5 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1959–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Colucci v. Kar Kare Automotive Group, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Colucci v. Kar Kare Automotive Grp., Inc. , 918 So.2d 431 , 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("To prevail on an action for temporary injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits."). 2019See Colucci v. Kar Kare Automotive Grp., Inc. , 918 So.2d 431 , 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("To prevail on an action for temporary injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits."). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Cridergreen1 sentence2024See Smith, 932 So. 2d at 398 (where a trial court enters an order temporarily modifying custody of a child without affording prior notice to the opposing party based on the existence of an emergency situation, “an opportunity to be heard should be provided to the opposing party as soon thereafter as possible”); Ashby v. Murray, 113 So. 3d 951, 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“[B]efore entering an emergency modification order, every reasonable effort should be made to ensure both parties have an opportunity to be heard. | 1 | 1 |
Reese v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Smith, 932 So. 2d at 398 (where a trial court enters an order temporarily modifying custody of a child without affording prior notice to the opposing party based on the existence of an emergency situation, “an opportunity to be heard should be provided to the opposing party as soon thereafter as possible”); Ashby v. Murray, 113 So. 3d 951, 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“[B]efore entering an emergency modification order, every reasonable effort should be made to ensure both parties have an opportunity to be heard. | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2018See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is subject to interlocutory review); Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190 (“[A]n order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”); Keck, 104 So. 3d at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring) (requesting review for a rule expansion to permit interlocutory review of “the denial of any claim of immunity where the question presented is solely a question of law”). | 1 | 1 |
Keck v. Eminisorgreen1 sentence2018See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is subject to interlocutory review); Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190 (“[A]n order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”); Keck, 104 So. 3d at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring) (requesting review for a rule expansion to permit interlocutory review of “the denial of any claim of immunity where the question presented is solely a question of law”). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen1 sentence2018See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is subject to interlocutory review); Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190 (“[A]n order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”); Keck, 104 So. 3d at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring) (requesting review for a rule expansion to permit interlocutory review of “the denial of any claim of immunity where the question presented is solely a question of law”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bettez v. City of Miami
green
2 sentences2019However, as Appellees point out, the trial court has the inherent authority to reconsider "any of its interlocutory rulings prior to the entry of a final judgment or final order in the cause," see Bettez v. City of Miami , 510 So.2d 1242 , 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and the trial court expressly said that it set the return hearing "to determine whether the temporary injunction should continue." Based on the evidence presented to the trial court, it concluded that the Association and the 2018 Board were unlikely to prevail on the merits. 2019However, as Appellees point out, the trial court has the inherent authority to reconsider "any of its interlocutory rulings prior to the entry of a final judgment or final order in the cause," see Bettez v. City of Miami , 510 So.2d 1242 , 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and the trial court expressly said that it set the return hearing "to determine whether the temporary injunction should continue." Based on the evidence presented to the trial court, it concluded that the Association and the 2018 Board were unlikely to prevail on the merits. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Beach Community Bank v. City of Freeport, Florida
green
1 sentence2018The Court noted only that this court had concluded that “the City’s claim to sovereign immunity rested on a pure question of law.” Beach Community Bank, 150 So. 3d at 1113 . 8 This approach seems more similar to the United States Supreme Court’s approach in Scott and Plumhoff than to the rule stated in Hastings and Reeves. 9 Beach Community Bank appears to signal a return to the principle of permitting appellate review of an order denying immunity when the appellate court can consider the issue without any additional factual determinations (i.e., a question of law). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
The Department of Public Safety v. Koonce
green
2 sentences1959We now hold that the respondent's return to our rule to show cause is insufficient and that the allegations in the suggestion which are admitted by the respondent in his return are sufficient to show the respondent's disqualification and impel the issuance by this court of the rule absolute in prohibition. *223 As the Florida Supreme Court said in the case of the Department of Public Safety v. Koonce, 147 Fla. 616 , 3 So.2d 331, 334 ; "It is settled law in this state that prohibition may be an appropriate remedy to prevent judicial action, when the judge is disqualified, as well as when the ju 1959We now hold that the respondent's return to our rule to show cause is insufficient and that the allegations in the suggestion which are admitted by the respondent in his return are sufficient to show the respondent's disqualification and impel the issuance by this court of the rule absolute in prohibition. *223 As the Florida Supreme Court said in the case of the Department of Public Safety v. Koonce, 147 Fla. 616 , 3 So.2d 331, 334 ; "It is settled law in this state that prohibition may be an appropriate remedy to prevent judicial action, when the judge is disqualified, as well as when the ju | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Dick v. New York Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1959Other facts thus admitted in the respondent's return are that the relator later moved to quash the information filed in Volusia County on the ground that the relator was immunized from criminal prosecution on the bribery charge under Section 932.29, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the respondent denied said motion to quash, whereupon the relator filed in the Supreme Court his suggestion for writ of prohibition against the respondent as Circuit Judge for Volusia County to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case in said county; that a rule nisi was issued by the | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Florida ex rel. Arnold v. Revels
green
1 sentence1959Other facts thus admitted in the respondent's return are that the relator later moved to quash the information filed in Volusia County on the ground that the relator was immunized from criminal prosecution on the bribery charge under Section 932.29, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the respondent denied said motion to quash, whereupon the relator filed in the Supreme Court his suggestion for writ of prohibition against the respondent as Circuit Judge for Volusia County to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case in said county; that a rule nisi was issued by the | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Elgin Corp. v. Atlas Building Products Co.
green
1 sentence1959Other facts thus admitted in the respondent's return are that the relator later moved to quash the information filed in Volusia County on the ground that the relator was immunized from criminal prosecution on the bribery charge under Section 932.29, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the respondent denied said motion to quash, whereupon the relator filed in the Supreme Court his suggestion for writ of prohibition against the respondent as Circuit Judge for Volusia County to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case in said county; that a rule nisi was issued by the | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Davis v. State
neutral
1 sentence1959Other facts thus admitted in the respondent's return are that the relator later moved to quash the information filed in Volusia County on the ground that the relator was immunized from criminal prosecution on the bribery charge under Section 932.29, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the respondent denied said motion to quash, whereupon the relator filed in the Supreme Court his suggestion for writ of prohibition against the respondent as Circuit Judge for Volusia County to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case in said county; that a rule nisi was issued by the | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.