44 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1987–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Love v. City of Philadelphiared2 sentences2016Thus, even in a situation in which a government-owned vehicle caused the accident, and government employees' actions or inactions may have provided access to the vehicle, if the vehicle was not actually put in motion by the government employees, the vehicle liability exception to immunity is not applicable. 12 Here, since DeSimone's vehicle was stopped at the time Raith and/or Sweeney purportedly possessed DeSimone's car keys, see Knox , and, as in Gale , Potteiger, Raith and Sweeney did not "actually put [DeSimone's vehicle] in motion[,]" we are constrained to hold that they did not operate D 2014Muldrow next argues that her claim comes within the vehicle liability exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act and not within the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988) because a stopped bus where the motor is running and the bus driver’s hands are on the wheel should be considered “in operation” for purposes of the vehicle liability exception. | 3 | 15 |
Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen2 sentences2016Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 805 A.2d 47 , 49-50 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) "Where an injury results from movement of part of the vehicle, this [c]ourt has found the vehicle liability exception to apply." Id. at 50 . 2016Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 805 A.2d 47 , 49-50 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) "Where an injury results from movement of part of the vehicle, this [c]ourt has found the vehicle liability exception to apply." Id. at 50 . | 2 | 4 |
Balentine v. Aplt. v. Chester Water Authgreen2 sentences2018This requirement had no basis in the language of the statutory exception.6 As with Love’s extra-textual narrowing of the vehicle liability exception, Mascaro “embodied an imprudent departure from the letter of the [statutory] exception in pursuit of its spirit in violation of our rules of construction.” Balentine, 191 A.3d at 815 (Wecht, J., concurring). 2018This requirement had no basis in the language of the statutory exception. 6 As with Love 's extra-textual narrowing of the vehicle liability exception, Mascaro "embodied an imprudent departure from the letter of the [statutory] exception in pursuit of its spirit in violation of our rules of construction." Balentine , 191 A.3d at 815 (Wecht, J., concurring). | 2 | 3 |
Regester v. County of Chestergreen2 sentences2020PAM - 2 In fact, our Supreme Court in Regester v. City of Chester, 797 A.2d 898 (Pa. 2002), has already rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the vehicle liability exception when the conduct at issue was more closely associated with the emergency public service involved than it was with the physical operation of the vehicle. 2003Mosley cites Regester v. County of Chester, 568 Pa. 410, 420 , 797 A.2d 898, 904 (2002) for the proposition that “there is some range of negligence associated with the physical operation of a vehicle beyond actual driving that will implicate the vehicle liability exception.” Mosley’s rebanee on Regester is misplaced. | 2 | 3 |
Bazemore v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen2 sentences2009See Bazemore v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 657 A.2d 1323 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (passenger’s injury sustained when tripping on bus steps while exiting did not come under vehicle liability exception); Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 805 A.2d 47 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (passenger’s fall while stepping from bus steps to curb because driver failed to kneel bus did not come under vehicle liability exception); Miller v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 64 , 618 A.2d 1095 (1992) (vehicle exception was inapplicable where a bus passenger sli 2002See also Bazemore v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 657 A.2d 1323 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (wherein we held that a passenger’s injury sustained from tripping on the steps when exiting the bus did not meet the vehicle liability exception); Rubenstein v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 668 A.2d 283 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (wherein we held that the bus driver's failure to recognize the ground was uneven at the point of departure, allegedly contributing to plaintiff’s injuries, did not meet the vehicle liability exception); Bennan v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportati | 2 | 2 |
Sonnenberg v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences2018The Commonwealth Court reversed and held that “[t]he movement of parts of a vehicle or an attachment to a vehicle, is sufficient to constitute [J-59-2017] - 9 ‘operation’ for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to the Code.” Id. at 1028 . 2018The Commonwealth Court reversed and held that "[t]he movement of parts of a vehicle or an attachment to a vehicle, is sufficient to constitute 'operation' for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to the Code." Id. at 1028 . | 1 | 7 |
Miller v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences2009See Bazemore v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 657 A.2d 1323 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (passenger’s injury sustained when tripping on bus steps while exiting did not come under vehicle liability exception); Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 805 A.2d 47 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (passenger’s fall while stepping from bus steps to curb because driver failed to kneel bus did not come under vehicle liability exception); Miller v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 64 , 618 A.2d 1095 (1992) (vehicle exception was inapplicable where a bus passenger sli 2002See, e.g., Miller, 618 A.2d 1095 , (holding that the motor *50 vehicle exception was inapplicable where a bus passenger slipped on an object while alighting). 4 However, we do not require that the entire vehicle be in motion and a driver in the seat in order for a vehicle to be “in operation.” Where an injury results from movement of part of the vehicle, this Court has found the vehicle liability exception to apply. | 1 | 3 |
Grieff v. Reisingergreen2 sentences2018The Majority notes that this Court has limited Mascaro 's scope, observing charitably that we "clarified its import." Majority Op. at 360 (citing Crowell v. City of Phila. , 531 Pa. 400 , 613 A.2d 1178 , 1183-85 (1992) (concluding that Mascaro does not preclude recovery on the basis of governmental immunity to claims of joint liability where the government's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm); and Grieff v. Reisinger , 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 , 197 (1997) (reiterating that Mascaro was intended to apply only to cases in which a third party causes the harm) ). 7 While dip 2018The Majority notes that this Court has limited Mascaro 's scope, observing charitably that we "clarified its import." Majority Op. at 360 (citing Crowell v. City of Phila. , 531 Pa. 400 , 613 A.2d 1178 , 1183-85 (1992) (concluding that Mascaro does not preclude recovery on the basis of governmental immunity to claims of joint liability where the government's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm); and Grieff v. Reisinger , 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 , 197 (1997) (reiterating that Mascaro was intended to apply only to cases in which a third party causes the harm) ). 7 While dip | 1 | 2 |
Crowell v. City of Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2018The Majority notes that this Court has limited Mascaro 's scope, observing charitably that we "clarified its import." Majority Op. at 360 (citing Crowell v. City of Phila. , 531 Pa. 400 , 613 A.2d 1178 , 1183-85 (1992) (concluding that Mascaro does not preclude recovery on the basis of governmental immunity to claims of joint liability where the government's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm); and Grieff v. Reisinger , 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 , 197 (1997) (reiterating that Mascaro was intended to apply only to cases in which a third party causes the harm) ). 7 While dip 2018The Majority notes that this Court has limited Mascaro 's scope, observing charitably that we "clarified its import." Majority Op. at 360 (citing Crowell v. City of Phila. , 531 Pa. 400 , 613 A.2d 1178 , 1183-85 (1992) (concluding that Mascaro does not preclude recovery on the basis of governmental immunity to claims of joint liability where the government's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm); and Grieff v. Reisinger , 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 , 197 (1997) (reiterating that Mascaro was intended to apply only to cases in which a third party causes the harm) ). 7 While dip | 1 | 2 |
Lindstrom v. City of Corrygreen2 sentences2014See Lindstrom, supra at 397 (“Initially, we must determine if Appellees can meet the threshold requirement of 42 [J-31-2014] - 12 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a)(1), namely, whether Appellants owed [decedent] a common law duty”). 2004The Court held, “[o]n balance, these factors do not call for imposing a common law duty of care in these circumstances.” Id. (citing Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995)) (public policy does not support imposing a legal duty on officers to protect fleeing offenders from their own actions); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000) (police owe no duty to a wrongdoer, including fleeing driver). 6 As the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold requirement under the Act, the Court did not address the applicability of the vehicle liability exception or the effec | 1 | 2 |
Estate of Day Ex Rel. Strosin v. Willisgreen2 sentences2004The Court held, “[o]n balance, these factors do not call for imposing a common law duty of care in these circumstances.” Id. (citing Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995)) (public policy does not support imposing a legal duty on officers to protect fleeing offenders from their own actions); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000) (police owe no duty to a wrongdoer, including fleeing driver). 6 As the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold requirement under the Act, the Court did not address the applicability of the vehicle liability exception or the effec 2000See Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995) (public policy does not support imposing a legal duty on officers to protect fleeing offenders from their own actions); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 , 613 *586 N.W.2d 307 (2000) (police owe no duty to a wrongdoer, including fleeing driver). 2 Because Appellees fail to meet the threshold requirement of the Tort Claims Act, we need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether this claim falls within the vehicle liability exception or the effect of the 1995 amendment. 3 Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth | 1 | 2 |
Rubenstein v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen2 sentences2003See Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988) (governmental immunity barred recovery when elderly woman fell while alighting from a stationary city-owned van); see also, Rubenstein v. SEPTA, 668 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Commw. 1995) (“aregular stop on the vehicle’s route does not constitute operation of the motor vehicle”). 2002See also Bazemore v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 657 A.2d 1323 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (wherein we held that a passenger’s injury sustained from tripping on the steps when exiting the bus did not meet the vehicle liability exception); Rubenstein v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 668 A.2d 283 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (wherein we held that the bus driver's failure to recognize the ground was uneven at the point of departure, allegedly contributing to plaintiff’s injuries, did not meet the vehicle liability exception); Bennan v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportati | 1 | 2 |
Mickle v. City of Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2002Concerning the latter, the court initially cited Mickle v. City of Phila., 550 Pa. 539 , 707 A.2d 1124 (1998)(holding that a city’s alleged negligent maintenance and repair of a van constituted acts within the vehicle liability exception), in crediting the Regesters’ argument that the vehicle liability exception encompasses a broader range of conduct than solely negligent driving. 2002Concerning the latter, the court initially cited Mickle v. City of Phila., 550 Pa. 539 , 707 A.2d 1124 (1998)(holding that a city’s alleged negligent maintenance and repair of a van constituted acts within the vehicle liability exception), in crediting the Regesters’ argument that the vehicle liability exception encompasses a broader range of conduct than solely negligent driving. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Hillgreen2 sentences2014The law is well-established that “any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) [S]tatement will be deemed waived[.]” Commonwealth v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 427 , 16 A.3d 484, 494 (2011). 2014The law is well-established that “any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) [S]tatement will be deemed waived[.]” Commonwealth v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 427 , 16 A.3d 484, 494 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
| Warrick v. Pro Cor Ambulance, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Chieffogreen | 1 | 1 |
| First Nat. Bank v. Dept. of Transp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Keesey v. Longwood Volunteer Fire Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Regester v. Longwood Ambulance Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| HAWKS BY HAWKS v. Livermoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tyree v. City of Pittsburghgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Orth v. Department of Labor & Industrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edward Luedtke v. County of Milwaukeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cacchione v. Wieczorek
green
2 sentences2009In Cacchione v. Wieczorek, 674 A.2d 773 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), we held that the agency driver’s failure to set a truck handbrake when he exited a vehicle resulting in the vehicle rolling backwards and causing property damage constituted “operation.” Mannella contends negligent lowering of a wheelchair ramp by a Port Authority bus driver falls within the exception because, though not moving at the time of the accident, the ramp did not cease operation once it was lowered as it only stopped long enough for a passenger to enter or exit the bus after which its motion resumed until the ramp was fully re 2002In Cacchione v. Wieczorek, 674 A.2d 773 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 684 , 686 A.2d 1313 (1996), we held that the agency driver’s failure to set a truck handbrake when he exited a vehicle, resulting in the vehicle rolling backwards and causing property damage, constituted “operation.” Thus, the plaintiffs were permitted to pursue the City of Erie. | 3 | 1998–2009 |
Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township
green
2 sentences1992The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the order of the trial court ruling that the allegations of a decision to initiate a pursuit and in failing to exercise due care in a chase could form the basis for a negligence action against a police officer and his employer Township, and that these acts do not fall within the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity at § 8542(b)(1) of the Tort Claims Act. [1] Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township et al, 123 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 226 , 553 A.2d 510 (1989). 1992The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the order of the trial court ruling that the allegations of a decision to initiate a pursuit and in failing to exercise due care in a chase could form the basis for a negligence action against a police officer and his employer Township, and that these acts do not fall within the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity at § 8542(b)(1) of the Tort Claims Act. [1] Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township et al, 123 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 226 , 553 A.2d 510 (1989). | 3 | 1989–2000 |
Evans v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences2023Evans, 613 A.2d at 139 . 1993In Evans v. SEPTA, 149 Pa. Commw. 376 , 613 A.2d 137 (1992), an even more similar case, the Commonwealth Court upheld summary judgment granted to SEPTA on the issue of immunity. | 2 | 1993–2023 |
Speece v. Borough of North Braddock
green
2 sentences2020Similarly, in Speece v. Borough of North Braddock, 604 A.2d 760 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), the plaintiff filed suit after being injured when a hose attached to two fire trucks burst at the scene of a fire. 1998Speece v. Borough of North Braddock, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 568 , 604 A.2d 760 (Pa.Cmwlth.1992). | 2 | 1998–2020 |
Robinson v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2004The Court held, “[o]n balance, these factors do not call for imposing a common law duty of care in these circumstances.” Id. (citing Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995)) (public policy does not support imposing a legal duty on officers to protect fleeing offenders from their own actions); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000) (police owe no duty to a wrongdoer, including fleeing driver). 6 As the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold requirement under the Act, the Court did not address the applicability of the vehicle liability exception or the effec 2004The Court held, “[o]n balance, these factors do not call for imposing a common law duty of care in these circumstances.” Id. (citing Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995)) (public policy does not support imposing a legal duty on officers to protect fleeing offenders from their own actions); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 , 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000) (police owe no duty to a wrongdoer, including fleeing driver). 6 As the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold requirement under the Act, the Court did not address the applicability of the vehicle liability exception or the effec | 2 | 2000–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2001Id. quoting Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 374 , 543 A.2d 531, 533 (1988) (“Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of *328 operating a vehicle are not the same as actually operating the vehicle.”). 1998Id. *822 The movement must also be normally related to the operation of the vehicle in order for the vehicle liability exception to apply. | 2 | 1998–2001 |
Toombs, Harold T. v. Manning, Sylvester, Brown, James, and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences1997Greenleaf also cites Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453 (3rd Cir.1987), a criminal assault case where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the operation of a SEPTA subway train included the boarding and discharging of passengers onto SEPTA platforms and that SEPTA could be found liable under the vehicle liability exception where the plaintiff was injured after an attack by two men while waiting for a train at a SEPTA subway station. 1991It is this decision that SEPTA appeals. 3 *440 The trial court based its decision upon Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453 (3d Cir.1987), wherein the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, attempting to forecast how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would interpret the vehicle liability exception under facts similar to the case sub judice, concluded that the “operation” of a SEPTA subway train includes the boarding from and discharge of passengers onto SEPTA platforms. 4 In Toombs , the plaintiff was injured while waiting for a SEPTA train at a subway station when he was attacked by two men within the sight | 2 | 1991–1997 |
Mascaro v. Youth Study Center
green
2 sentences1993In Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), our Supreme Court narrowly construed the exceptions to. sovereign immunity as well as to governmental immunity. 1993In Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), our Supreme Court narrowly construed the exceptions to. sovereign immunity as well as to governmental immunity. | 2 | 1991–1993 |
Hall v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences1992In Hall v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 141 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 591, 596 A.2d 1153 (1991), the plaintiff, while riding in a SEPTA trolley, was injured by an egg thrown from outside the vehicle by an unknown third party. 1992In Hall v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 141 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 591, 596 A.2d 1153 (1991), the plaintiff, while riding in a SEPTA trolley, was injured by *387 an egg thrown from outside the vehicle by an unknown third party. | 2 | 1992–1992 |
City of Philadelphia v. Love
green
2 sentences1989As used in this paragraph, `motor vehicle' means any vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air. [3] In City of Philadelphia v. Love, 98 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 138 , 509 A.2d 1388 (1986), affd, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the term "operation" as it is used in Section 8542(b)(1) is to be strictly construed to mean actually putting a vehicle in motion. 1989As used in this paragraph, `motor vehicle' means any vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air. [3] In City of Philadelphia v. Love, 98 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 138 , 509 A.2d 1388 (1986), affd, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the term "operation" as it is used in Section 8542(b)(1) is to be strictly construed to mean actually putting a vehicle in motion. | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Force v. WATKINS
green
2 sentences1989Similarly, in the companion case of Force v. Watkins, 118 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 87 , 544 A.2d 114 (1988), we found that the allegations of “driving without due regard for the safety as well as in reckless disregard for the safety and rights of others on the highway” raised a factual question as to the degree of care exercised by the police car’s operator. 1989Thus, we concluded in Bickert and in its companion case, Force v. Watkins, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 87, 544 A.2d 114 (1988), that when negligence is alleged in a complaint, a cognizable claim within the vehicle liability exception is stated. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Mazur v. Trinity Area School District
green
1 sentence2023Mazur, 961 A.2d at 101 . 15 Obviously Perilous Point Appellant contends that the Authority’s act of allowing the decedent to disembark at an obviously perilous point subjects it to liability under the vehicle liability exception of the Tort Claims Act. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Shinal, M., et ux, Aplts. v. Toms M.D., S.
green
2 sentences2018Shinal v.Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 441 (Pa. 2017). 2018Shinal v. Toms , 640 Pa. 295 , 162 A.3d 429 , 441 (2017). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences2014There are essentially three issues before this Court: (1) whether the holding in Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 618 Pa. 501 , 57 A.3d 1154 (2012), denies SEPTA immunity protection under the act commonly referred to as the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act (Sovereign Immunity Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8528; (2) whether Muldrow’s cause of action comes within the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity; and (3) whether Muldrow’s cause of action falls within the personal property exception to sovereign immunity. 2014There are essentially three issues before this Court: (1) whether the holding in Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 618 Pa. 501 , 57 A.3d 1154 (2012), denies SEPTA immunity protection under the act commonly referred to as the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act (Sovereign Immunity Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8528; (2) whether Muldrow’s cause of action comes within the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity; and (3) whether Muldrow’s cause of action falls within the personal property exception to sovereign immunity. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mannella ex rel. Mannella v. Port Authority of Allegheny County
green
2 sentences2009Because neither the bus nor the wheel chair ramp was moving at the time of the accident, the vehicle liability exception did not apply.” Id., 982 A.2d at 134 . 2009Because neither the bus nor the wheel chair ramp was moving at the time of the accident, the vehicle liability exception did not apply.” Id., 982 A.2d at 134 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Walters v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation
green
1 sentence2004In Walters , this Court also held that the Department of Transportation did not have control over the motorist’s vehicle for the vehicle liability exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1), to apply because the Department of Transportation did not have control over it "in any functional sense.” Walters, 474 A.2d at 67 . . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brelish v. Clarks Green Borough neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| D'Amico v. VFW Post 191 Volunteer Ambulance Ass'n green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Aiken v. Borough of Blawnox green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Berman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Wolfe ex rel. Wolfe v. Stroudsburg Area School District green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Vogel v. Langer green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Hussey green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Snyder v. Harmon green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Gratkie v. Air Wisconsin, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Scheerer v. Lippman & Lowy, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Davies v. Barnes green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Burkey v. Borough of Auburn green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.