exceptional sentence factors in Washington

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). "'[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range."' !d. (quoting Ha 'mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). “ £[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.’ ” Id. (quoting Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2021State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2016State v. Ha'mim. 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), citing State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717, 725 , 888 P.2d 1169 (1995).

2021In our review of the legal adequacy of an aggravating factor, we employ a two-part test: “(1) The trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors the Legislature necessarily considered in establishing the standard sentencing range; and (2) the aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Jennings, 106 Wn.

2018To determine whether an aggravating factor supports departure from the standard sentencing range, we apply a two-part test: “(1) The trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors the Legislature necessarily considered in establishing the standard sentencing range; and (2) the aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” Jennings, 106 Wn.

2016State v. Ha'mim. 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), citing State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717, 725 , 888 P.2d 1169 (1995).

2016State v. Ha'mim. 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), citing State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717, 725 , 888 P.2d 1169 (1995).

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). "'[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range."' !d. (quoting Ha 'mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). “ £[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.’ ” Id. (quoting Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). "'[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range."' !d. (quoting Ha 'mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). “ £[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.’ ” Id. (quoting Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2002State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 649 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). “[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range; and second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the charged offense from others in the same category.” Id.

2002State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 649 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). “[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range; and second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the charged offense from others in the same category.” Id.

2002State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 649 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). “[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range; and second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the charged offense from others in the same category.” Id.

2002State v. Ferguson, 142 Wash.2d 631, 649 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). [ F ] irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range; and second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the charged offense from others in the same category.

1992What this means, however, is that in reviewing the legal adequacy of an aggravating factor "a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range." State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991) (citing Nordby, at 518).

1992What this means, however, is that in reviewing the legal adequacy of an aggravating factor "a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range." State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991) (citing Nordby, at 518).

2007"We are hesitant to affirm an exceptional sentence where the standard range has been incorrectly calculated because of the great likelihood that the judge relied, at least in part, on the incorrect standard ranges in his calculus." Parker, 132 Wash.2d at 190 , 937 P.2d 575 (cited in State v. Ford, 137 Wash.2d 472, 485 , 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). [6] Kilgore cites no authority to support his related argument that the trial court was obligated to resentence him on remand because our reduction of his total convictions from seven to five would likely have had an impact.

2007After citing the passage from Roche , the Supreme Court added in Parker that, because the sentencing court must correctly calculate the standard range before imposing an exceptional sentence, failure to do so is legal error subject to review. 132 Wn.2d at 189 . ‘We are hesitant to affirm an exceptional sentence where the standard range has been incorrectly calculated because of the great likelihood that the judge relied, at least in part, on the incorrect standard ranges in his calculus.” Parker, 132 Wn.2d at 190 (quoted in State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 485 , 973 P.2d 452 (1999)).

2007"We are hesitant to affirm an exceptional sentence where the standard range has been incorrectly calculated because of the great likelihood that the judge relied, at least in part, on the incorrect standard ranges in his calculus." Parker, 132 Wash.2d at 190 , 937 P.2d 575 (cited in State v. Ford, 137 Wash.2d 472, 485 , 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). [6] Kilgore cites no authority to support his related argument that the trial court was obligated to resentence him on remand because our reduction of his total convictions from seven to five would likely have had an impact.

2007After citing the passage from Roche , the Supreme Court added in Parker that, because the sentencing court must correctly calculate the standard range before imposing an exceptional sentence, failure to do so is legal error subject to review. 132 Wn.2d at 189 . ‘We are hesitant to affirm an exceptional sentence where the standard range has been incorrectly calculated because of the great likelihood that the judge relied, at least in part, on the incorrect standard ranges in his calculus.” Parker, 132 Wn.2d at 190 (quoted in State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 485 , 973 P.2d 452 (1999)).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2020Former RCW 9.94A.120(3); State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001), overruled by State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 131 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2020Former RCW 9.94A.120(3); State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001), overruled by State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 131 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2004State v. Borg, 145 Wash.2d 329, 336 , 36 P.3d 546 (2001).

2003State v. Borg, 145 Wn.2d 329, 336 , 36 P.3d 546 (2001).

2004State v. Borg, 145 Wash.2d 329, 336 , 36 P.3d 546 (2001).

2003State v. Borg, 145 Wn.2d 329, 336 , 36 P.3d 546 (2001).

2021State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2021State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2013Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d at 34 .

2006Next, they argue that the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence in violation of their constitutional right to a jury trial, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).

2006Next, they argue that the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence in violation of their constitutional right to a jury trial, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).

2005Kennedy and Appelwick, JJ., concur. 117 Wn.

2001Affirming such would uphold a sentence which the sentencing judge might not have imposed given correct information and would defeat the purpose of the [Sentencing Reform Act]. *437 We note the Court of Appeals took the opposite approach in State v. Thomas, 57 Wash.App. 403, 411 , 788 P.2d 24 ("erroneous offender score did not affect the exceptional sentence"), review denied, 115 Wash.2d 1003 , [ 795 P.2d 1155 ], (1990); State v. Altum, 47 Wash.App. 495 , 735 P.2d 1356 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1024 (1987); and State v. Hernandez, 48 Wash.App. 751, 754 , 740 P.2d 374 , review denied, 109 Was

2001Affirming such would uphold a sentence which the sentencing judge might not have imposed given correct information and would defeat the purpose of the [Sentencing Reform Act]. *437 We note the Court of Appeals took the opposite approach in State v. Thomas, 57 Wash.App. 403, 411 , 788 P.2d 24 ("erroneous offender score did not affect the exceptional sentence"), review denied, 115 Wash.2d 1003 , [ 795 P.2d 1155 ], (1990); State v. Altum, 47 Wash.App. 495 , 735 P.2d 1356 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1024 (1987); and State v. Hernandez, 48 Wash.App. 751, 754 , 740 P.2d 374 , review denied, 109 Was

2001Affirming such would uphold a sentence which the sentencing judge might not have imposed given correct information and would defeat the purpose of the [Sentencing Reform Act]. *437 We note the Court of Appeals took the opposite approach in State v. Thomas, 57 Wash.App. 403, 411 , 788 P.2d 24 ("erroneous offender score did not affect the exceptional sentence"), review denied, 115 Wash.2d 1003 , [ 795 P.2d 1155 ], (1990); State v. Altum, 47 Wash.App. 495 , 735 P.2d 1356 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1024 (1987); and State v. Hernandez, 48 Wash.App. 751, 754 , 740 P.2d 374 , review denied, 109 Was

2001Affirming such would uphold a sentence which the sentencing judge might not have imposed given correct information and would defeat the purpose of the [Sentencing Reform Act]. *437 We note the Court of Appeals took the opposite approach in State v. Thomas, 57 Wash.App. 403, 411 , 788 P.2d 24 ("erroneous offender score did not affect the exceptional sentence"), review denied, 115 Wash.2d 1003 , [ 795 P.2d 1155 ], (1990); State v. Altum, 47 Wash.App. 495 , 735 P.2d 1356 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1024 (1987); and State v. Hernandez, 48 Wash.App. 751, 754 , 740 P.2d 374 , review denied, 109 Was

2001Although the Thomas court concluded that "the erroneous offender score did not affect the exceptional sentence," Thomas, 57 Wash. App. at 411 , 788 P.2d 24 , the Supreme Court deemed this conclusion improper: We are hesitant to affirm an exceptional sentence where the standard range has been incorrectly calculated because of the great likelihood that the judge relied, at least in part, on the incorrect standard ranges in his calculus.

2001Although the Thomas court concluded that "the erroneous offender score did not affect the exceptional sentence," Thomas, 57 Wash. App. at 411 , 788 P.2d 24 , the Supreme Court deemed this conclusion improper: We are hesitant to affirm an exceptional sentence where the standard range has been incorrectly calculated because of the great likelihood that the judge relied, at least in part, on the incorrect standard ranges in his calculus.