clear and unambiguous waiver in New Jersey

2026"No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights," id. at 444 , but the arbitration clause A-3001-24 10 must explain the party is relinquishing the right to pursue a claim in court, id. at 447 . "[T]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue." Id. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).

2026"No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights," id. at 444 , but the arbitration clause A-3001-24 10 must explain the party is relinquishing the right to pursue a claim in court, id. at 447 . "[T]he point is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue." Id. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001)).

2026Indeed, "[t]he intent to waive need not be stated expressly, provided the circumstances A-2252-24 8 clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference." Knorr, 178 N.J. at 177 .

2025Indeed, the Atalese Court in fashioning the clear and unambiguous test favorably cited the Supreme Court's decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998), which held a "'union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination' must be 'clear and unmistakable.'" Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444 (quoting Wright, 525 U.S. at 80 ); see also Darrington v. Milton Hershey Sch., 958 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining a CBA may waive employees' rights to bring statutory claims in a judicial forum provided such waiver is

2025Indeed, the Atalese Court in fashioning the clear and unambiguous test favorably cited the Supreme Court's decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998), which held a "'union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination' must be 'clear and unmistakable.'" Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444 (quoting Wright, 525 U.S. at 80 ); see also Darrington v. Milton Hershey Sch., 958 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining a CBA may waive employees' rights to bring statutory claims in a judicial forum provided such waiver is

2024He also argues the MAAC is unenforceable because the Union had exclusive authority to negotiate over the arbitrability of plaintiff's employment-related statutory discrimination claims under the United States Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).

2017Id. at 442 , 124 A.3d 257 .

2017Id. at 442 .

2017Id. at 442 , 124 A.3d 257 .

2015They aver the decisions in Atalese and State v. Blann, 217 N.J. 517 (2014), when read in conjunction, stand for the proposition that when parties seek to arbitrate a claim that would otherwise be submitted to a jury, the arbitration agreement must inform the parties of (1) the number of jurors, (2) the parties' rights to choose the jurors, (3) how many jurors would have to agree on a verdict, and (4) who will decide the dispute instead of the jurors.

2014The parties shall bear their own legal fees." See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 44 , 912 A.2d 104 (2006) (stating that "defendant [] may not limit a consumer’s ability to pursue the statutory remedy of attorney's fees and costs when it is available to prevailing parties” and explaining that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,] rather than a judicial forum.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 (stating that under TCCWNA "

2014The parties shall bear their own legal fees." See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 44 , 912 A.2d 104 (2006) (stating that "defendant [] may not limit a consumer’s ability to pursue the statutory remedy of attorney's fees and costs when it is available to prevailing parties” and explaining that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,] rather than a judicial forum.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 (stating that under TCCWNA "

1996In Ochs, supra, 90 N.J. at 112 n. 1, 447 A. 2d 163 , the Supreme Court, citing Bell , made clear that it was not there dealing "with the question of the appropriate starting date of the period of limitations where there has been voluntary compensation for previous medical expenses." To the extent that question may still be regarded as open, we hold that this limitations period is triggered by the last payment made by the carrier on account of the injuries sustained in the original accident.

1996In Ochs, supra, 90 N.J. at 112 n. 1, 447 A. 2d 163 , the Supreme Court, citing Bell , made clear that it was not there dealing "with the question of the appropriate starting date of the period of limitations where there has been voluntary compensation for previous medical expenses." To the extent that question may still be regarded as open, we hold that this limitations period is triggered by the last payment made by the carrier on account of the injuries sustained in the original accident.