5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022See Martin v. Williams , 263 Ga. 707, 708 (1) ( 438 SE2d 353 ) (1994) (substance and function, “rather than nomenclature, govern[] pleadings”); L. 2022See Martin v. Williams , 263 Ga. 707, 708 (1) ( 438 SE2d 353 ) (1994) (substance and function, “rather than nomenclature, govern[] pleadings”); L. | 1 | 1 |
Woodruff v. Morgan Countygreen2 sentences2020As a threshold matter, we note that “[a] suit commences only after the filing of a petition and the proper service of process upon the defendant as required and 6 See Woodruff v. Morgan County, 284 Ga. 651, 652 (1) ( 670 SE2d 415 ) (2008) (explaining that in an in rem quiet title action against all the world, “a special master must first be appointed . . . who causes process to issue . . . before a party is required to file a responsive pleading”) (punctuation omitted). 7 Although the court denied Richards’s motion to open default as to the conventional quiet title claim, it did not explicitly 2020As a threshold matter, we note that “[a] suit commences only after the filing of a petition and the proper service of process upon the defendant as required and 6 See Woodruff v. Morgan County, 284 Ga. 651, 652 (1) ( 670 SE2d 415 ) (2008) (explaining that in an in rem quiet title action against all the world, “a special master must first be appointed . . . who causes process to issue . . . before a party is required to file a responsive pleading”) (punctuation omitted). 7 Although the court denied Richards’s motion to open default as to the conventional quiet title claim, it did not explicitly | 1 | 1 |
EarthLink, Inc. v. Eavesgreen2 sentences2014“A motion is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”9 “A moot [issue] is one which seeks to determine 8 See EarthLink, Inc. v. Eaves, 293 Ga. App. 75, 78-79 (4) ( 666 SE2d 420 ) (2008). 9 Carlock v. Kmart Corp., 227 Ga. App. 356, 360-361 ( 489 SE2d 99 ) (1997). 8 an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” 10 An abstract question is “[o]ne which does not rest upon existing facts or rights.”11 In ruling that the motion was moot, the trial court cited the following excerpt f 2014“A motion is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”9 “A moot [issue] is one which seeks to determine 8 See EarthLink, Inc. v. Eaves, 293 Ga. App. 75, 78-79 (4) ( 666 SE2d 420 ) (2008). 9 Carlock v. Kmart Corp., 227 Ga. App. 356, 360-361 ( 489 SE2d 99 ) (1997). 8 an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” 10 An abstract question is “[o]ne which does not rest upon existing facts or rights.”11 In ruling that the motion was moot, the trial court cited the following excerpt f | 1 | 1 |
Unnever v. Stephensgreen2 sentences2014Compare generally Jones v. Isom, 223 Ga. App. 7, 9 (2) ( 477 SE2d 139 ) (1996) (where trial court correctly concluded that appellants failed to serve appellee within the applicable statute of limitation and properly granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, trial court also correctly concluded that appellants’ motion for entry of default and motion for partial summary judgment were rendered moot). 21 Unnever v. Stephens, 142 Ga. App. 787, 789 (2) ( 236 SE2d 886 ) (1977) (citations omitted); see Ellington, supra. 11 case is remanded to the trial court for the court to exercise its discretion and is 2014Compare generally Jones v. Isom, 223 Ga. App. 7, 9 (2) ( 477 SE2d 139 ) (1996) (where trial court correctly concluded that appellants failed to serve appellee within the applicable statute of limitation and properly granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, trial court also correctly concluded that appellants’ motion for entry of default and motion for partial summary judgment were rendered moot). 21 Unnever v. Stephens, 142 Ga. App. 787, 789 (2) ( 236 SE2d 886 ) (1977) (citations omitted); see Ellington, supra. 11 case is remanded to the trial court for the court to exercise its discretion and is | 1 | 1 |
Carlock v. Kmart Corp.green2 sentences2014“A motion is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”9 “A moot [issue] is one which seeks to determine 8 See EarthLink, Inc. v. Eaves, 293 Ga. App. 75, 78-79 (4) ( 666 SE2d 420 ) (2008). 9 Carlock v. Kmart Corp., 227 Ga. App. 356, 360-361 ( 489 SE2d 99 ) (1997). 8 an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” 10 An abstract question is “[o]ne which does not rest upon existing facts or rights.”11 In ruling that the motion was moot, the trial court cited the following excerpt f 2014“A motion is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”9 “A moot [issue] is one which seeks to determine 8 See EarthLink, Inc. v. Eaves, 293 Ga. App. 75, 78-79 (4) ( 666 SE2d 420 ) (2008). 9 Carlock v. Kmart Corp., 227 Ga. App. 356, 360-361 ( 489 SE2d 99 ) (1997). 8 an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights.” 10 An abstract question is “[o]ne which does not rest upon existing facts or rights.”11 In ruling that the motion was moot, the trial court cited the following excerpt f | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Isomgreen2 sentences2014Compare generally Jones v. Isom, 223 Ga. App. 7, 9 (2) ( 477 SE2d 139 ) (1996) (where trial court correctly concluded that appellants failed to serve appellee within the applicable statute of limitation and properly granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, trial court also correctly concluded that appellants’ motion for entry of default and motion for partial summary judgment were rendered moot). 21 Unnever v. Stephens, 142 Ga. App. 787, 789 (2) ( 236 SE2d 886 ) (1977) (citations omitted); see Ellington, supra. 11 case is remanded to the trial court for the court to exercise its discretion and is 2014Compare generally Jones v. Isom, 223 Ga. App. 7, 9 (2) ( 477 SE2d 139 ) (1996) (where trial court correctly concluded that appellants failed to serve appellee within the applicable statute of limitation and properly granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, trial court also correctly concluded that appellants’ motion for entry of default and motion for partial summary judgment were rendered moot). 21 Unnever v. Stephens, 142 Ga. App. 787, 789 (2) ( 236 SE2d 886 ) (1977) (citations omitted); see Ellington, supra. 11 case is remanded to the trial court for the court to exercise its discretion and is | 1 | 1 |
Aycock v. Calkgreen2 sentences2014“Where a ruling of the trial court which is ordinarily one within the sound discretion of the court shows that no discretion was, in fact, exercised, and the judgment rendered is based upon an erroneous view of the law which would preclude the exercise of a discretion, a new trial results.”21 Therefore, the judgment of the trial court denying Richards’s motion as moot is vacated, and the 19 See Aycock v. Calk, 228 Ga. App. 172, 175 ( 491 SE2d 383 ) (1997) (having failed to assert compulsory counterclaim in prior action either in their answer or by properly amended answer with leave of trial co 2014“Where a ruling of the trial court which is ordinarily one within the sound discretion of the court shows that no discretion was, in fact, exercised, and the judgment rendered is based upon an erroneous view of the law which would preclude the exercise of a discretion, a new trial results.”21 Therefore, the judgment of the trial court denying Richards’s motion as moot is vacated, and the 19 See Aycock v. Calk, 228 Ga. App. 172, 175 ( 491 SE2d 383 ) (1997) (having failed to assert compulsory counterclaim in prior action either in their answer or by properly amended answer with leave of trial co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2014“Where a ruling of the trial court which is ordinarily one within the sound discretion of the court shows that no discretion was, in fact, exercised, and the judgment rendered is based upon an erroneous view of the law which would preclude the exercise of a discretion, a new trial results.”21 Therefore, the judgment of the trial court denying Richards’s motion as moot is vacated, and the 19 See Aycock v. Calk, 228 Ga. App. 172, 175 ( 491 SE2d 383 ) (1997) (having failed to assert compulsory counterclaim in prior action either in their answer or by properly amended answer with leave of trial co 2014“Where a ruling of the trial court which is ordinarily one within the sound discretion of the court shows that no discretion was, in fact, exercised, and the judgment rendered is based upon an erroneous view of the law which would preclude the exercise of a discretion, a new trial results.”21 Therefore, the judgment of the trial court denying Richards’s motion as moot is vacated, and the 19 See Aycock v. Calk, 228 Ga. App. 172, 175 ( 491 SE2d 383 ) (1997) (having failed to assert compulsory counterclaim in prior action either in their answer or by properly amended answer with leave of trial co | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Chambers v. State
green
2 sentences1984The trial court held that the State had not “scrupulously adhered” to the stipulation between counsel for Richards and counsel for the State for use of the polygraph examination at trial as required by Chambers v. State, 146 Ga. App. 126 ( 245 SE2d 467 ) (1978). 1984The trial court held that the State had not “scrupulously adhered” to the stipulation between counsel for Richards and counsel for the State for use of the polygraph examination at trial as required by Chambers v. State, 146 Ga. App. 126 ( 245 SE2d 467 ) (1978). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences1983Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and Rolland v. State, 235 Ga. 808 ( 221 SE2d 582 ) (1976), this enumeration is without merit. (5) The court did not err in charging the jury as to flight since Richards' own statement contains the admission that when he left the Spivey trailer he "just wanted to get out of there," that he "ran down the road to my car" and that he "left there in my car and went back to my trailer on Georgia 225." The evidence thus authorized a charge on flight. 1983Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and Rolland v. State, 235 Ga. 808 ( 221 SE2d 582 ) (1976), this enumeration is without merit. (5) The court did not err in charging the jury as to flight since Richards’ own statement contains the admission that when he left the Spivey trailer he “just wanted to get out of there,” that he “ran down the road to my car” and that he “left there in my car and went back to my trailer on Georgia 225.” The evidence thus authorized a charge on flight. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Kellar v. State
green
2 sentences1983Kellar v. State, 226 Ga. 432 ( 175 SE2d 654 ) (1970). (4) Enumerations of error 4, 5, 6, and 7 all deal with the sufficiency of the evidence and the failure of the court to grant Richards' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the state's evidence. 1983Kellar v. State, 226 Ga. 432 ( 175 SE2d 654 ) (1970). (4) Enumerations of error 4, 5, 6, and 7 all deal with the sufficiency of the evidence and the failure of the court to grant Richards' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the state's evidence. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rolland v. State
green
2 sentences1983Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and Rolland v. State, 235 Ga. 808 ( 221 SE2d 582 ) (1976), this enumeration is without merit. (5) The court did not err in charging the jury as to flight since Richards' own statement contains the admission that when he left the Spivey trailer he "just wanted to get out of there," that he "ran down the road to my car" and that he "left there in my car and went back to my trailer on Georgia 225." The evidence thus authorized a charge on flight. 1983Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and Rolland v. State, 235 Ga. 808 ( 221 SE2d 582 ) (1976), this enumeration is without merit. (5) The court did not err in charging the jury as to flight since Richards' own statement contains the admission that when he left the Spivey trailer he "just wanted to get out of there," that he "ran down the road to my car" and that he "left there in my car and went back to my trailer on Georgia 225." The evidence thus authorized a charge on flight. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.