suppression motion hearing in Georgia

1993See Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 422-423 ( 370 SE2d 784 ). 2.

1993See Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 422-423 ( 370 SE2d 784 ). 2.

1994See State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123 (1) ( 355 SE2d 646 ) (1987).

1994See State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123 (1) ( 355 SE2d 646 ) (1987).

1994The record before us does not support appellant’s contention that the state at any time conceded that it did not have probable cause to detain appellant; on the contrary, evidence introduced at the suppression motion hearing, as well as at trial, supports the conclusion that even at the time appellant was driven to police headquarters for the purpose of giving his palm prints, Bibb County authorities had “knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information about facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [appellant] had committed an offense. [Cits.]” Borden

1994The record before us does not support appellant’s contention that the state at any time conceded that it did not have probable cause to detain appellant; on the contrary, evidence introduced at the suppression motion hearing, as well as at trial, supports the conclusion that even at the time appellant was driven to police headquarters for the purpose of giving his palm prints, Bibb County authorities had “knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information about facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [appellant] had committed an offense. [Cits.]” Borden

1992See Gregg v. State, 201 Ga. App. 238, 240 (3 b) ( 411 SE2d 65 ); Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 422-423 ( 370 SE2d 784 ). 2.

1992See Gregg v. State, 201 Ga. App. 238, 240 (3 b) ( 411 SE2d 65 ); Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 422-423 ( 370 SE2d 784 ). 2.

1990Further, viewed in its entirety, the suppression motion hearing tran *726 script independently “shows that [during the police-citizen encounter] appellant was not subjected to any duress or coercion, and that he freely, voluntarily and intelligently consented to the search of his person and his personal belongings.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 791 (1) ( 371 SE2d 428 ).

1990Further, viewed in its entirety, the suppression motion hearing tran *726 script independently “shows that [during the police-citizen encounter] appellant was not subjected to any duress or coercion, and that he freely, voluntarily and intelligently consented to the search of his person and his personal belongings.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Santone v. State, 187 Ga. App. 789, 791 (1) ( 371 SE2d 428 ).

1990Neither should the State's silence prevent this court from exercising its right to base its judgment on affirmative evidence of record, particularly as we have long recognized the existence of "a presumption in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the superior court." (Emphasis supplied.) Nalley v. State, 147 Ga. App. 634, 635 ( 249 SE2d 685 ).

1990Neither should the State's silence prevent this court from exercising its right to base its judgment on affirmative evidence of record, particularly as we have long recognized the existence of "a presumption in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the superior court." (Emphasis supplied.) Nalley v. State, 147 Ga. App. 634, 635 ( 249 SE2d 685 ).

1990“Once a voluntary consent is legally obtained, it continues until it either is revoked or withdrawn.” Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga. App. 398, 403 ( 379 SE2d 210 ).

1990“Once a voluntary consent is legally obtained, it continues until it either is revoked or withdrawn.” Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga. App. 398, 403 ( 379 SE2d 210 ).