic requirements of due process were met (see Budd, 133 AD3d at 1342-1343; Matter of Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 AD3d 1117 , 1119 [2013]).

2017Here, we conclude that those basic requirements of due process were met (see Budd, 133 AD3d at 1342-1343; Matter of Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 AD3d 1117 , 1119 [2013]).

2013Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated inasmuch as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed (see Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159 AD2d 835, 836 [1990]; Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 AD2d 41, 43-44 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 1

2013Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated inasmuch as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed (see Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159 AD2d 835, 836 [1990]; Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 AD2d 41, 43-44 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 1

2017In a case such as this involving a public university, “[d]ue process requires that the petitioner[ ] be given the name of the witnesses against [her], the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing” (Nawaz, 295 AD2d at 944 ).

2017In a case such as this involving a public university, “[d]ue process requires that the petitioner[ ] be given the name of the witnesses against [her], the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing” (Nawaz, 295 AD2d at 944 ).

2017Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the fact that we did not set aside its premature verdict when the appeal was previously before us did not preclude it from considering further proof or making new factual determinations (cf. People v Cunningham, 95 NY2d 909, 910 [2000]; see generally People v Mitchell, 144 AD3d 1598, 1600 [2016]).

2017Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the fact that we did not set aside its premature verdict when the appeal was previously before us did not preclude it from considering further proof or making new factual determinations (cf. People v Cunningham, 95 NY2d 909, 910 [2000]; see generally People v Mitchell, 144 AD3d 1598, 1600 [2016]).

2013Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated inasmuch as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed (see Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159 AD2d 835, 836 [1990]; Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 AD2d 41, 43-44 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 1

2013Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated inasmuch as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed (see Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159 AD2d 835, 836 [1990]; Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 AD2d 41, 43-44 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 1

2017Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the fact that we did not set aside its premature verdict when the appeal was previously before us did not preclude it from considering further proof or making new factual determinations (cf. People v Cunningham, 95 NY2d 909, 910 [2000]; see generally People v Mitchell, 144 AD3d 1598, 1600 [2016]).

2017Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the fact that we did not set aside its premature verdict when the appeal was previously before us did not preclude it from considering further proof or making new factual determinations (cf. People v Cunningham, 95 NY2d 909, 910 [2000]; see generally People v Mitchell, 144 AD3d 1598, 1600 [2016]).

2016Generally, “[d]ue process requires that the petitioners be given the names of the witnesses against them, the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing” (Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; see Matter of Boyd v State Univ. of N.Y. at Cortland, 110 AD3d 1174 , 1175 [2013]).

2016Generally, “[d]ue process requires that the petitioners be given the names of the witnesses against them, the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing” (Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; see Matter of Boyd v State Univ. of N.Y. at Cortland, 110 AD3d 1174 , 1175 [2013]).

2013Petitioner was provided with fair notice of the charges and hearing dates, an opportunity to present a defense and a fair hearing that comported with due process (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d 980, 981 [2008], appeal dismissed 10 NY3d 950 [2008]).

2013Petitioner was provided with fair notice of the charges and hearing dates, an opportunity to present a defense and a fair hearing that comported with due process (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d 980, 981 [2008], appeal dismissed 10 NY3d 950 [2008]).

2013The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) did not abuse her discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely, last minute request for an adjournment of the agreed-upon second day of the hearing (see id. at 982-983; see also Matter of Rigle v Dairies, 78 AD3d 1249, 1251 [2010], appeal dismissed 16 NY3d 825 [2011]).

2013The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) did not abuse her discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely, last minute request for an adjournment of the agreed-upon second day of the hearing (see id. at 982-983; see also Matter of Rigle v Dairies, 78 AD3d 1249, 1251 [2010], appeal dismissed 16 NY3d 825 [2011]).

2013Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated inasmuch as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed (see Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159 AD2d 835, 836 [1990]; Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 AD2d 41, 43-44 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 1

2013Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated inasmuch as he was given written notice of the charges prior to the hearing, the name of the witness against him, the opportunity to present a defense and have the assistance of an advisor at the hearing, and a statement detailing the factual findings, evidence relied upon and discipline imposed (see Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159 AD2d 835, 836 [1990]; Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 AD2d 41, 43-44 [1984]; cf. Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 1

2013Finally, the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the form of the victim’s statement to police and her testimony at the hearing (see Matter of Abrahamian v City Univ. of N.Y., 170 AD2d 233, 233-234 [1991]; see also Matter of Willett v City Univ. of N.Y. [CUNY] Law School, 231 AD2d 642, 643 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 801 [1997]). * Rose, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.

2013Finally, the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the form of the victim’s statement to police and her testimony at the hearing (see Matter of Abrahamian v City Univ. of N.Y., 170 AD2d 233, 233-234 [1991]; see also Matter of Willett v City Univ. of N.Y. [CUNY] Law School, 231 AD2d 642, 643 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 801 [1997]). * Rose, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.

2013Finally, the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the form of the victim’s statement to police and her testimony at the hearing (see Matter of Abrahamian v City Univ. of N.Y., 170 AD2d 233, 233-234 [1991]; see also Matter of Willett v City Univ. of N.Y. [CUNY] Law School, 231 AD2d 642, 643 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 801 [1997]). * Rose, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.

2013Finally, the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the form of the victim’s statement to police and her testimony at the hearing (see Matter of Abrahamian v City Univ. of N.Y., 170 AD2d 233, 233-234 [1991]; see also Matter of Willett v City Univ. of N.Y. [CUNY] Law School, 231 AD2d 642, 643 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 801 [1997]). * Rose, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.

2013Petitioner was provided with fair notice of the charges and hearing dates, an opportunity to present a defense and a fair hearing that comported with due process (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d 980, 981 [2008], appeal dismissed 10 NY3d 950 [2008]).

2013Petitioner was provided with fair notice of the charges and hearing dates, an opportunity to present a defense and a fair hearing that comported with due process (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d 980, 981 [2008], appeal dismissed 10 NY3d 950 [2008]).

2013The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) did not abuse her discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely, last minute request for an adjournment of the agreed-upon second day of the hearing (see id. at 982-983; see also Matter of Rigle v Dairies, 78 AD3d 1249, 1251 [2010], appeal dismissed 16 NY3d 825 [2011]).

2013The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) did not abuse her discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely, last minute request for an adjournment of the agreed-upon second day of the hearing (see id. at 982-983; see also Matter of Rigle v Dairies, 78 AD3d 1249, 1251 [2010], appeal dismissed 16 NY3d 825 [2011]).

2018In the student disciplinary context, due process entitles an accused student to "the names of the witnesses against [him or her], the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing" ( Matter of Gruen v Chase , 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; accord Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton , 135 AD3d 1144 , 1146 [2016]; see Matter of [*8]Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam , 105 AD3d 1117 , 1119 [2013]).

2017Here, we conclude that those basic requirements of due process were met (see Budd, 133 AD3d at 1342-1343; Matter of Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 AD3d 1117 , 1119 [2013]).

2018In the student disciplinary context, due process entitles an accused student to "the names of the witnesses against [him or her], the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing" ( Matter of Gruen v Chase , 215 AD2d 481, 481 [1995]; accord Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton , 135 AD3d 1144 , 1146 [2016]; see Matter of [*8]Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam , 105 AD3d 1117 , 1119 [2013]).

2018In disciplinary proceedings at public colleges, " [d]ue process requires that the [accused students] be given the names of the witnesses against them, the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing'" ( Matter of Lambraia v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 AD3d 1144 , 1146, quoting Matter of Gruen v Chase, 215 AD2d 481, 481 ).

2024In addition, contrary to petitioner's remaining contentions, the record does not establish that the Hearing Officer "was biased or that the determination flowed from the alleged bias" ( Matter of Amaker v Fischer , 112 AD3d 1371 , 1372 [4th Dept 2013]) or that petitioner was denied the opportunity to present his defense ( see generally Matter of Abdur-Raheem v Mann , 85 NY2d 113, 124 [1995]; Matter of Thomas v Annucci , 193 AD3d 1356, 1357 [4th Dept 2021]).

2024RIVERA, J.: Every person accused of a crime is constitutionally presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to present a defense (see U.S. Const Amend VI, XIV; NY Const art I, § 6; Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 [1976] [“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment” and “(t)he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial -1- -2- No. 24 under our system of criminal justice”]; Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683, 690 [1985] [“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Cl

2024In addition, contrary to petitioner's remaining contentions, the record does not establish that the Hearing Officer "was biased or that the determination flowed from the alleged bias" ( Matter of Amaker v Fischer , 112 AD3d 1371 , 1372 [4th Dept 2013]) or that petitioner was denied the opportunity to present his defense ( see generally Matter of Abdur-Raheem v Mann , 85 NY2d 113, 124 [1995]; Matter of Thomas v Annucci , 193 AD3d 1356, 1357 [4th Dept 2021]).

2024RIVERA, J.: Every person accused of a crime is constitutionally presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to present a defense (see U.S. Const Amend VI, XIV; NY Const art I, § 6; Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 [1976] [“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment” and “(t)he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial -1- -2- No. 24 under our system of criminal justice”]; Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683, 690 [1985] [“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Cl

2024RIVERA, J.: Every person accused of a crime is constitutionally presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to present a defense (see U.S. Const Amend VI, XIV; NY Const art I, § 6; Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 [1976] [“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment” and “(t)he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial -1- -2- No. 24 under our system of criminal justice”]; Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683, 690 [1985] [“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Cl

2021The Hearing Officer appropriately rejected as unreasonable petitioner's demand to view approximately two weeks of video footage to assess whether he could be heard soliciting an assault from his cell, particularly given that the footage was rendered redundant by the testimony presented on that point and could not rule out that the alleged conduct had occurred via other means ( see Matter of Rodriguez v Coughlin , 211 AD2d 926, 927 [1995]; Matter of Smith v Coughlin , 161 AD2d 1082, 1082-1083 [1990]).

2021The Hearing Officer appropriately rejected as unreasonable petitioner's demand to view approximately two weeks of video footage to assess whether he could be heard soliciting an assault from his cell, particularly given that the footage was rendered redundant by the testimony presented on that point and could not rule out that the alleged conduct had occurred via other means ( see Matter of Rodriguez v Coughlin , 211 AD2d 926, 927 [1995]; Matter of Smith v Coughlin , 161 AD2d 1082, 1082-1083 [1990]).

2019Defense counsel's misunderstanding of the override — as evidenced by his erroneous statement that defendant's prior felony conviction for a sex crime resulted in "an automatic override" to a risk level three classification — deprived defendant of the opportunity to present factors in support of a downward departure; similarly, County Court's misapplication of the override — premised upon the court's mistaken belief that "a mandatory override to a risk level [three] status" was "required" — foreclosed any inquiry into whether the presumptive risk level three classification was in fact warranted

2019Defense counsel's misunderstanding of the override — as evidenced by his erroneous statement that defendant's prior felony conviction for a sex crime resulted in "an automatic override" to a risk level three classification — deprived defendant of the opportunity to present factors in support of a downward departure; similarly, County Court's misapplication of the override — premised upon the court's mistaken belief that "a mandatory override to a risk level [three] status" was "required" — foreclosed any inquiry into whether the presumptive risk level three classification was in fact warranted