5 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1992IX, §2), a “classification must be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and that the classification must bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” (Emphasis omitted.) The Searle court specifically rejected the usual equal protection standard which provided that the party attacking a tax classification must “negate every conceivable basis which might support it.” (Emphasis omitted.) (Searle, 117 Ill. 2d at 468 .) Arguing that the language of the uniformity provisions of sections 2 and 4(b) of arti 1992IX, §2), a “classification must be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and that the classification must bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” (Emphasis omitted.) The Searle court specifically rejected the usual equal protection standard which provided that the party attacking a tax classification must “negate every conceivable basis which might support it.” (Emphasis omitted.) (Searle, 117 Ill. 2d at 468 .) Arguing that the language of the uniformity provisions of sections 2 and 4(b) of arti | 3 | 4 |
Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authoritygreen2 sentences2020Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 248 (1992) (citing Illinois Gasoline Dealers Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 119 Ill. 2d 391, 403 (1988)). ¶ 30 To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must pass the “Searle test,” i.e., it must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. 2020Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 248 (1992) (citing Illinois Gasoline Dealers Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 119 Ill. 2d 391, 403 (1988)). 10 No. 1-19-1680 ¶ 30 To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must pass the “Searle test,” i.e., it must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. | 2 | 2 |
Illinois Gasoline Dealers Ass'n v. City of Chicagogreen2 sentences2020Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 248 (1992) (citing Illinois Gasoline Dealers Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 119 Ill. 2d 391, 403 (1988)). ¶ 30 To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must pass the “Searle test,” i.e., it must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. 2020Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 248 (1992) (citing Illinois Gasoline Dealers Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 119 Ill. 2d 391, 403 (1988)). 10 No. 1-19-1680 ¶ 30 To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must pass the “Searle test,” i.e., it must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder
green
2 sentences2020Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 146 . ¶ 31 In this case, the Act meets both prongs of the Searle test. 2020Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 146 . ¶ 31 In this case, the Act meets both prongs of the Searle test. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation
green
2 sentences1979A jury was entitled to conclude that Enovid does produce such disorders and that “the cumulative effect of [Searle’s warnings] was a definite assurance that no risk of thrombotic disorders was connected to the use of [Enovid], contrary to the defendant’s actual [or constructive] knowledge.” McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1974), 270 Ore. 375 , 528 P.2d 522, 535 . 1979A jury was entitled to conclude that Enovid does produce such disorders and that “the cumulative effect of [Searle’s warnings] was a definite assurance that no risk of thrombotic disorders was connected to the use of [Enovid], contrary to the defendant’s actual [or constructive] knowledge.” McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1974), 270 Ore. 375 , 528 P.2d 522, 535 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Company
green
1 sentence1979App. 1968), 437 S.W.2d 15 .) The adequacy of Searle’s warnings concerning Enovid is measured, therefore, not only by what is stated, but also by the manner in which it is stated. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.