interest of justice standard in District of Columbia

2022Id. 10 “The interest of justice standard calls for a new trial if ‘a fair trial requires that the new witness’ testimony be made available to the jury.” Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C. 1979) (quoting Benton, 188 F.2d at 627 (parentheses omitted)).

2017Cir. 1961); Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C. 1979) (noting that, though the decision whether to grant' a new trial under the interest of justice standard is committed to the trial court’s discretion and should be “temperately ... utilized,” the standard to be applied is “broader in scope than the limitations which have been held applicable where the motion is based on newly discovered evidence” (quoting Benton v. United States, 188 F.2d 625, 627 (1951))).

2022Id. 10 “The interest of justice standard calls for a new trial if ‘a fair trial requires that the new witness’ testimony be made available to the jury.” Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C. 1979) (quoting Benton, 188 F.2d at 627 (parentheses omitted)).

2017Cir. 1961); Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C. 1979) (noting that, though the decision whether to grant' a new trial under the interest of justice standard is committed to the trial court’s discretion and should be “temperately ... utilized,” the standard to be applied is “broader in scope than the limitations which have been held applicable where the motion is based on newly discovered evidence” (quoting Benton v. United States, 188 F.2d 625, 627 (1951))).

2017This is sensible because, to be considered under the interest of justice standard, the motion has to be filed within seven days of the finding of guilt, whereas in the case of a later-filed, newly discovered evidence motion (up to three years), “the passage of time inevitably ripens the finality of the judgment and increases the difficulty of again proving a case.” Brodie, 295 F.2d at 159-60 .

2017This is sensible because, to be considered under the interest of justice standard, the motion has to be filed within seven days of the finding of guilt, whereas in the ease of a later-filed, newly discovered evidence motion (up to three years), “the passage'of time inevitably ripens the finality of the judgment and increases the difficulty of again proving a case.” Brodie, 295 F.2d at 159-60 .

2003R. 33. 9 In applying the interest of justice standard where the defendant claims the right to present additional evidence, the trial judge who heard the trial evidence, sits as the “thirteenth juror” to determine “whether a fair trial requires that the [additional evidence] be made available to the jury.” Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 441 (D.C.1996), citing Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1982) (internal citations omitted). 10 When the convicted defendant claims that he was under duress from or intimidated by his co-defendant — and thus prevented from putting on excul

2003R. 33. [9] In applying the interest of justice standard where the defendant claims the right to present additional evidence, the trial judge who heard the trial evidence, sits as the "thirteenth juror" to determine "whether a fair trial requires that the [additional evidence] be made available to the jury." Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 441 (D.C.1996), citing Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1982) (internal citations omitted). [10] When the convicted defendant claims that he was under duress from or intimidated by his co-defendant — and thus prevented from putting on e

2017See Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C. 1995) (“[Generally the factual record must be capable of supporting the determination reached by the trial court.”). ’ Moreover, unlike under the “newly discovered” evidence standard, delay is not a primary focus under the interest of justice standard.

2017Cf. Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1167 (D.C. 2006) (noting with respect to recantations proffered posttrial, that “if the trial court does not deem the recantation credible, that determination ends the inquiry” under the interest of justice standard).

2017Cf. Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1167 (D.C. 2006) (noting with respect to recantations proffered posttrial, that “if the trial court does not deem the recantation credible, that determination ends the inquiry” under the interest of justice standard).

2017It is associated with a variety of chemical substances . . . .”); Glispie v. State, 779 S.E.2d 767, 771-72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (text messages referring to “molly”; capsules “tested positive for 3, 4- methylenedioxymethcathinone, commonly known as methylone or „Molly‟”). 22 RUIZ, Senior Judge, dissenting: Appellant appeals his conviction, after a bench trial, of possession with intent to distribute MDMC.1 I would remand the case to the Superior Court for further consideration of appellant‟s motion for a new trial on that charge, pursuant to the interest of justice standard, and for clarificatio

2003R. 33. 9 In applying the interest of justice standard where the defendant claims the right to present additional evidence, the trial judge who heard the trial evidence, sits as the “thirteenth juror” to determine “whether a fair trial requires that the [additional evidence] be made available to the jury.” Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 441 (D.C.1996), citing Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1982) (internal citations omitted). 10 When the convicted defendant claims that he was under duress from or intimidated by his co-defendant — and thus prevented from putting on excul

2003R. 33. [9] In applying the interest of justice standard where the defendant claims the right to present additional evidence, the trial judge who heard the trial evidence, sits as the "thirteenth juror" to determine "whether a fair trial requires that the [additional evidence] be made available to the jury." Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 441 (D.C.1996), citing Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1982) (internal citations omitted). [10] When the convicted defendant claims that he was under duress from or intimidated by his co-defendant — and thus prevented from putting on e

1996D.C. 170, 173, 295 F.2d 157, 160 (1961)); (Dwayne) Johnson v. United States, 537 A.2d 555, 562 (D.C.1988).

1996D.C. 170, 173, 295 F.2d 157, 160 (1961)); *441 (Dwayne) Johnson v. United States, 537 A.2d 555, 562 (D.C.1988).