Fritz test in New Jersey

2026The inquiry here is whether trial counsel's performance satisfies the Strickland/Fritz standard, which requires counsel's representation to be "reasonably competent," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58 , based on an "objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2026To meet the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2026The inquiry here is whether trial counsel's performance satisfies the Strickland/Fritz standard, which requires counsel's representation to be "reasonably competent," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58 , based on an "objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 .

2026The judge considered each of the IAC claims and concluded they lacked merit under the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test.2 2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1986); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).

2026State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 , 280 (2012).

2026State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).

2026Focusing on the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test as we are permitted to do, defendant has not even averred that but for counsel's perceived errors, she would "not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ).

2025Focusing on the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test as we are permitted to do, defendant has not averred that but for counsel's perceived errors, he would "'not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ).

2022In considering the first factor, a PCR judge "should view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant to determine whether a defendant" has "demonstrate[d] the reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the [Strickland/Fritz test]." Id. at 463 .

2021Under the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show "by a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459 ), that: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58 .

2020A-5573-17T1 23 To establish a prima facie claim of IAC, a defendant must satisfy the two- prong Strickland/Fritz test, and "bears the burden of proving" both prongs of an IAC claim "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).

2020To establish a prima facie claim of IAC, a defendant must satisfy the two- prong Strickland/Fritz test, and "bears the burden of proving" both prongs of an IAC claim "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).

2011Even if counsel's failure to advance a Battered Women's Syndrome rationale in mitigation of sentence in fact was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case[,]" Echols, supra, 199 N.J. at 358, 972 A. 2d 1091 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), thereby satisfying the ineffectiveness prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, it plainly cannot be shown that such failure inured to defendant's prejudice, that is, that "there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

2011Even if counsel's failure to advance a Battered Women's Syndrome rationale in mitigation of sentence in fact was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case[,]" Echols, supra, 199 N.J. at 358, 972 A. 2d 1091 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), thereby satisfying the ineffectiveness prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, it plainly cannot be shown that such failure inured to defendant's prejudice, that is, that "there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

2022Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994).

2022Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994).

2022Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994).

2022Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994).

2025State v. Gaither, 396 N.J.

2025See State v. Gaither, 396 N.J.

2024We are not convinced that defendant has presented a prima facie showing of either prong of the Strickland/Fritz standard. "[I]n order to establish a prima facie claim, [plaintiff] must do more than make bald assertions that he was A-3085-21 9 denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

2021To demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant "must do more than make bald assertions[,] . . . [and] must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

2026Focusing on the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test as we are permitted to do, defendant has not even averred that but for counsel's perceived errors, she would "not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ).

2025Focusing on the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test as we are permitted to do, defendant has not averred that but for counsel's perceived errors, he would "'not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ).

2024Indeed, the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test "is an exacting standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

2024We find no error, much less plain error, warranting reversal. [Flagler, slip op. 40-41.] A-2180-20 19 If there was no error, then there can be no prejudice to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test because "[t]hat second prong . . . is an exacting standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

2024State v. Guzman, 313 N.J.

2021State v. Guzman, 313 N.J.

2024Indeed, the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test "is an exacting standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

2024We find no error, much less plain error, warranting reversal. [Flagler, slip op. 40-41.] A-2180-20 19 If there was no error, then there can be no prejudice to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test because "[t]hat second prong . . . is an exacting standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

2022Super. 351, 371 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).

2022Super. at 365; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 ; Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 380 (same).

2021In order to establish the Strickland prejudice prong to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, in addition to showing "there is a reasonable probability that, but for A-0410-19 6 See State v. Brewster, 429 N.J.

2021In order to establish the Strickland prejudice prong to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, in addition to showing "there is a reasonable probability that, but for A-0410-19 6 See State v. Brewster, 429 N.J.

2002The Strickland/Fritz standard demands no less. [Id. at 356, 561 A.2d 1082 .] In State v. Marshall, the Court differentiated the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard when evaluating counsel’s performance at the penalty phase. 148 N.J. 89, 250 , 690 A.2d 1 (1997) (Marshall III)- We concluded that a capital defendant may demonstrate prejudice by showing a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially.” Ibid.

2002The Strickland/Fritz standard demands no less. [Id. at 356, 561 A.2d 1082 .] In State v. Marshall, the Court differentiated the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard when evaluating counsel’s performance at the penalty phase. 148 N.J. 89, 250 , 690 A.2d 1 (1997) (Marshall III)- We concluded that a capital defendant may demonstrate prejudice by showing a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially.” Ibid.

2026Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 ; State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013); Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 .

2023We affirm because the PCR court's amplified decision on remand is "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013).

2025During pretrial investigation, counsel "has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary[,]" and counsel's failure to do so will "render the lawyer's performance deficient." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013) (quoting Chew, 179 N.J. at 217 ). "[W]hen a petitioner claims [a] trial attorney inadequately investigated [the] case, [to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective counsel the petitioner] must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based u

2025See Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (citing R. 3:22-10(b)).

2025A-3787-23 14 Nor has defendant shown by competent evidence that "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J.

2022More importantly, as to the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, "to obtain relief from a conviction following a plea, 'a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.'" State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J.

2004The Strickland/Fritz standard demands no less. [Id. at 356, 561 A. 2d 1082.] While the prejudice prong analysis normally conducted under Strickland applies to a defendant's guilt phase representation, a less demanding prejudice-prong standard is used for the penalty phase.

2004The Strickland/Fritz standard demands no less. [Id. at 356, 561 A.2d 1082 .] While the prejudice prong analysis normally conducted under Strickland applies to a defendant’s guilt phase representation, a less demanding prejudice-prong standard is used for the penalty phase.

2021In order to establish the Strickland/Fritz test to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, "a defendant must show that (i) counsel's assistance was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases'; and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez- A-2823-19 9 Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457 ).

2009As the majority readily notes, there is a second prong to the Strickland/Fritz test, that is, the "prejudice prong." Ante at 142, 975 A. 2d at 426 .

2026See State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 (2015) (to establish prejudice under the Strickland/Fritz analysis, a defendant must demonstrate that but for counsel's deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different).

2024State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578-79 (2015).

2025The Strickland/Fritz framework requires the following: First, [the defendant] must demonstrate that counsel made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." An attorney's representation is deficient when it "[falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness." Second, a defendant "must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." A defendant will be prejudiced when counsel's errors are sufficiently serious to deny [a defendant] "a fair trial." The prejudice standard is met if there is "a reasonable pr

2021"The Strickland/Fritz standard may not require appellate counsel to have the foresight to raise a cutting-edge issue or anticipate a change in the law not evident in existing jurisprudence." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 616 (2014); see also Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 793 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating "[a]ppellate counsel must be competent, not clairvoyant").

1997Except for a brief reference in State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 626 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990), this is the first case in which we have occasion comprehensively to discuss and apply the Strickland/Fritz standard to the penalty phase of a capital case.

1997Except for a brief reference in State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 626 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990), this is the first case in which we have occasion comprehensively to discuss and apply the Strickland/Fritz standard to the penalty phase of a capital case.

2026State v. Morrison extends the Strickland/Fritz standard to the assessment of claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. 215 N.J.

2022State v. Morrison, 215 N.J.

2009Before abolition of the death penalty, L. 2007, c. 204, the Strickland/Fritz standard applied to capital trials, albeit "with some adjustment." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 , 844 A. 2d 487 (2004).

2009Before abolition of the death penalty, L. 2007, c. 204, the Strickland/Fritz standard applied to capital trials, albeit "with some adjustment." State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 , 844 A. 2d 487 (2004).

2025Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey) (Strickland/Fritz test). 3 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).

2020The judge also addressed defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea by considering the factors enunciated by the Court in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).5 Judge Shanahan noted that defendant "present[ed] no claim of innocence." The judge concluded that the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawing did not justify relief, because defendant delayed asserting prejudice from his PSL sentence for years.