self-critical analysis in Illinois

2015See Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 69 (2001). ¶7 SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE ¶8 The self-critical analysis privilege appears to have originated in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), a medical malpractice case.

2015See Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 69 (2001). ¶7 SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE ¶8 The self-critical analysis privilege appears to have originated in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), a medical malpractice case.

2015See id. at 527 . ¶ 26 Having acknowledged the rationale underpinning the deliberative process privilege, this court nonetheless hastened to add that “privileges are strongly disfavored because they operate to ‘exclude relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of legal proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1983)).

2015The appellate court reiterated the general principle that “privileges are disfavored because they are in derogation of the search for truth” and quoted from -6- Birkett, where this court stated that “ ‘the extension of an existing privilege or establishment of a new one is a matter best deferred to the legislature.’ ” Id. at 153 (quoting Birkett, 184 Ill. 2d at 528 ).

2015Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069 , 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This court has not recognized this novel privilege.”); Medina v. County of San Diego, No. 08cv1252, 2014 WL 4793026 , at *7 (S.D.

2015Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069 , 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This court has not recognized this novel privilege.”); Medina v. County of San Diego, No. 08cv1252, 2014 WL 4793026 , at *7 (S.D.

2015Cal. Sept. 25, 2014) (“The Ninth Circuit does not recognize the self-critical analysis privilege.”); Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2003) (referring to the self-critical analysis privilege as “a privilege never recognized in this circuit”).

2015Cal. Sept. 25, 2014) (“The Ninth Circuit does not recognize the self-critical analysis privilege.”); Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2003) (referring to the self-critical analysis privilege as “a privilege never recognized in this circuit”).

2015See generally Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342 , 351 n.12 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The self-critical analysis privilege has never been recognized by this Court and we see no reason to recognize it now.”); Williams, 2014 WL 5697204 , at *3 (rejecting a contention that “there is a ‘developing trend’ in the federal courts toward *** recognition” of the privilege); Granberry v. Jet Blue Airways, 228 F.R.D. 647, 650 (N.D.

2015See generally Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342 , 351 n.12 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The self-critical analysis privilege has never been recognized by this Court and we see no reason to recognize it now.”); Williams, 2014 WL 5697204 , at *3 (rejecting a contention that “there is a ‘developing trend’ in the federal courts toward *** recognition” of the privilege); Granberry v. Jet Blue Airways, 228 -4- F.R.D. 647, 650 (N.D.

2015See Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 69 (2001). ¶7 SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE ¶8 The self-critical analysis privilege appears to have originated in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), a medical malpractice case.

2015Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 27 ; Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71 . ¶ 14 Our appellate court has been asked to consider recognition of the self-critical analysis privilege in at least three different contexts, including the case now before us: People v. Campobello, 348 Ill.

2015The appellate court first acknowledged that “[s]ome federal courts” have recognized a self-critical analysis privilege, which, “on the federal level is created only by case law and not by federal statutes or specific court rules.” -5- 2013 IL App (1st) 131152, ¶¶ 1, 11 .

2015The appellate court first acknowledged that “[s]ome federal courts” have recognized a self-critical analysis privilege, which, “on the federal level is created only by case law and not by federal statutes or specific court rules.” 2013 IL App (1st) 131152, ¶¶ 1, 11 .

2015See id. at 527 . ¶ 26 Having acknowledged the rationale underpinning the deliberative process privilege, this court nonetheless hastened to add that “privileges are strongly disfavored because they operate to ‘exclude relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of legal proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1983)).

2015See id. at 527 . ¶ 26 Having acknowledged the rationale underpinning the deliberative process privilege, this court nonetheless hastened to add that “privileges are strongly disfavored because they operate to ‘exclude relevant evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of legal proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1983)).

2010See Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 270, 272-73 (N.D.

2010See Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 270, 272-73 (N.D.Ill.2000).

2015The defendants, including the police department, represented that the purpose of the survey was to assess the department’s performance, and was thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to “the self-critical analysis privilege as developed under the federal common law.” Rockford, 398 Ill.

2015The circuit court rejected that contention, ruling that “the survey was not exempt from disclosure either as an audit or pursuant to the self-critical analysis privilege, or any other privilege.” Id. at 149 . ¶ 18 On appeal, defendants argued multiple bases for exemption of records requested, among them, applicability of a self-critical analysis privilege to the survey sought in discovery.

2010Citing Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 157 Ill. 2d 29, 40 (1993), defendants argue that the self-critical analysis privilege embodied in the Medical Studies Act ensures that “members of the medical profession will effectively engage in self-evaluation of their peers in the interest of advancing the quality of health care.” Defendants urge, by analogy to the Medical Studies Act, that we should likewise create a self-critical analysis privilege that applies to the FOIA.

2010Citing Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 157 Ill.2d 29, 40 , 191 Ill.Dec. 1 , 623 N.E.2d 246 (1993), defendants argue that the self-critical analysis privilege embodied in the Medical Studies Act ensures that "members of the medical profession will effectively engage in self-evaluation of their peers in the interest of advancing the quality of health care." Defendants urge, by analogy to the Medical Studies Act, that we should likewise create a self-critical analysis privilege that applies to the FOIA.

2015See generally Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342 , 351 n.12 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The self-critical analysis privilege has never been recognized by this Court and we see no reason to recognize it now.”); Williams, 2014 WL 5697204 , at *3 (rejecting a contention that “there is a ‘developing trend’ in the federal courts toward *** recognition” of the privilege); Granberry v. Jet Blue Airways, 228 F.R.D. 647, 650 (N.D.