proof exceeds standard in Tennessee

2021The line between harmless and reversible error “is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn. 1979).

2017But, “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn. 1979).

2022“The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn. 1986).

2016“The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 404 (quoting State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence, that “the line between. harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d. 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence that “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence, that “the line between. harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d. 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence that “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2010“The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Shirley, 6 S.W.3d at 250 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

2005In most severance cases, “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree . . . by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn. 1979); see also Spicer, 12 S.W.3d at 447 ; Shirley, 6 S.W.3d at 250 .

2012Harmless Error Analysis Appellant cites Gilliland for the proposition that “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d at 273 .

2003This Court has stated on numerous occasions that “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 273-74 (Tenn.2000); see also State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn.1986) (citing Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979)).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence, that “the line between. harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d. 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence that “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence, that “the line between. harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d. 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015It is a well-settled tenet of Tennessee jurisprudence that “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 302-03 (Tenn.2007); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.2004); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tenn.2000); State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn.1999).

2015Considering the whole record, “[t]he more the proof exceeds that which is necessary to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the less likely it becomes that an error affirmatively affected the outcome on its merits.” State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tenn.2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 231 (Tenn.2003)); see also State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 250 (Tenn.1999) (remanding for new trial because, although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction, the evidence was clearly not overwhelming in light of the error a

2003While it is true that under some circumstances there is a danger that a jury may use the evidence of other similar acts to conclude that a defendant has a propensity to commit certain types of crimes, the rationale for Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), it is equally true that the “line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Toliver, – S.W.3d –, 2003 WL 22251400, at *14 ; Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn. 1979).

2015Considering the whole record, “[t]he more the proof exceeds that which is necessary to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the less likely it becomes that an error affirmatively affected the outcome on its merits.” State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tenn.2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 231 (Tenn.2003)); see also State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 250 (Tenn.1999) (remanding for new trial because, although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction, the evidence was clearly not overwhelming in light of the error a

2015Considering the whole record, “[t]he more the proof exceeds that which is necessary to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the less likely it becomes that an error affirmatively affected the outcome on its merits.” State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tenn. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216, 231 (Tenn. 2003)); see also State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 250 (Tenn. 1999) (remanding for new trial because, although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction, the evidence was clearly not overwhelming in light of the erro

2016“The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 404 (quoting State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1998As the supreme court said in State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 680 (1987): “The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Carter was quoted with approval in State v. Suttles, 767 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tenn. 1989), and State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 644 (Tenn. Crim.

2002Because “[t]he line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt,” State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 644 (Tenn. Crim.

1998As the supreme court said in State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 , 107 S.Ct. 910 , 93 L.Ed.2d 680 (1987): “The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Carter was quoted with approval in State v. Suttles, 767 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tenn. 1989), and State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 644 (Tenn. Crim.

2002“The line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict.” Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tenn. 2000); Shirley, 6 S.W.3d at 250 ; Moore, 6 S.W.3d at 242 ; Hallock, 875 S.W.2d at 292 .

1997Rule 52(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[n]o judgment of conviction shall be reserved on appeal except for errors which affirmatively appear to have affected the result of the trial on the merits.” In other words, “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict.” State v. Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 292 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993).

2002Subsequently, however, in State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 726 (Tenn.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 122 S. Ct. 408 (2001), our supreme court clarified that a trial court’s “erroneous failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses is a constitutional error for which the State bears the burden of proving its harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Reconsidering our finding of harmless error in light of Ely, we initially note our supreme court’s prior observation that, generally speaking, “the line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the

2001Because “the goal of harmless error analysis is to identify the actual basis on which the jury rested its verdict,” Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn.1999), we have frequently held that “[t]he line between harmless and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt,” see, e.g., State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 274 (Tenn.2000); State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn.1986) (citing Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn.1979)).

2000P. 52(a); see also State v. Neal, 810 S.W.2d 131, 139 (Tenn.1991) (stating that “in a criminal case non-constitutional error must be shown by the defendant to have probably affected the judgment before reversal is appropriate”) As we have stated many times before, “[t]he line between harmless *274 and prejudicial error is in direct proportion to the degree of the margin by which the proof exceeds the standard required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241, 248 (Tenn.1986) (citing Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 485, 442 (Tenn.1979)).