44 Pennsylvania opinions name it 13 courts 1992–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Nason Hospitalgreen2 sentences2023Id; see Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1387 (to make out a viable Thompson claim, a plaintiff must prove that a hospital knew or should have known of the mistake or deficiency.) In other words, when a plaintiff claims that the hospital failed to supervise the patient’s treatment, what the hospital should have known under the circumstances becomes a jury question. ____________________________________________ 4 Notably, that case also involved allegations that York breached the second and fourth duties owed under Thompson, supra. The jury similarly rejected the corporate-negligence claim under those theor 2023Id; see Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1387 (to make out a viable Thompson claim, a plaintiff must prove that a hospital knew or should have known of the mistake or deficiency.) In other words, when a plaintiff claims that the hospital failed to supervise the patient’s treatment, what the hospital should have known under the circumstances becomes a jury question. ____________________________________________ 4 Notably, that case also involved allegations that York breached the second and fourth duties owed under Thompson, supra. The jury similarly rejected the corporate-negligence claim under those theor | 8 | 22 |
Welsh v. Bulgergreen2 sentences2025Thus, under this theory, a corporation is held directly liable, as opposed to - 13 - J-A28033-24 vicariously liable, for its own negligent acts.” Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 265 A.3d 383 , 415 n.18 (Pa. 2021) (noting that a claim that a hospital did not have proper protocols in place “implicates the type of systemic negligence that is the hallmark of a corporate negligence claim”). 2025Thus, under this theory, a corporation is held directly liable, as opposed to - 13 - J-A28033-24 vicariously liable, for its own negligent acts.” Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 265 A.3d 383 , 415 n.18 (Pa. 2021) (noting that a claim that a hospital did not have proper protocols in place “implicates the type of systemic negligence that is the hallmark of a corporate negligence claim”). | 8 | 12 |
Ruff, T. v. York Hospitalgreen2 sentences2024Appellees also claimed that, in a recent case, this Court “explained [that] the doctrine of corporate negligence [did] not require a hospital to direct or override its providers’ clinical judgment.” Id. at 10, citing Ruff v. York Hospital, 257 A.3d 43 (Pa. Super. 2021). 2024Appellees claimed this Court recently “explained [in Ruff that] the doctrine of corporate negligence does not require a hospital to direct or override its’ providers clinical judgment.” Id. at 14; see also Ruff, 257 A.3d at 53-54 . | 2 | 3 |
Edwards v. Brandywine Hospitalgreen2 sentences2023Id; see Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1387 (to make out a viable Thompson claim, a plaintiff must prove that a hospital knew or should have known of the mistake or deficiency.) In other words, when a plaintiff claims that the hospital failed to supervise the patient’s treatment, what the hospital should have known under the circumstances becomes a jury question. ____________________________________________ 4 Notably, that case also involved allegations that York breached the second and fourth duties owed under Thompson, supra. The jury similarly rejected the corporate-negligence claim under those theor 2023Id; see Edwards, 652 A.2d at 1387 (to make out a viable Thompson claim, a plaintiff must prove that a hospital knew or should have known of the mistake or deficiency.) In other words, when a plaintiff claims that the hospital failed to supervise the patient’s treatment, what the hospital should have known under the circumstances becomes a jury question. ____________________________________________ 4 Notably, that case also involved allegations that York breached the second and fourth duties owed under Thompson, supra. The jury similarly rejected the corporate-negligence claim under those theor | 2 | 3 |
Shannon v. McNultygreen2 sentences2005Subsequent to Thompson , in the case of Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1998), the Superior Court reviewed the Thompson case and held that it was proper to apply the corporate negligence doctrine from Thompson to health maintenance organizations (HMOs) such as involved with Shannon . 2000The court in Shannon was faced with applying the corporate negligence doctrine to health maintenance organizations and held that because HMOs “involve themselves daily in decisions affecting their subscriber’s medical care,” Thompson’s corporate liability duties should “be equally applied to an HMO when that HMO is performing the same or similar functions as a hospital.” Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835, 836 . | 2 | 3 |
Whittington v. Episcopal Hospitalgreen2 sentences2023Hence, the Thompson Court, for the first time, held that a hospital had a responsibility to “ensure [a] patient’s safety and well-being while at a hospital” and imposed liability directly upon a hospital if it “fail[ed] to uphold any of the . . . four [expressly enumerated] duties.” Whittington v. Episcopal Hosp., 768 A.2d 1144 , 1149 (Pa. Super. 2001), citing Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707-708. 2002As summarized in Whittington v. Episcopal Hospital, 768 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2001): “In order to present a prima facie case of corporate negligence, [plaintiff was] required to introduce evidence of the following: (1) [hospital] acted in deviation from the standard of care; (2) [hospital] had actual or constructive notice of the defects or procedures which created the harm; and (3) that the conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” As to the first and third elements necessary to support a claim under the corporate negligence doctrine against the hospital, that is, br | 2 | 2 |
Kennedy v. Butler Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2023Hosp., 901 A.2d 1042 , 1045 (Pa. Super. 2006) (element of actual or constructive notice is critical because “the corporate negligence doctrine contemplates a kind of systemic negligence in the actions and procedures of the hospital rather than in the individual acts of its employees”). 2023Hosp., 901 A.2d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2006) (element of actual or constructive notice is critical because “the corporate negligence doctrine contemplates a kind of systemic negligence in the actions and procedures of the hospital rather than in the individual acts of its employees”). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Widmergreen2 sentences2018Id. at 41-44.3 This Court has held that “[a] motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049 , 1054 n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 315 , 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000)). 2018Id. at 41-44.3 This Court has held that “[a] motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049 , 1054 n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 315 , 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000)). | 1 | 2 |
Moser v. Heistandgreen2 sentences2005This was clearly a claim for corporate liability, a “cause of action for corporate negligence [which] arises from the policies, actions or inaction of the institution itself rather than the specific acts of individual hospital agents.” White v. Behlke, 69 D.&C.4th 353, 362 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Welsh v. Bulger, 548 Pa. 504, 513 , 698 A.2d 581, 585 (1997) and Moser v. Heistand, 545 Pa. 554, 560 , 681 A.2d 1322, 1326 (1996)). “[SJince a corporate liability claim is not based solely on respondeat superior principles and except in cases of obvious negligence, must be supported by expert 2005This was clearly a claim for corporate liability, a “cause of action for corporate negligence [which] arises from the policies, actions or inaction of the institution itself rather than the specific acts of individual hospital agents.” White v. Behlke, 69 D.&C.4th 353, 362 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Welsh v. Bulger, 548 Pa. 504, 513 , 698 A.2d 581, 585 (1997) and Moser v. Heistand, 545 Pa. 554, 560 , 681 A.2d 1322, 1326 (1996)). “[SJince a corporate liability claim is not based solely on respondeat superior principles and except in cases of obvious negligence, must be supported by expert | 1 | 2 |
Rauch v. Mike-Mayergreen2 sentences2005Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 28 With the four duties and the nature of a corporate negligence claim in mind, we now examine the three elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of corporate negligence. 2002This desire to protect individuals has led to the adoption of the doctrine of corporate negligence if it did not fulfill any of the following duties: “[1] a duty to select and retain only competent physicians; “[2] a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; and “[3] a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.” Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 827 (Pa. Super. 2001). | 1 | 2 |
Moure v. Raeuchlegreen1 sentence2017See Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, 907 A.2d 1061 , 1070-71 Pa. (2006). (explaining that, in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must present a medical expert to establish the applicable standard of care, the deviation from that standard, causation, and the extent of the injury); Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585-86 (Pa. 1997) (noting that a corporate negligence claim requires an expert to identify a defendant medical institution’s standard of care, and the ways in which the defendant’s departure from those standards led to the plaintiff’s injuries); Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2 | 1 | 1 |
Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc.green1 sentence2017See Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, 907 A.2d 1061 , 1070-71 Pa. (2006). (explaining that, in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must present a medical expert to establish the applicable standard of care, the deviation from that standard, causation, and the extent of the injury); Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585-86 (Pa. 1997) (noting that a corporate negligence claim requires an expert to identify a defendant medical institution’s standard of care, and the ways in which the defendant’s departure from those standards led to the plaintiff’s injuries); Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2 | 1 | 1 |
Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Construction Corp.green1 sentence2017Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the Estate’s corporate negligence expert, Dr. Thomas Bojko, from testifying about [PMMC’s] corporate negligence (failure to properly credential and supervise) and dismissing the corporate negligence claim because the trial court imposed a novel evidentiary requirement that may be perfected after an appeal notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final judgment.” Id. at 513 (citations omitted). -2- J-A02045-17 the Estate cannot use the same causation expert to provide the causative link between the claims of corporate negligence a | 1 | 1 |
Kit v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2017Id. at 48-49 (emphasis in original; citations to the record omitted; citing Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); Kit v. Mitchell, 771 A.2d 814, 818-19 (Pa. Super. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Sokolsky v. Eidelmangreen2 sentences2014As the Scampone Court stated, and as the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently clarified, when considering a corporate negligence claim, “the trial court must apply section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the Althaus factors in order to determine if a duty of care exists.” Sokolsky v. Eidelman, 93 A.3d at 870 (citing Scampone, 57 A.3d at 606-607 ). 2014Sokolsky, 93 A.3d at 870-71 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Yee v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2005This was clearly a claim for corporate liability, a “cause of action for corporate negligence [which] arises from the policies, actions or inaction of the institution itself rather than the specific acts of individual hospital agents.” White v. Behlke, 69 D.&C.4th 353, 362 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Welsh v. Bulger, 548 Pa. 504, 513 , 698 A.2d 581, 585 (1997) and Moser v. Heistand, 545 Pa. 554, 560 , 681 A.2d 1322, 1326 (1996)). “[SJince a corporate liability claim is not based solely on respondeat superior principles and except in cases of obvious negligence, must be supported by expert | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Rayner
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 41-44. 3 This Court has held that "[a] motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict." Commonwealth v. Rayner , 153 A.3d 1049 , 1054 n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer , 560 Pa. 308 , 315, 744 A.2d 745 , 751 (2000) ). 2018Id. at 41-44.3 This Court has held that “[a] motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049 , 1054 n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 315 , 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000)). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC
green
2 sentences2017Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the Estate from introducing evidence of Dr. Bhardwaj’s repeated failures to attain Board Certification to support the Estate’s claim that PMMC was corporately negligent for failing to properly credential and supervise Dr. Bhardwaj pursuant to Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012) and Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991)? 3. 2014As the Scampone Court stated, and as the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently clarified, when considering a corporate negligence claim, “the trial court must apply section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the Althaus factors in order to determine if a duty of care exists.” Sokolsky v. Eidelman, 93 A.3d at 870 (citing Scampone, 57 A.3d at 606-607 ). | 2 | 2014–2017 |
McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization
green
2 sentences1996Id. at 139, 604 A.2d at 1058-59 , citing, Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 527 Pa. 330, 338-40 , 591 A.2d 703, 706-707 (1991). 1995McClellan I, 413 Pa.Super. at 137-43 , 604 A.2d at 1058-60 . | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Scampone, R. v. Grane Healthcare Co.
green
2 sentences2021Id. at 621 . 2021Id. at 621- 22. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Woullard, D v. Sanner Concrete
green
1 sentence2021Because Plaintiffs failed to establish separate duties the Other Defendants owed to Decedent, the trial court neither grossly - 16 - J-A01038-21 abused its discretion nor erred by determining that if the Facility’s negligence were not the cause of Decedent’s harm, Plaintiffs did not have a basis for obtaining a new trial on a corporate negligence claim against the Other Defendants.6 See Woullard, 241 A.3d at 1211 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Boyle v. Independent Lift Truck, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Lift Truck, Inc. , 607 Pa. 311 , 6 A.3d 492 (2010), in support of their contention that any error in giving the instruction was harmless as the jury did not deliberate over the corporate negligence claim to which the allegedly erroneous two schools of thought instruction applied. 2019Lift Truck, Inc. , 607 Pa. 311 , 6 A.3d 492 (2010), in support of their contention that any error in giving the instruction was harmless as the jury did not deliberate over the corporate negligence claim to which the allegedly erroneous two schools of thought instruction applied. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Reeves
green
1 sentence2018Furthermore, the Court summarized the hearing and listed some of the actions that Appellant was to take, such as filing with the Court "something...as to [Defendant] Dr. Fosnocht and why he should not just become part of the corporate negligence claim." Id. at 93 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Webb v. Zern
green
2 sentences2016In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966), Pennsylvania recognized the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1), which imposed a non-delega-ble duty upon the seller of a product to make and/or market the product free from "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or [the consumer's] property.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1); Tincher v. Omega Flex, 628 Pa. 296 , 104 A.3d 328 (2014). 2016In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966), Pennsylvania recognized the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1), which imposed a non-delega-ble duty upon the seller of a product to make and/or market the product free from "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or [the consumer's] property.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1); Tincher v. Omega Flex, 628 Pa. 296 , 104 A.3d 328 (2014). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Tincher, T. v. Omega Flex, Inc., Aplt.
green
2 sentences2016In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966), Pennsylvania recognized the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1), which imposed a non-delega-ble duty upon the seller of a product to make and/or market the product free from "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or [the consumer's] property.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1); Tincher v. Omega Flex, 628 Pa. 296 , 104 A.3d 328 (2014). 2016In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966), Pennsylvania recognized the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1), which imposed a non-delega-ble duty upon the seller of a product to make and/or market the product free from "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or [the consumer's] property.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1); Tincher v. Omega Flex, 628 Pa. 296 , 104 A.3d 328 (2014). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sutherland v. Monongahela Valley Hospital
green
1 sentence2012Id. 3 According to appellants, the test applied by Pennsylvania lower courts following Shannon is whether a particular type of healthcare corporation resembles either a hospital or an HMO rather than a physician’s office: “if [a healthcare corporation] is 1 % or more like an HMO or a hospital, corporate negligence applies ... [and i]f it is 1 % or more like a physician’s office, it does not apply.” Appellants’ Brief at 27. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Olshan v. TENET HEALTH SYS. CITY AVENUE
green
1 sentence2004Accordingly, since a corporate liability claim is not based solely on respondeat superior principles and, except in cases of obvious negligence, must be supported by expert testimony establishing a deviation from the accepted standard of care, a certificate of merit under Rule 1042.3(a)(1) is required for a corporate negligence claim. 2 But, see Olshan v. Tenet Health System City Av enue, 849 A.2d 1214 , 1218 (Pa. Super. 2004) (remarking in obiter dictum that “no such certificate [of merit] is required for allegations made against the hospital or other corporate entity.”). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Kaskie v. Wright
green
2 sentences2000Yet that is exactly what is implied in Kaskie [v. Wright, 403 Pa. Super. 334 , 589 A.2d 213 (1991)]. 2000Yet that is exactly what is implied in Kaskie [v. Wright, 403 Pa. Super. 334 , 589 A.2d 213 (1991)]. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.