5 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences1992The trial court found no lack of diligence on the part of the State but ordered that the victim of the 1988 robbery be produced by the State for discovery by appellant prior to the commencement of the trial. “ ‘[T]his court has adopted as its primary consideration whether *703 defendant was deprived of any substantial rights under the circumstances. [Cit.] (Cit.) (In this regard we have also) noted “that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions a 1989In another case we reiterated that “ ‘ “the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.” ’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 421, 422 (2) ( 367 SE2d 586 ). | 1 | 2 |
Sweatman v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474 (1) ( 352 SE2d 796 ) (1986), where we approved the trial court’s determination and noted “that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.” The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investigate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was 1987See Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474 (1) ( 352 SE2d 796 ) (1986), where we approved the trial court’s determination and noted “that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.” The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investigate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was | 1 | 2 |
Nolan v. Stategreen1 sentence1989See Flournoy, supra, and Nolan, supra. In this case we can find no persuasive reason why the trial court should not have held this hearing before trial; or why this appellant was required, as if it were a matter of inconsequence, to go through more than half the trial, and what he hoped was the entire presentation of the State’s evidence, without knowing whether he must also defend a perhaps irrelevant matter of such prejudicial nature as this so-called “similar transaction.” In effect, when the State “rested its case” in the trial of the indicted charges, its case was not “rested” at all, for | 1 | 1 |
Roman v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See, e.g., Roman v. State, 185 Ga. App. 32 (1) ( 363 SE2d 329 ) (1987); Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474 (1) ( 352 SE2d 796 ) (1987); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155 (2) ( 351 SE2d 683 ) (1986); Hall, supra at (1b). 1988See, e.g., Roman v. State, 185 Ga. App. 32 (1) ( 363 SE2d 329 ) (1987); Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474 (1) ( 352 SE2d 796 ) (1987); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155 (2) ( 351 SE2d 683 ) (1986); Hall, supra at (1b). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1988Stewart v. State, 180 Ga. App. 266, 267 ( 349 SE2d 18 ) (1986). [Cit.] [In this regard we have also] noted ‘that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.’ The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investi *423 gate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was served here by t 1988Stewart v. State, 180 Ga. App. 266, 267 ( 349 SE2d 18 ) (1986). [Cit.] [In this regard we have also] noted ‘that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.’ The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investi *423 gate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was served here by t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ramsey v. State
green
1 sentence1999(Punctuation omitted.) Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Houston v. State
green
1 sentence1989Under such circumstances, we find no error in holding the hearing on the date of trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, we have conceded that in view of the discretion given in the rule, substantial compliance does not necessitate that the hearing be held “prior to the time at which such case is scheduled for trial” merely because Rule 31.2 says this “generally . . . will” be the procedure (see Houston, supra), but we have also stated that the apparent purpose of the rule is directed to the end of “ ‘ “[resolving] questions as to the admissibility of such evidence . . . before trial” ’ ” (Thomp so | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Flournoy v. State
neutral
2 sentences1989In Flournoy v. State, 186 Ga. App. 774 ( 368 SE2d 538 ), where we held the evidence of similar transaction “certainly was admissible” based on its actual similarity (sales of cocaine to certain persons) to *237 the crime charged (sale of cocaine to the same persons in almost identical circumstances), the appellant complained that the trial court failed to determine its admissibility “before the evidence was presented to the jury,” contrary to the requirements of Superior Court Rule 31.3. 1989In Flournoy v. State, 186 Ga. App. 774 ( 368 SE2d 538 ), where we held the evidence of similar transaction “certainly was admissible” based on its actual similarity (sales of cocaine to certain persons) to *237 the crime charged (sale of cocaine to the same persons in almost identical circumstances), the appellant complained that the trial court failed to determine its admissibility “before the evidence was presented to the jury,” contrary to the requirements of Superior Court Rule 31.3. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Devane v. State
green
1 sentence1988Stewart v. State, 180 Ga. App. 266, 267 ( 349 SE2d 18 ) (1986). [Cit.] [In this regard we have also] noted ‘that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.’ The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investi *423 gate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was served here by t | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Durham v. State
green
2 sentences1988See, e.g., Roman v. State, 185 Ga. App. 32 (1) ( 363 SE2d 329 ) (1987); Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474 (1) ( 352 SE2d 796 ) (1987); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155 (2) ( 351 SE2d 683 ) (1986); Hall, supra at (1b). 1988See, e.g., Roman v. State, 185 Ga. App. 32 (1) ( 363 SE2d 329 ) (1987); Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474 (1) ( 352 SE2d 796 ) (1987); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155 (2) ( 351 SE2d 683 ) (1986); Hall, supra at (1b). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Richardson v. State
green
2 sentences1988Stewart v. State, 180 Ga. App. 266, 267 ( 349 SE2d 18 ) (1986). [Cit.] [In this regard we have also] noted ‘that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.’ The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investi *423 gate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was served here by t 1988Stewart v. State, 180 Ga. App. 266, 267 ( 349 SE2d 18 ) (1986). [Cit.] [In this regard we have also] noted ‘that the apparent purpose of the rule is to provide a criminal defendant with fair and adequate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.’ The purpose of the length of the advance notice is to allow defendant the opportunity to investi *423 gate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses, which purpose was served here by t | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.