statute has created bar in Alabama

2010Fraud claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. § 6-2-38(1), Ala.Code 1975. “ ‘That statute of limitations is subject to the “saving clause” provided by § 6 — 2—3[, Ala.Code 1975]: “ ‘ “In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.” ’ “Ex parte Seabol, 782 So.2d 212, 216 (Ala.2000).

2009"That statute of limitations is subject to the `saving clause' provided by § 6-2-3[, Ala Code 1975]: "`In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.'" Ex parte Seabol, 782 So.2d 212, 216 (Ala. 2000).

2017Price argues that his claims fall within the savings clause of § 6-2-3, which provides: "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." In DGB, LLC v. Hinds , 55 So.3d at 226 , this Court stated: "This Court has stated: 'When, as in this case, the plaintiff's complaint on its face is barred by the statute of limitations, the complaint must also show that

2016However, this Court has held that § 6-2-3 applies not only to fraud claims, but also “‘to the fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action.’ ” DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So.3d 218, 225-26 (Ala.2010)(quoting Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133 , 194 So. 147, 149 (1940)).

2012See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 457 , 233 So.2d 465, 467 (1970); Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. 92 , 5 So.2d 73 (1941); and Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133, 194 So. 147, 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other grounds, as noted in Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So.2d 635, 638 (Ala.1997); see also Dennis, 887 So.2d at 221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-574(a) applied to make the plaintiffs claim timely).” Jett accordingly a

2012See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 457 , 233 So.2d 465, 467 (1970); Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. 92 , 5 So.2d 73 (1941); and Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133, 194 So. 147, 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other grounds, as noted in Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So.2d 635, 638 (Ala.1997); see also Dennis, 887 So.2d at 221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-574(a) applied to make the plaintiffs claim timely).” Jett accordingly a

2016However, this Court has held that § 6-2-3 applies not only to fraud claims, but also “‘to the fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action.’ ” DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So.3d 218, 225-26 (Ala.2010)(quoting Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133 , 194 So. 147, 149 (1940)).

2016However, this Court has held that § 6-2-3 applies not only to fraud claims, but also “‘to the fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action.’ ” DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So.3d 218, 225-26 (Ala.2010)(quoting Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133 , 194 So. 147, 149 (1940)).

2000Cook, Johnstone, and England, JJ., dissent. 1 Some filings in the record spell these names as "Ray Sherrin" and "Leslie Sherrin." 2 The title company sought the amount of the Sherrins' payoff on the note because the Sherrins were selling the house they had purchased from Reynolds. 3 Reynolds later amended her complaint to add a fraud claim based on the allegation that the defendants had "engaged in the fraudulent practice of `flipping.'" 4 Seenote 6. 5 Section 6-2-3 provides: "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered

2000Notary Public, State of Alabama at Large THIS INSTRUMENT PREPARED BY: American General Finance, Inc. Post Office Box 1183 Daphne, Alabama 36526 NOTES [1] Some filings in the record spell these names as "Ray Sherrin" and "Leslie Sherrin." [2] The title company sought the amount of the Sherrins' payoff on the note because the Sherrins were selling the house they had purchased from Reynolds. [3] Reynolds later amended her complaint to add a fraud claim based on the allegation that the defendants had "engaged in the fraudulent practice of `flipping.'" [4] See note 6. [5] Section 6-2-3 provides: "I

2017See- § 6—2—38(1) (‘All actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.’); § 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975 (‘In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.’).[ 6 ] In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Abston, 822 So.2d 1187, 1194-95 (Ala. 2001), this Cou

2014In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Abston, 822 So.2d 1187, 1194-95 (Ala.2001), this Court set forth the standard for evaluating when a fraud claim accrues and, therefore, when the statutory limitations period commences: “In Foremost [ Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409 (Ala.1997) ], we reinstated important, historical principles regarding the law of fraud in Alabama, including the proper standard for evaluating when the statutory limitations period commences: “ ‘Claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

2012See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 457 , 233 So.2d 465, 467 (1970); Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. 92 , 5 So.2d 73 (1941); and Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133, 194 So. 147, 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other grounds, as noted in Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So.2d 635, 638 (Ala.1997); see also Dennis, 887 So.2d at 221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-574(a) applied to make the plaintiffs claim timely).” Jett accordingly a

2004See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire , 285 Ala. 454 , 457 , 233 So.2d 465 , 467 (1970); Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp , 242 Ala. 92 , 5 So.2d 73 (1941); and Hudson v. Moore , 239 Ala. 130 , 133 , 194 So. 147 , 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other grounds , as noted in Ex parte Sonnier , 707 So.2d 635 , 638 (Ala. 1997); see also Dennis , 887 So.2d at 221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-574 (a) applied to make the plaintiff's claim timely).

1992Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-3, provides: “In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.” This provision has been interpreted as follows: “ ‘Fraud is deemed to have been discovered when the person either actually discovered, or ... ought to or should have discovered, facts which would provoke inquiry by a person of ordinary prudence, and, by simple investigation

1990However, § 6-2-3 provides: "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." This provision has been interpreted as follows: "Fraud is deemed to have been discovered when the person either actually discovered, or when the person ought to or should have discovered, facts which would provoke inquiry by a person of ordinary prudence, and, by simple investigati

1990Construction Co. , 385 So.2d 966 (Ala. 1980); Johnson v. Shenandoah Life Ins.

1987Boros v. Palmer , 472 So.2d 1020 (Ala. 1985); Papastefan v. B L Construction Co. , 385 So.2d 966 (Ala. 1980).

2000As a general rule, they do not. 1 Section 6-2-3 , Ala. Code 1975, reads: "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." We have stated that "[u]nder this provision the general statute of limitations is . . . tolled and the time period for bringing an action extended when there has been a fraudulent concealment by the party guilty of fraud ." Parsons Steel, I

1993Section 6-2-3 provides: "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." "[D]iscovery is made when facts become known `which provoke an inquiry in the mind of a man of reasonable prudence, and which, if followed up, would have led to a discovery of the fraud'; therefore, `fraud is deemed to have been discovered when it ought to have been discovered.'" Ryan

2004With respect to the fraudulent-misrepresentation claims against M B and Panayiotou, § 6-2-3 , Ala. Code 1975, is applicable; that statute provides as follows: "Accrual of claim — Fraud "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." In their initial brief, the Gilmores explain that their fraud claims arose out of the alleged misrepresentations they conten

2004With respect to the fraudulent-misrepresentation claims against M & B and Panayiotou, § 6-2-3, Ala.Code 1975, is applicable; that statute provides as follows: "Accrual of claim — Fraud "In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." In their initial brief, the Gilmores explain that their fraud claims arose out of the alleged misrepresentations they conten

2018Section 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975, provides that, "[i]n actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action." See also Dixon v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A. , 574 So.2d at 708 ("A claim for fraud accrues at the time of 'the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting fraud.' " (quoting Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-3 )).

2017See § 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975 ("In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action."), and *926 Garris v. A & M Forest Consultants, Inc. , 623 So.2d 1035 , 1039 (Ala. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff's claim was "barred by the statute of limitations for a conspiracy action, which is two years; § 6-2-38( l ), Ala. Code 1975, as amended").

2013As stated in Dickinson , however, this Court has held that “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he question of when a party discovered or should have discovered the fraud is generally one for the jury.’ ” ’ Potter v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So.2d 540, 546 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte Seabol, 782 So.2d 212, 216 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Liberty Nat’l Life Ins.

2013Section 6-2-3 states: “In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.” Target Media and Leader acknowledge that when a plaintiff discovered facts that would put it on notice of fraud “can be” a jury question, but they argue that this Court has determined in certain circumstances that it is appropriate to enter a JML as to the discovery issue, citing Dickin

2010This Court has stated: “We have recognized that § 6-2-3 may be ‘applied to other torts not arising in fraud in appropriate cases, and applies to a fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action.’ ” Holdbrooks v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 435 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Ala.1983) (quoting Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 457 , 233 So.2d 465, 467 (Ala.1970)).

2004See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 457 , 233 So.2d 465, 467 (1970); Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. 92 , 5 So.2d 73 (1941); and Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133 , 194 So. 147, 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other grounds, as noted in Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So.2d 635, 638 (Ala.1997); see also Dennis, 887 So.2d at 221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-574(a) applied to make the plaintiff's claim timely).

2004See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire , 285 Ala. 454 , 457 , 233 So.2d 465 , 467 (1970); Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp , 242 Ala. 92 , 5 So.2d 73 (1941); and Hudson v. Moore , 239 Ala. 130 , 133 , 194 So. 147 , 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other grounds , as noted in Ex parte Sonnier , 707 So.2d 635 , 638 (Ala. 1997); see also Dennis , 887 So.2d at 221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-574 (a) applied to make the plaintiff's claim timely).

2000Co. v. Parker, 703 So.2d 307, 308 (Ala.1997).

1992Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-3, provides: “In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action.” This provision has been interpreted as follows: “ ‘Fraud is deemed to have been discovered when the person either actually discovered, or ... ought to or should have discovered, facts which would provoke inquiry by a person of ordinary prudence, and, by simple investigation

1992Stated another way, the test for determining whether the fraud action is timely filed is: “ ‘Whether, within [two] year[s] prior to filing suit, plaintiff had [first acquired] knowledge of such facts, or knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable man to make diligent inquiry which would have enabled plaintiff to discover the fraud alleged....”’ Norman Properties, 557 So.2d at 1268 , quoting State Security Life Ins.