5 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, 267 Ga. App. 264, 265 ( 599 SE2d 211 ) (2004). 2011See Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, 267 Ga. App. 264, 265 ( 599 SE2d 211 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Hemphillgreen1 sentence1970See Morgan v. Hemphill, 214 Ga. 555 , supra; Hamilton v. Daniel, Ga. 650, supra. We therefore conclude that the contract, as to the portions attacked, is not so vague and indefinite as to be unenforceable, and that both the complaints set forth a claim for which relief could be granted. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985Palace contends that the trial court erred in its reliance upon Bell v. Loosier of Albany, 237 Ga. 585 ( 229 SE2d 374 ) (1976), in holding that acceleration by the seller plus filing a complaint against the buyer without deducting unearned interest from the alleged indebtedness constituted a “charge” by the seller in violation of RIHSSA. 1985Palace contends that the trial court erred in its reliance upon Bell v. Loosier of Albany, 237 Ga. 585 ( 229 SE2d 374 ) (1976), in holding that acceleration by the seller plus filing a complaint against the buyer without deducting unearned interest from the alleged indebtedness constituted a “charge” by the seller in violation of RIHSSA. | 3 | 1978–1985 |
Carlos v. Murphy Warehouse Co.
green
2 sentences1985Appellant also enumerates as error the trial court’s ruling that its written notice to the Craigs of default and demand for payment was insufficient to allow recovery of reasonable attorney fees, and relies upon Carlos v. Murphy Warehouse Co., 166 Ga. App. 406 ( 304 SE2d 439 ) (1983), General Elec. 1985Appellant also enumerates as error the trial court’s ruling that its written notice to the Craigs of default and demand for payment was insufficient to allow recovery of reasonable attorney fees, and relies upon Carlos v. Murphy Warehouse Co., 166 Ga. App. 406 ( 304 SE2d 439 ) (1983), General Elec. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gentry v. Hibbler-Barnes Co.
green
2 sentences1978Gentry v. Hibbler-Barnes Company, 113 Ga. App. 1 [ 147 SE2d 31 ] (1966). "(3) The acceleration by the Defendant of the promissory note executed by Plaintiff, said obligation having been accelerated and satisfied in full by the foreclosure sale of March 2, 1976, and the filing of the State Court action C-98588, seeking recovery of an amount which would have been due had the loan not been satisfied by the foreclosure sale and without crediting Plaintiff with the sum of $11,580.47 bid by the Defendant at the foreclosure sale amount to 'charge’ by the seller in violation of the Georgia Second Mort 1978Gentry v. Hibbler-Barnes Company, 113 Ga. App. 1 [ 147 SE2d 31 ] (1966). "(3) The acceleration by the Defendant of the promissory note executed by Plaintiff, said obligation having been accelerated and satisfied in full by the foreclosure sale of March 2, 1976, and the filing of the State Court action C-98588, seeking recovery of an amount which would have been due had the loan not been satisfied by the foreclosure sale and without crediting Plaintiff with the sum of $11,580.47 bid by the Defendant at the foreclosure sale amount to 'charge’ by the seller in violation of the Georgia Second Mort | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Liberty Loan Corp. v. Childs
green
2 sentences1978Gentry v. Hibbler-Barnes Company, 113 Ga. App. 1 [ 147 SE2d 31 ] (1966). "(3) The acceleration by the Defendant of the promissory note executed by Plaintiff, said obligation having been accelerated and satisfied in full by the foreclosure sale of March 2, 1976, and the filing of the State Court action C-98588, seeking recovery of an amount which would have been due had the loan not been satisfied by the foreclosure sale and without crediting Plaintiff with the sum of $11,580.47 bid by the Defendant at the foreclosure sale amount to 'charge’ by the seller in violation of the Georgia Second Mort 1978Gentry v. Hibbler-Barnes Company, 113 Ga. App. 1 [ 147 SE2d 31 ] (1966). "(3) The acceleration by the Defendant of the promissory note executed by Plaintiff, said obligation having been accelerated and satisfied in full by the foreclosure sale of March 2, 1976, and the filing of the State Court action C-98588, seeking recovery of an amount which would have been due had the loan not been satisfied by the foreclosure sale and without crediting Plaintiff with the sum of $11,580.47 bid by the Defendant at the foreclosure sale amount to 'charge’ by the seller in violation of the Georgia Second Mort | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.