Legislature in establishing standard in Washington

2022In other words, the destructive and foreseeable impact warranting an exceptional sentence must not be inherent in the crime itself and therefore must not have been “necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.” State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991); State v. Mulligan, 87 Wn.

2022In other words, the destructive and foreseeable impact warranting an exceptional sentence must not be inherent in the crime itself and therefore must not have been “necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.” State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991); State v. Mulligan, 87 Wn.

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). "'[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range."' !d. (quoting Ha 'mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2015State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 95 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). “ £[F]irst, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.’ ” Id. (quoting Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 840 ).

2006"To justify an exceptional sentence, the cruelty must go beyond that normally associated with the commission of the charged offense or inherent in the elements of the offense—elements of the crime that were already contemplated by the legislature in establishing the standard range." Tili, 148 Wash.2d at 369 , 60 P.3d 1192 . ¶ 13 Two cases held to involve deliberate cruelty are illustrative here.

2006“To justify an exceptional sentence, the cruelty must go beyond that normally associated with the commission of the charged offense or inherent in the elements of the offense — elements of the crime that were already contemplated by the legislature in establishing the standard range.” Tili, 148 Wn.2d at 369 . ¶13 Two cases held to involve deliberate cruelty are illustrative here.

1997An aggravating factor is legally sufficient to justify the imposition of an exceptional sentence as long as the factor was not necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard range, and as long as the factor is " 'sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.’ ” Scott, 72 Wn.

1994An aggravating factor is legally adequate to justify a sentence outside of the standard range as long as the aggravating factor was not necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard range, and as long as the asserted aggravating factor is "sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” Scott, 72 Wn.

2005Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d at 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (citing State v. Alexander, 125 Wash.2d 717, 725 , 888 P.2d 1169 (1995)). ¶ 14 Looking to the first prong of the above Ha'mim test, we have previously concluded that the purposes of the SRA were factors necessarily considered by the legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.

2005The trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence based on the stated purposes of the SRA, impermissibly relied on "factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range." Id.

2020State v. Tili, 148 Wn.2d 350, 369 , 60 P.3d 1192 (2003) (internal citations omitted).

2006"To justify an exceptional sentence, the cruelty must go beyond that normally associated with the commission of the charged offense or inherent in the elements of the offense—elements of the crime that were already contemplated by the legislature in establishing the standard range." Tili, 148 Wash.2d at 369 , 60 P.3d 1192 . ¶ 13 Two cases held to involve deliberate cruelty are illustrative here.

2005State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 409 , 38 P.3d 355 (2002).

2005State v. Fowler, 145 Wash.2d 400, 409 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002).

2022In other words, the destructive and foreseeable impact warranting an exceptional sentence must not be inherent in the crime itself and therefore must not have been “necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range.” State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991); State v. Mulligan, 87 Wn.

2022App. 261, 265 , 941 P.2d 694 (1997).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2021State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2021State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2021Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 140 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005).

2013State v. Tili, 148 Wn. d 350, 369, 60 P. d 1192 (2003).In State v. Pockert, 53 2 3 Wn.

2005State v. Fowler, 145 Wash.2d 400, 409 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002).

2005App. 93 , 853 P.2d 457 (1993), rev’d, 123 Wn.2d 250 , 866 P.2d 1257 (1994) (per curiam), as authority for reliance on the purposes of the SRA in support of an exceptional sentence. 12 However, given our reversal of the Court of Appeals ruling in that case, coupled with the cases subsequent to it discussed above, the Court of Appeals ruling in Friederich-Tibbets lacks any precedential value in this context. ¶26 In fact, we had previously concluded in Pascal that the purposes of the SRA were factors necessarily considered by the legislature in establishing the standard sentence range and as such

2005App. 93 , 853 P.2d 457 (1993), rev’d, 123 Wn.2d 250 , 866 P.2d 1257 (1994) (per curiam), as authority for reliance on the purposes of the SRA in support of an exceptional sentence. 12 However, given our reversal of the Court of Appeals ruling in that case, coupled with the cases subsequent to it discussed above, the Court of Appeals ruling in Friederich-Tibbets lacks any precedential value in this context. ¶26 In fact, we had previously concluded in Pascal that the purposes of the SRA were factors necessarily considered by the legislature in establishing the standard sentence range and as such

2005App. 93 , 853 P.2d 457 (1993), rev’d, 123 Wn.2d 250 , 866 P.2d 1257 (1994) (per curiam), as authority for reliance on the purposes of the SRA in support of an exceptional sentence. 12 However, given our reversal of the Court of Appeals ruling in that case, coupled with the cases subsequent to it discussed above, the Court of Appeals ruling in Friederich-Tibbets lacks any precedential value in this context. ¶26 In fact, we had previously concluded in Pascal that the purposes of the SRA were factors necessarily considered by the legislature in establishing the standard sentence range and as such

2005Id. (emphasis added) (citing RCW 9.94A.010(5), (6) and Pascal, 108 Wash.2d at 137 , 736 P.2d 1065 ). ¶ 17 Finally, in 2002 we reaffirmed our holding in Pascal that the purposes of the SRA were factors considered by the legislature in establishing the standard ranges.

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente