decline hearing in Washington

44 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Ramergreen wash · 2004 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Harbert, 85 Wash.2d at 728 , 538 P.2d 1212 ; see also State v. Ramer, 151 Wash.2d 106 , 110 n. 1, 86 P.3d 132 (2004); State v. Linares, 75 Wash.App. 404, 407-08 , 880 P.2d 550 (1994). ¶ 39 And Hegney's Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission of hearsay evidence is without merit. 2007Harbert, 85 Wn.2d at 728 ; see also State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106 , 110 n.1, 86 P.3d 132 (2004); State v. Linares, 75 Wn.	2	2
State v. Ramergreen wash · 2004 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Harbert, 85 Wash.2d at 728 , 538 P.2d 1212 ; see also State v. Ramer, 151 Wash.2d 106 , 110 n. 1, 86 P.3d 132 (2004); State v. Linares, 75 Wash.App. 404, 407-08 , 880 P.2d 550 (1994). ¶ 39 And Hegney's Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission of hearsay evidence is without merit. 2007Harbert, 85 Wn.2d at 728 ; see also State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106 , 110 n.1, 86 P.3d 132 (2004); State v. Linares, 75 Wn.	2	2
State v. Ringgreen wash · 1959 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Dillenburg, 70 Wn.2d at 355-56 ; see also State v. Ring, 54 Wn.2d 250 , 339 P.2d 461 (1959). ¶43 Thus, Hegney would not be “left remediless” to challenge the decline hearing. 2007Dillenburg, 70 Wn.2d at 355-56 ; see also State v. Ring, 54 Wn.2d 250 , 339 P.2d 461 (1959). ¶43 Thus, Hegney would not be “left remediless” to challenge the decline hearing.	2	2
State v. QDgreen wash · 1984 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004State v. Vela, 100 Wn.2d 636, 641 , 673 P.2d 185 (1983) (explaining that statutes “should receive a sensible construction to effect the legislative intent and, if possible, to avoid unjust and absurd consequences”); see also Q.D., 102 Wn.2d at 22-23 . 2004State v. Vela, 100 Wash.2d 636, 641 , 673 P.2d 185 (1983) (explaining that statutes "should receive a sensible construction to effect the legislative intent and, if *131 possible, to avoid unjust and absurd consequences"); see also Q.D., 102 Wash.2d at 22-23 , 685 P.2d 557 .	2	2
State v. Pritchardgreen washctapp · 1995 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999	2	2
In re the Personal Restraint of Dallugegreen wash · 2004 · cited in 9 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2024 2 sentences 2019Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 783 , 100 P.3d 279 (2004) (Once the juvenile is charged with an offense that does not qualify for automatic adult court jurisdiction, the adult court loses jurisdiction over the proceedings and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court for a decline hearing.). 2013In Dalluge, Dalluge challenged his superior court felony convictions, arguing that because he was 17 years old when the State charged him with crimes that did not automatically mandate adult court jurisdiction, the trial court erred by failing to remand to juvenile court for a decline hearing. 152 Wn.2d at 776-77 .	1	9
Kent v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1966 · cited in 5 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1982–2020 2 sentences 2020Restraint of Chavez (Dissent) The law of this state has been summarized in short hand as “once declined, always declined,” based on a statement from State v. Sharon, 100 Wn.2d 230, 232 , 668 P.2d 584 (1983) (“Kent does not mandate an additional decline hearing on subsequent offenses.”) That policy made eminent sense for cases declined from juvenile court pursuant to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S. Ct. 1045 , 16 L. 2020Restraint of Chavez (Dissent) The law of this state has been summarized in short hand as “once declined, always declined,” based on a statement from State v. Sharon, 100 Wn.2d 230, 232 , 668 P.2d 584 (1983) (“Kent does not mandate an additional decline hearing on subsequent offenses.”) That policy made eminent sense for cases declined from juvenile court pursuant to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S. Ct. 1045 , 16 L.	1	5
State v. Cornejogreen wash · 1996 · cited in 5 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–2005 2 sentences 2005Id. at 570 . 2004See RCW 13.40.110 (explaining normal decline hearing process); Boot, 130 Wn.2d at 557 (interpreting what is now RCW 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(A) and (B)).	1	5
State v. Saenzgreen wash · 2012 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2024 2 sentences 2024Cf. State v. Saenz, 175 Wn.2d 167, 175-76 , 283 P.3d 1094 (2012) (where State relies on defendant’s prior conviction as a juvenile in adult court to seek a persistent offender sentence, it must prove “that either there was a decline hearing or the hearing was properly waived and the juvenile court entered No. 83256-5-I/2 written findings that transfer of the case was in either [the defendant]’s or the public’s best interest” (footnote omitted)). 2024Cf. State v. Saenz, 175 Wn.2d 167, 175-76 , 283 P.3d 1094 (2012) (where State relies on defendant’s prior conviction as a juvenile in adult court to seek a persistent offender sentence, it must prove “that either there was a decline hearing or the hearing was properly waived and the juvenile court entered No. 83256-5-I/2 written findings that transfer of the case was in either [the defendant]’s or the public’s best interest” (footnote omitted)).	1	4
State v. Sharongreen wash · 1983 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–2020 2 sentences 2020Restraint of Chavez (Dissent) The law of this state has been summarized in short hand as “once declined, always declined,” based on a statement from State v. Sharon, 100 Wn.2d 230, 232 , 668 P.2d 584 (1983) (“Kent does not mandate an additional decline hearing on subsequent offenses.”) That policy made eminent sense for cases declined from juvenile court pursuant to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S. Ct. 1045 , 16 L. 2020Restraint of Chavez (Dissent) The law of this state has been summarized in short hand as “once declined, always declined,” based on a statement from State v. Sharon, 100 Wn.2d 230, 232 , 668 P.2d 584 (1983) (“Kent does not mandate an additional decline hearing on subsequent offenses.”) That policy made eminent sense for cases declined from juvenile court pursuant to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S. Ct. 1045 , 16 L.	1	3
State v. Calderongreen wash · 1984 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (41)

Case	Cited	Years
In RE DILLENBURG v. Maxwell green wash · 1966 2 sentences 2015Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331 , 413 P.2d 940 (1966), modified on reh'g, 422 P.2d 783 (1967) (court must hold a retroactive decline hearing when ajuvenile is tried in adult court without a decline hearing). i! 2015Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331 , 413 P.2d 940 (1966), modified on reh'g, 422 P.2d 783 (1967) (court must hold a retroactive decline hearing when ajuvenile is tried in adult court without a decline hearing). i!	6	2004–2025
In Re Personal Restraint Petition of Dalluge green wash · 2004 2 sentences 2024Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 781 , 100 P.3d 279 (2004). 2019Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d 772, 783 , 100 P.3d 279 (2004) (Once the juvenile is charged with an offense that does not qualify for automatic adult court jurisdiction, the adult court loses jurisdiction over the proceedings and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court for a decline hearing.).	3	2008–2024
State v. Jacobson green washctapp · 1982 2 sentences 2007H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 552 , 81 P.3d 883 . ¶ 25 Relying on State v. Jacobson, 33 Wash.App. 529 , 656 P.2d 1103 (1982), review denied, 99 Wash.2d 1010 (1983), Division One reasoned that a decline hearing "determined, not ultimate guilt or innocence, but the forum in which guilt or innocence was to be found." H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 553 , 81 P.3d 883 . 2007App. 529 , 656 P.2d 1103 (1982), review denied, 99 Wn.2d 1010 (1983), Division One reasoned that a decline hearing “determined, not ultimate guilt or innocence, but the forum in which guilt or innocence was to be found.” H.O., 119 Wn.	3	2007–2016
State v. Posey green wash · 2007 2 sentences 2016The Washington Supreme Court held that the case should have been remanded to the juvenile court for a decline hearing for sentencing once Posey was acquitted of the automatic decline offense, id. at 647 . 2012As we indicated in Posey I, "once Posey was acquitted of the enumerated charge, [a serious violent offense,] the matter should have been remanded to juvenile court for a decline hearing or sentencing." Posey, 161 Wash.2d at 647 , 167 P.3d 560 .	3	2008–2016
State v. Posey green wash · 2007 2 sentences 2012As we indicated in Posey I, “once Posey was acquitted of the enumerated charge, [a serious violent offense,] the matter should have been remanded to juvenile court for a decline hearing or sentencing.” Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 647 . 2012As we indicated in Posey I, "once Posey was acquitted of the enumerated charge, [a serious violent offense,] the matter should have been remanded to juvenile court for a decline hearing or sentencing." Posey, 161 Wash.2d at 647 , 167 P.3d 560 .	3	2008–2012
Harbert v. State green wash · 1975 2 sentences 1996Although a decline hearing itself is not an adversary proceeding or prosecutorial in nature, In re Harbert, 85 Wn.2d 719, 725 , 538 P.2d 1212 (1975), the filing of an indictment or information charging the defendant commences a criminal action. 1996Although a decline hearing itself is not an adversary proceeding or prosecutorial in nature, In re Harbert, 85 Wn.2d 719, 725 , 538 P.2d 1212 (1975), the filing of an indictment or information charging the defendant commences a criminal action.	3	1996–2007
In Re Boot green wash · 1996 2 sentences 2005Id. at 570, 925 P.2d 964 . 2004See RCW 13.40.110 (explaining normal decline hearing process); Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 557 , 925 P.2d 964 (interpreting what is now RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) and (B)).	3	1999–2005
State v. Maynard green wash · 2015 2 sentences 2016He argues that under State v. Maynard, 183 Wn.2d 253 , 351 P.3d 159 (2015) and State v. Posey. 174 Wn.2d 131, 134 , 272 P.3d 840 (2012) (Posey II), we may remand for sentencing consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 19773 (JJA) without a decline hearing. 2016He argues that under State v. Maynard, 183 Wn.2d 253 , 351 P.3d 159 (2015) and State v. Posey. 174 Wn.2d 131, 134 , 272 P.3d 840 (2012) (Posey II), we may remand for sentencing consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 19773 (JJA) without a decline hearing.	2	2016–2025
State v. Houston-Sconiers green wash · 2017 2 sentences 2021But Houston-Sconiers held “that sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice system, regardless of whether the juvenile is there following a decline hearing or not.” 188 Wn.2d at 21 . 2018In accordance with Miller , we held that "sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice system, regardless of whether the juvenile is there following a decline hearing or not." Id. at 21, 391 P.3d 409 .	2	2018–2021
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 2012Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2012Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.	2	1983–2012
State v. Knippling green wash · 2009 2 sentences 2012Knippling, 166 Wn.2d at 97 ; former RCW 13.40.110(1)(a). 2012See RCW 13.04.030(1)(e); State v. Knippling, 166 Wash.2d 93, 100 , 206 P.3d 332 (2009).	2	2012–2012
State v. Piche green wash · 1968 2 sentences 2007Piche, 74 Wash.2d at 14 , 442 P.2d 632 . 2007Piche, 74 Wn.2d at 14 .	2	2007–2007
State v. MA green washctapp · 2001 2 sentences 2007Rather, "the sole purpose of a decline hearing is to determine whether the best interests of the child and of society would be served by the retention of the juvenile court authority over him or whether the juvenile, under all the circumstances, should be transferred to be tried as an adult." State v. M.A., 106 Wash.App. 493, 503-04 , 23 P.3d 508 (2001) (quotations omitted). 1203 And in making this determination, the juvenile court must consider: (1) the juvenile's past, future, state of mind, and actions; and (2) society's safety, needs, and demands. 2007*App. 493, 503-04 , 23 P.3d 508 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Welfare of Harbert, 85 Wn.2d 719, 725 , 538 P.2d 1212 (1975)).	2	2007–2007
State v. Williams green · 1981 2 sentences 2007Williams, 96 Wash.2d at 223 , 634 P.2d 868 . ¶ 53 Even assuming, without deciding, that the CPS records and the neuropsychological evaluation could not have been discovered before the decline hearing by the exercise of due diligence, they would not change the result of the decline hearing. ¶ 54 Hegney argues that the newly discovered CPS records [13] and neuropsychological evaluation are relevant to refute the juvenile court's findings of fact regarding the following two Kent factors: (1) the sophistication 1206 and maturity of the juvenile and (2) the prospects for adequate protection of the 2007*Williams, 96 Wn.2d at 223 . ¶53 Even assuming, without deciding, that the CPS records and the neuropsychological evaluation could not have been discovered before the decline hearing by the exercise of due diligence, they would not change the result of the decline hearing. ¶54 Hegney argues that the newly discovered CPS records 13 and neuropsychological evaluation are relevant to refute the juvenile court’s findings of fact regarding the following two Kent factors: (1) the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile and (2) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood	2	2007–2007
State v. Linares green washctapp · 1994 2 sentences 2007Harbert, 85 Wash.2d at 728 , 538 P.2d 1212 ; see also State v. Ramer, 151 Wash.2d 106 , 110 n. 1, 86 P.3d 132 (2004); State v. Linares, 75 Wash.App. 404, 407-08 , 880 P.2d 550 (1994). ¶ 39 And Hegney's Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission of hearsay evidence is without merit. 2007Harbert, 85 Wn.2d at 728 ; see also State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106 , 110 n.1, 86 P.3d 132 (2004); State v. Linares, 75 Wn.	2	2007–2007
Clemons v. State green indctapp · 1974 2 sentences 2007Harbert, 85 Wash.2d at 726 , 538 P.2d 1212 (citing Clemons, 317 N.E.2d at 865 n. 10). 2007Harbert, 85 Wn.2d at 726 (citing Clemons, 317 N.E.2d at 865 n.10).	2	2007–2007
State v. M.A. green washctapp · 2001 2 sentences 2007Rather, "the sole purpose of a decline hearing is to determine whether the best interests of the child and of society would be served by the retention of the juvenile court authority over him or whether the juvenile, under all the circumstances, should be transferred to be tried as an adult." State v. M.A., 106 Wash.App. 493, 503-04 , 23 P.3d 508 (2001) (quotations omitted). 1203 And in making this determination, the juvenile court must consider: (1) the juvenile's past, future, state of mind, and actions; and (2) society's safety, needs, and demands. 2007*Rather, “the sole purpose of a decline hearing ‘is to determine whether the best interests of the child and of society would be served by the retention of the juvenile court authority over him or whether the juvenile, under all the circumstances, should be transferred to be tried as an adult.’” State v. M.A., 106 Wn.	2	2007–2007
State v. H.O. green washctapp · 2003 2 sentences 2007H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 552 , 81 P.3d 883 . ¶ 25 Relying on State v. Jacobson, 33 Wash.App. 529 , 656 P.2d 1103 (1982), review denied, 99 Wash.2d 1010 (1983), Division One reasoned that a decline hearing "determined, not ultimate guilt or innocence, but the forum in which guilt or innocence was to be found." H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 553 , 81 P.3d 883 . 2007App. 529 , 656 P.2d 1103 (1982), review denied, 99 Wn.2d 1010 (1983), Division One reasoned that a decline hearing “determined, not ultimate guilt or innocence, but the forum in which guilt or innocence was to be found.” H.O., 119 Wn.	2	2007–2007
State v. Mora green wash · 1999	2	2004–2004
State v. Salavea green wash · 2004	2	2004–2004
State v. Mora green wash · 1999 2 sentences 2004RCW 13.40.110(l)(a); RCW 9A.44.050. 3 After the decline hearing, the juvenile court can waive its exclusive jurisdiction by “transfer [ring] jurisdiction of a particular juvenile to adult criminal court,” RCW 13.04.030(l)(e)(i), “upon a finding that the declination would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public.” RCW 13.40.110(2). 4 In State v. Mora, 138 Wn.2d 43, 49 , 977 P.2d 564 (1999), this court recognized that the statutes contemplate only “automatic decline, based on the nature of the crime, or an actual decline hearing by the juvenile court.” In Mora, as in this case, char 2004RCW 13.40.110(1)(a); RCW 9A.44.050. [3] After the decline hearing, the juvenile court can waive its exclusive jurisdiction by "transfer[ring] jurisdiction of a particular juvenile to adult criminal court" "upon a finding that the declination would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public." RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(i); RCW 13.40.110(2). [4] In State v. Mora, 138 Wash.2d 43, 49 , 977 P.2d 564 (1999), this court recognized that the statutes contemplate only "automatic decline, based on the nature of the crime, or an actual decline hearing by the juvenile court." In Mora, as in this case,	2	2004–2004
State v. Salavea green wash · 2004 2 sentences 2004State v. Salavea, 151 Wn.2d 133, 140 , 86 P.3d 125 (2004). 2004State v. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d 133, 140 , 86 P.3d 125 (2004).	2	2004–2004
State v. Vela green wash · 1983 2 sentences 2004State v. Vela, 100 Wn.2d 636, 641 , 673 P.2d 185 (1983) (explaining that statutes “should receive a sensible construction to effect the legislative intent and, if possible, to avoid unjust and absurd consequences”); see also Q.D., 102 Wn.2d at 22-23 . 2004State v. Vela, 100 Wn.2d 636, 641 , 673 P.2d 185 (1983) (explaining that statutes “should receive a sensible construction to effect the legislative intent and, if possible, to avoid unjust and absurd consequences”); see also Q.D., 102 Wn.2d at 22-23 .	2	2004–2004
State v. Nicholson green washctapp · 1996	2	2003–2003
State v. Bonds green wash · 1982	2	1983–1989
In re Dependency of K.W. green wash · 2022	1	2024–2024
Miller v. Alabama green scotus · 2012	1	2021–2021
In re the Personal Restraint of Swagerty green wash · 2016	1	2019–2019
In Re the Personal Restraint of Cook green wash · 1990	1	2019–2019
State v. Posey green wash · 2012	1	2016–2016
State v. Meridieth neutral washctapp · 2008	1	2016–2016
Dutil v. State green wash · 1980	1	2012–2012
State v. Holland green wash · 1983	1	2012–2012
State v. Knippling green wash · 2009	1	2012–2012
State v. Ho green washctapp · 2003	1	2007–2007
State v. Rosenbaum green washctapp · 1989	1	2003–2003
State v. Corrado green washctapp · 1995	1	1996–1996
Safecard Services, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co. green scotus · 1983	1	1989–1989
State v. Hovland neutral washctapp · 1983	1	1986–1986
State v. Jacks green washctapp · 1980	1	1983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030 (30) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.110 (30) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030 (16) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020 (11) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (9) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.300 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.021 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.140 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.010 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.525 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.050 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 44 (1982–2025) MS 3 (2012–2014) CA 2 (2011–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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